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A Letter from the Editor 
 
 Historia, the peer-reviewed student history journal of 
Eastern Illinois University and the Epsilon Mu Chapter of Phi Alpha 
Theta, began publication in 1992 and continues to provide a strong 
tradition of exemplary academic excellence.  This collection of essays 
represents the continued achievements of undergraduate and graduate 
students.  Ranging across several disciplines, it is my belief that historical 
scholarship inspires great interest and solid research within a range of 
academic disciplines.  This scholarship has left an indelible mark in the 
historical profession as well, which continues to expand its boundaries 
through the integration of interdisciplinary approaches.  In this spirit, all of 
our authors are to be congratulated on making our selection process a 
difficult and thought-provoking task. 
 This year’s volume contains articles of a vast temporal and 
chronological scope.  From the jungles of Mesoamerica, to the shores of 
Algiers, to the crowded pubs of Ireland, we find a number of interesting 
analyses of sporting events and nationalist movements alike.  From 
turbulent Latin American rebellions, Christian missionaries in Korea, and 
slanderous political cartoons in the Chicago Times, we can appreciate the 
breadth and depth of this journal’s impressive range.  We have also 
included four book reviews that cover each author’s primary field of 
research.  We hope that the presence of reviews will establish a tradition 
and that will be followed in future volumes of Historia.   
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 I would like to extend my gratitude to Dr. Joshua Birk, who will 
be leaving Eastern for Smith College in the fall.  His time, effort, and 
patience as our adviser not only helped make this journal a reality, but has 
left his mark in a short time as an exemplary teacher and colleague to our 
department.  I would like to thank the patience and participation of the 
editorial board, which was at times, a difficult task to select nine articles.  
Finally, I would like to thank the faculty of the history department, whose 
leadership and guidance continue to promote the best scholarly work 
possible.  I hope this year’s journal continues what has become a solid 
tradition for the history department and the university. 
 
Chad R. Cussen, Editor           
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Oppression in the Defense of Liberty: Abraham Lincoln and Freedom 
of the Press during the Civil War 
 
Brandon Johnson 
Brandon Johnson is an undergraduate student in Business from New Lenox, IL.  He wrote this paper 
for Dr. Leslie R. Hyder in EIU 4158, Freedom of Expression: Dissent, Hate, and Heresy, during the 
spring 2009. 
 
The founding fathers of the United States of America knew that the value of 
free press brought to a democratic society was both immeasurable and 
undeniable.  Without a means to disseminate relevant political and social 
information to the voting public, the power of elected officials would likely 
run unchecked and threaten to destroy the historic work of the 
Constitutional Convention.  For that very reason, freedom of the press was 
fused into the bedrock supporting the nation by enshrining it in the first 
amendment in the Constitution’s Bill of Rights.   
 Despite its prominent position in the country’s founding, many 
groups throughout United States’ history have challenged freedom of the 
press.  In his Gettysburg Address, Abraham Lincoln proclaimed that 
America is run by a government “of the people, by the people, for the 
people.”  True to Lincoln’s statement, the citizens of America during the 
1860s had an enormous impact on the interpretation of civil liberties as laid 
out in the Bill of Rights.  The following paper explores some of the 
prevailing public attitudes, professional beliefs, and governmental actions 
affecting freedom of the press under the Lincoln Administration during the 
Civil War.  During this time period, public citizens and newspaper 
professionals had at least as much to do with shaping the freedom of the 
press as government officials. 
 Although the Constitution has always guaranteed certain rights to 
all citizens, the interpretation and limit of those rights has evolved within 
American society over more than two hundred years.  Close scrutiny into 
the evolution of our civil rights is an excellent way to fully appreciate their 
application to modern society, which in turn fosters understanding of the 
potential impact of governmental and societal restrictions of these rights.  
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The free speech limitations imposed by Abraham Lincoln, news editors, and 
public citizens in the name of preserving the Union illustrate the difficulty 
of protecting civil rights in a complicated landscape like the one created by 
the Civil War.  
There is no doubt that the 1860’s press played a vital role in both 
the social and political landscape of the nation.  The number of newspapers 
in circulation grew rapidly in the first half of the nineteenth century until 
“there were almost 2,500 on the eve of the Civil War.”1  Newspapers during 
this time were often associated with a particular political party, and 
generally put forth no claim of impartiality.  Despite the unabashed political 
motivation that existed amongst most editors during the 1860s, “the ability 
of a newspaper to expose hypocrisy or express an opposing view was as 
vital as it is today.”2  The abundance of print-worthy news created by the 
outbreak of war in 1861 fueled the first industry-wide use of the telegraph; 
used extensively by field reporters to send accounts of battles and other 
news back to their home offices in large cities like New York and Chicago.  
Telegraph rates were high, but so was the potential for profit by being on 
the leading edge of a story.   
This unprecedented use of communications technology to speed 
the rate at which stories went to press resulted in some serious and valid 
concerns for the military.  If news stories could be reported from the 
battlefront, transmitted to the printer in a matter hours, to be printed the 
next day, then any mention of troop movements or other vital strategic 
information in the articles could provide crucial information to the enemy.  
It became common practice to require military officials to approve outgoing 
telegraph messages before transmission.  Such military officials had broad 
legal authorities due to the implementation of martial law by Lincoln 
during the war. 
                                                            
 1 Brayton Harris, Special!: Correspondents and Newspapers of the American Civil War (New 
York: Potomac Books, 1999), 9.  
 2 Jeffrey Manber,  Lincoln’s Wrath: Fierce Mobs, Brilliant Scoundrels and a President’s 
Mission to Destroy  the Press (Naperville, IL: Sourcebooks, 2005), 8. 
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There are some historians who portray President Lincoln as a 
villain, claiming that he actively manipulated the press throughout his 
political career.  In their book, Lincoln’s Wrath, Jeffrey Manber and Neil 
Dahlstrom comment on some of the acts of vandalism targeted against 
printing presses during the Civil War and conclude that it is “not as 
outrageous as it may initially seem to believe that the destruction of 
dissenting voices was in accordance with the wishes of the president.”3  
While Lincoln’s actions during the Civil War were extraordinary, not all 
historians view him so negatively.  In fact, according to an article written 
by Stephen Towne in a journal titled Civil War History, “most historians… 
have argued that in the North under Lincoln’s leadership, no concerted, 
official policy of governmental interference with the press existed.”4 Those 
who defend Lincoln’s actions point to his unenviable task of conducting a 
war based upon civil liberties for slaves while combating sedition and 
insurrection by secessionist citizens of the Union.   
 Even critics of Lincoln like Manber and Dahlstrom have cited the 
fact that Lincoln and many of his cabinet appointees owed much of their 
political success to positive, long-standing relationships with newspaper 
editors.  Lincoln, like many of his political contemporaries, realized that 
newspaper editors were the gatekeepers in any effort to relay political ideas 
to the public.   The President himself had been quoted saying “no man be he 
citizen or president of the United States, can successfully carry on a 
controversy with a great newspaper, and escape destruction, unless he owns 
a newspaper equally great, with a circulation in the same neighborhood.”5  
Lincoln had a profound respect for the ability of the press to rally the public 
to a cause.   
                                                            
3 Manber, 7.  
4 Stephen E. Towne, “Killing the Serpent Speedily: Governor Morton, General Hascall, and the 
Suppression of the Democratic Press in Indiana, 1863.” Civil War History 52, no. 1 (Mar. 
2006): 4. 
 5 Manber, 8.  
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 The question then becomes whether Lincoln’s respect for an 
association with the press motivated him to support or hinder it during his 
time in office.  The truth of the matter remains open for debate among 
historians.  Even so, it is clear that Lincoln possessed an iron-willed 
determination to both win the war and reunite the country.  To this end, he 
took unprecedented measures to stamp out dissidence and protect the 
Union during the Civil War.   
 An unparalleled level of animosity among American citizens 
shaped the political landscape during the Civil War.  The nation had 
literally been torn in half along political lines between the anti-slavery 
Union to the North and the pro-slavery Confederacy to the South.  The 
separation was not a clean break, however, as there were many citizens of 
the Union who sympathized with the cause of the South.  Further, there 
was a prominent anti-war movement in the North that supported the 
creation of a sovereign Confederacy if it would bring peace.   
As the head of the Union, President Lincoln acted as a lightning 
rod for political dissidents in the press who wished to attack the leadership 
of the North.  Lincoln “was mercilessly lampooned, viciously libeled, and 
relentlessly satirized in his own time.”6  Newspapers throughout the 
country attacked the president both for political reasons and out of malice.  
Press criticism rarely intimidated Lincoln during this troubling time.  
Lincoln took no notice of the personal attacks on his character during his 
time in office.  There were, however, several events and circumstances 
during the war that did motivate him to lash out against the press. 
Due to the nature of the Civil War, enemies of the Union were 
sprinkled throughout the North.  There was no easy way to track down 
these southern sympathizers and deport them.  Thus, sedition was one of 
President Lincoln’s primary concerns throughout the conflict.  “Lincoln had 
                                                            
 6 Harold  Holzer, “Lincoln Takes the Heat,” Civil War Times Illustrated 39, no. 7 (Feb. 2001): 
44.   
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little tolerance for anything that smacked of dissidence.”7  One common 
form of sedition during the war was to attempt to persuade soldiers to 
desert their posts.  Desertion was a serious crime during the war that was 
dealt with quite harshly by the government.  Lincoln, therefore, did not 
hesitate to strike out against individuals who interfered with military 
discipline; claiming that he found it “incongruous that he ‘must shoot a 
simpleminded soldier boy, who deserts, while he must not touch a hair of 
the wily agitator who induces him to desert.  I think…to silence the 
agitator, and save the boy, is not only constitutional, but…a great mercy.’”8  
Maintaining the integrity and reliability of the military remained a focus of 
Lincoln’s policies throughout the war. 
In September of 1862, Lincoln issued an executive order 
suspending the writ of habeas corpus for “not only rebels and insurgents 
but also abettors who were ‘discouraging volunteer enlistments’ or 
‘resisting militia drafts.’”9  In addition to the suspension of habeas corpus 
rights, Lincoln declared that people arrested for these seditious acts were 
“subject to ‘martial law’ and… ‘liable to trial and punishment by Courts 
Martial or Military Commission.’”10  The legal implications for members of 
the press were enormous.  Military officials could now decide to imprison 
members of the press through accusations of sedition with no habeas corpus 
protection.  Given the level of distaste that many generals had for the 
coverage that they received from the press, it is not surprising that the fear 
of imprisonment led to a certain level of self-censorship by some reporters. 
The press had routinely clashed with military commanders since 
the onset of the war.  One well documented example involved General 
Halleck in mid-1862.  While many Union officers were respectful of and 
even friendly with members of the press, there were some who chafed under 
                                                            
 7 Wyatt Kingseed, “The Fire in the Rear,” American History 42, no. 3 (Aug. 2007): 48.  
8 Ibid., 50. 
9 Sean Mattie, “Prerogative and the Rule of Law in John Locke and the Lincoln Presidency,”  
Review of Politics 67, no. 1 (2005): 98. 
10 Ibid. 
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the glare of constant public attention that embedded reporters inevitably 
brought to the battlefield.  Halleck “was becoming increasingly impatient 
with the reporters who hung around headquarters,” and goes on to say that 
Lincoln “was also under considerable pressure from several of his division 
commanders and certain staff officers who resented the needling criticisms 
of the reporters.”11  In May of 1862, Halleck issued Field Order No. 54, 
which called “for the expulsion of all ‘unauthorized hangers on’ from his 
army.”12  When questioned about the definition of the phrase “unauthorized 
hangers on,” by his subordinate commanders, Halleck made it clear that he 
considered newspaper reporters to be unauthorized.  Most field reporters 
were expelled from the ranks of Halleck’s forces and denied first-hand 
access necessary to report on battles and troop morale.  Although there 
were several examples of broad-based military suppression of the media, 
many actions were aimed at smaller groups or individuals.   
When targeting reporters or newspapers proved ineffective at 
squelching damaging coverage, members of the military were quick to 
arrest and prosecute private citizens suspected of providing information to 
the press.  As in most American wars, there arose a vocal anti-war political 
movement, the Peace Democrats, during the Civil War.  Peace Democrats, 
referred to as “Copperheads” by Republican newspapers, “wanted to end the 
war, even if it meant continued slavery.  They held little sympathy for 
blacks and believed that Lincoln had consistently acted unconstitutionally 
in conducting the war.”13  Ohio Congressman Clement Vallandigham, a 
very vocal critic of Lincoln and his policies, lead Copperhead movement.  In 
fact, “in December 1862, he had boldly introduced a congressional 
resolution calling for Lincoln’s imprisonment.”14  Although such a 
resolution had little chance of being taken seriously in the House of 
                                                            
11 J.C. Andrews, The North Reports The Civil War (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
1955), 183.  
12 Ibid., 184.  
13 Kingseed, 47.  
14 Ibid., 48.  
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Representatives, Vallandigham had a large public following and strong 
associations with several newspaper editors, including the editors of the 
Columbus Crisis and Chicago Times.   
Vallandigham, through both newspapers and public speeches, 
vehemently criticized both the Lincoln administration and the war.  As he 
traveled across the North, “he articulately and energetically pushed the 
envelope in speech after speech, encouraging soldiers to desert and inciting 
weary crowds, all the while knowing he enraged official Washington.”15  
The huge influence of this congressman meant that any attempted 
prosecution under sedition laws risked turning him into a martyr, which 
caused Lincoln to remain cautious in the hope that success on the battlefield 
would turn the tides of public opinion away from Vallandigham.  The 
unofficial policy of Lincoln was to avoid drawing attention to the outspoken 
critic. 
Unfortunately for the president, General Ambrose Burnside had 
no such reservations.  In April 1863, Burnside “threw down the gauntlet 
and issued Order No. 38, threatening death or banishment to anyone 
committing treason… A military tribunal would try perpetrators.”16  
Vallandigham, who by this time was running for governor in Ohio, saw an 
opportunity to get some much needed publicity.  A few days after Order 
No. 38 was issued, Vallandigham gave a speech “at Mount Vernon, Ohio, 
aware that undercover officers stood ready to record his every word.”17  
Vallandigham proceeded to declare his disdain for President Lincoln, 
General Burnside, and Order No. 38 in very plain and inflammatory 
language.   
Four days later Vallandigham was arrested in the middle of the 
night by military authorities.  The congressman was escorted to Cincinnati, 
where a military court convicted him of inciting the public in an attempt to 
                                                            
15 Ibid.  
16 Ibid., 49.  
17 Ibid.  
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undermine the government.  Since Lincoln had suspended the writ of 
habeas corpus, the gubernatorial hopeful had little recourse when “Burnside 
ordered Vallandingham imprisoned for the duration of the war.”18  
Unfortunately for Lincoln, the result of the military trial played into the 
plans of his congressional nemesis. 
Though imprisoned, “Vallandigham watched a firestorm of protest 
rise throughout the North in an 1860s media frenzy.  Free speech and the 
right to a fair, civilian trial were the crucial issues.”19  In imprisoning the 
influential congressman, Burnside had unwittingly created the political 
martyr that Lincoln had hoped to avoid.  Protests after the arrest of 
Vallandingham were widespread and sometimes violent.  Mob actions 
included the destruction of the offices of a Republican newspaper, the 
Dayton Journal.  Although Lincoln believed that military justice had 
fittingly punished the actions of Vallandingham, he knew swift action was 
needed to staunch the political bleeding.  Lincoln had Vallandingham 
banished to the Confederate States, where he would be unable to rabble 
rouse the northern population.  Through this creative response, Lincoln 
diffused the situation and eliminated a dangerous political rival.   
 Angry mobs frequently destroyed newspaper offices and printing 
presses during the Civil War.  As with the occurrence at the offices of the 
Dayton Journal, attacks were often politically motivated and targeted 
newspapers that were perceived as intolerably critical of the war.  In 
August of 1861, mobs descended upon and destroyed the offices of “the 
Bangor (Maine) Democrat, August 11; the Easton (Pennsylvania) Sentinal 
August 19; the West Chester (Pennsylvania) Jeffersonian, August 20; the 
Cumberland (Virginia) Alleghanian, August 23” and several other 
newspapers for printing material considered to be in opposition of the 
Union cause.20  Although most efforts to suppress newspapers during the 
                                                            
18 Ibid.  
19 Ibid., 50.  
20 Brayton Harris, Special! : Correspondents and Newspapers of the American Civil War (New 
York: Potomac Books, 1999), 98.  
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Civil War involved government sanctions, the public had a hand in 
“censoring” newspapers as well.  If enough people believed that a specific 
newspaper was lending an inappropriate level of support to the enemy, then 
protests were likely. 
 Not all public action against newspapers culminated in the 
destruction of property.  Angry groups of citizens often sent strongly-
worded messages to the editor, “encouraging” the self-censorship of 
potentially offensive articles.  But there was seldom any hesitation to 
employ more “aggressive” means of persuasion.  In Massachusetts a mob 
targeted the editor of the Haverhill Essex County Democrat.  The unfortunate 
victim “was ‘forcibly taken from his house by an excited mob, and refusing 
information, was covered with a coat of tar and feathers, and ridden on a 
rail through the town.’”21  After enduring this painful demonstration of 
civic displeasure, the editor apologized for the material that he had printed 
and swore to never again print articles advocating secession.  Other editors 
throughout the Union, in the face of similar reprisals, either abandoned 
their presses or agreed to “swear allegiance to the U.S. Government.”22  
Although mob violence occasionally targeted editors who 
supported Union forces, a far more pervasive source of suppression was 
self-imposed.  Even as secessionist publications criticized and condemned 
every move the North made during the war, anti-secessionist editors often 
spoke out regarding the importance of censoring material considered 
“damaging” to the Union cause.  On June 12, 1863, Joseph Medill, editor of 
the Chicago Tribune, wrote: 
 
It is licensee they want, not liberty!  License to stab the bosom of 
the Republic – our beautiful mother!  And drag her corpse to be 
trampled upon by the blaspheming South – to the end that they 
may set up in her stead the loathsome harlot of the Confederacy.  If 
                                                            
21 Ibid., 100. 
22 Ibid.  
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ruffians like these are not to be arrested and punished with severe 
penalties, there is no reason in our fighting the rebels at 
Vicksburg.23 
 
Editors supporting the Northern cause frequently spoke out in 
against any newspaper deemed to have printed unpatriotic material.  
Medill’s statements “typify what most of the editors wrote.”24  In addition 
to the censorship imposed by the public at large, the editorial profession 
itself suppressed the publication of anything considered too provocatively 
critical of government policy. 
 The freedoms of speech and the press, enshrined in our 
Constitution, act as the cornerstones of our liberty.  Throughout our 
country’s history, public and governmental interpretations of these rights 
have continued to shape and evolve.  It is illuminating to look beneath the 
surface narrative of a famous historical event like the American Civil War 
and discover that the war itself was not the only conflict raging at the time.  
The actions of key players on the battlefield like Generals Halleck and 
Burnside, along with political leaders in Washington like President Lincoln 
and Congressman Vallandingham, helped to shape attitudes and set 
precedents that affect both our perception and the government’s 
enforcement of our constitutional rights. 
 Historians have tended to be pragmatic in their assessment of the 
appropriateness and scope of media suppression by the government during 
the Civil War.  Menahem Blondheim write: 
 
The record does show dozens of wartime incidents that could be 
considered substantive infringement of press freedom, even by 
nineteenth-century standards.  However, when weighing the 
                                                            
 23 Hazel Dicken-Garcia and Giovanna Dell'Orto, Hated Ideas and the American Civil War 
Press (New York: Marquette Books, 2007), 159.  
 24 Ibid.  
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number of the violations and the limited and temporary nature of 
most of them against the long duration of the war, the huge 
number of Northern newspapers, and the enormous volume of 
public information, not the mention the vehemence of opposition 
speech, the significance of those isolated, unsystematic 
infringements would appear minimal.25  
 
In contrast to previous conflicts in the history of the United States, 
in which the government took an active role in suppressing the media, the 
opposition press was given an enormous amount of latitude during the Civil 
War.  President Lincoln focused his media suppression efforts toward 
specific publications actively damaging the war effort, rather than against 
the industry as a whole.  Even then, governmental actions were often 
temporary and rarely heavy-handed.   
 Public sentiment during the 1860s tended to mirror the actions of 
the government.  Union judges generally agreed that rulings imposing 
shut-downs of secessionist newspapers were rarely necessary.  Public 
protests and mob actions would often shut these presses down faster than 
official sanctions.  The patriotic attitudes of most Union editors often 
resulted in a cautious approach toward the publication of information that 
might hinder the North’s war effort.  These factors rendered broad-based 
government suppression of the media largely unnecessary. 
 The United States has come a long way since the onset of the Civil 
War.  Landmark Supreme Court cases, public protests, and the proliferation 
of advocacy groups have advanced the causes of free speech and free press 
greatly over that last 150 years.  However, thoughtful inspection of the not-
too-distant past provides valuable insight into the evolution of these rights 
since the Civil War era.  
                                                            
25 Menahem Blondheim, “Public Sentiment Is Everything: The Union’s Public Communications 
Strategy and the Bogus Proclamation of 1864,” The Journal of American History 89, no. 3 
(2002): 871. 
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A Democratic Impulse?: Political Institutions in Early New England 
Towns  
 
Jason Miller 
Jason Miller of Tolono, Illinois wrote this essay for Dr. Foy’s Seminar in Early American History in 
Fall 2008. He completed his Bachelor of Arts in history at the University of Illinois in December of 
2007 where he was a member of Phi Kappa Phi. Currently, he is buried in research for his thesis project, 
a social history of political violence and the Copperhead movement in Illinois during the Civil War.  
Thirty-nine years after its initial publication, Kenneth Lockridge’s A New 
England Town remains a staple in graduate level courses covering the 
colonial period.  Exploring Dedham, Massachusetts from its inception in 
the first half of the seventeenth-century to the midpoint of the eighteenth-
century, Lockridge has posited that during the first one hundred years of its 
existence great changes within Dedham’s political community had taken 
place.  In his depiction, the townsmen metamorphose from an almost 
slothful political entity during the seventeenth-century to dyed in the wool 
democrats in the eighteenth-century.  For Lockridge, this change occurred 
because of the shifting socioeconomic, geographic, and political facets of a 
growing society in which a populace that once occupied a small, close-knit 
community became an enlarging and continually expanding community 
with disparate interests.   
 At its inception, Dedham’s political culture centered upon the all-
powerful town meeting and its townsmen.  These townsmen, largely 
occupied by their agricultural pursuits, did not want to spend time at the 
town meeting, the political body that decided every issue by a majority 
vote. Encumbered by a myriad of issues demanding the townsmen’s 
attention and vote, they created the position of selectmen to administer the 
town’s will on a day-to-day basis.  From this point forward, an elite cadre of 
comparatively wealthy selectmen elected by the townsmen ruled Dedham.  
These selectmen exercised all the power that the community of townsmen 
could exercise at their meetings, but on a day-to-day basis.  The townsmen, 
as Lockridge accounts, could have exercised greater control over the 
selectmen, but because of the deferential nature of Puritan society’s belief in 
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the “natural inequality of men,”1 allowed them to operate largely 
unimpeded.  This deference to authority and political harmony died with 
the founding generation.  With their deaths and subsequent issues of a 
growing population, shrinking land availability near town, and a myriad of 
conflicts based on sectionalism within the township, Dedham’s residents 
increasingly turned upon one another. The result was political infighting 
leading to attempts at secession and equally vigorous attempts to maintain 
the town proper.  This, for Lockridge, was evidence to the rise of an “active 
democratic behavior” within early eighteenth-century New England.2 
 It is an impossibility to explore the primary sources from which 
Lockridge drew his conclusions. A New England Town is a social history 
based upon town records that still affords an opportunity for 
reinterpretation, though a guarded one.  Contingent on Lockridge’s faithful 
representation of sources, it is possible to draw alternative conclusions from 
his evidence and propose a new model that not only explains the early 
political stability of New England towns, but also the fractious nature of 
politics during the eighteenth century.  Imposing the model of Communal 
Authoritarianism, in which a community that is active in policing itself to 
ensure communal adherence to and progress towards commonly held 
values, beliefs, and ambitions, upon seventeenth-century, Dedham reveals 
that the townsmen are not as deferential as they appear.  Creating the 
position of, and investing their power in, the selectmen, New England 
townsmen exercised ultimate control and oversight.  They actively policed 
the selectmen’s actions and their repercussions, creating the peaceful 
political existence that Lockridge mistakenly attributed to political 
deference.  At the inception of the eighteenth-century, population pressures 
began stressing their political system because of the relative ease at which 
they could be corrupted.  
 
 
 
                                                            
1 This view held that the more prosperous members of society were blessed by God and should 
serve as an example to be followed by those who were not.  Kenneth Lockridge, A New England 
Town (New York: Norton, 1970), 10. 
 2 Lockridge, 138. 
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Dedham During the Seventeenth-Century 
The Puritan settlers of New England sought to establish a stable 
society within the howling wilderness of the North American continent.  
Through the creation of covenants, town meetings, and selectmen, their 
investment paid immediate dividends.  In comparison with early Virginian 
settlers, inhabitants of the early Puritan settlements enjoyed remarkable 
stable social and political lives.  Lockridge has proposed the model of 
“Conservative Corporate Voluntarism” as an explanation of how this 
stability was achieved at the local level. Key to this local stability was the 
wise and judicious use of power by the towns’ selectmen operating within 
the construct of a covenant and a largely passive populace.  The selectmen 
routinely settled disputes in such a manner both beneficial to the 
individuals involved and the community.  The routine manner in which 
they settled disputes is irrefutable.  However, the downplaying of the town 
meeting and of the agency of individual townsmen within Dedham’s 
political culture overshadows a more promising way of understanding just 
how and why towns such as Dedham achieved social and political stability.  
It is difficult to fathom that a community so devoted and fervent in their 
desire for stability, and a peaceful Christian existence, would be so passive. 
The proposal here is to adopt a different model that reinvests the power 
into the people in a way that fits the evidence Lockridge presented.    
 This proposed model is what can be termed Communal 
Authoritarianism. Communal Authoritarianism can be defined as a 
community that is active in policing itself to ensure communal adherence to 
and progress towards commonly held values, beliefs, and ambitions.  An 
easy way of envisioning this model is through a set of isosceles triangles in 
a position so that they form a figure similar to an X.  The populace with its 
beliefs and values would be positioned at the base of one triangle and the 
selectmen at the junction between the two triangles.  The investment of the 
populace’s power is represented by a vertical line from the midpoint of the 
base of the triangle rising towards the juncture between the triangles.  
Once that power reaches the juncture (the selectmen) the power is then 
redistributed on the other side.  If the two triangles match in size the 
community’s needs and aspirations have been met.  If, however, the other 
triangle’s base is too large or too small, their needs and wants have not 
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been met, resulting in a refusal to reinvest their power into the group, 
making individual or whole sale changes where necessary. 
 This model is predicated on a commonly held mindset among the 
community.  Though there existed some stratification in the distribution of 
wealth, the community was based upon commonly held values and external 
pressures which bound them together.  New England towns of this period 
were based on “covenants or mini-constitutions that directed who was 
allowed to live there and how they were supposed to conduct themselves.”3  
In early Dedham, every male resident bound himself to a covenant that 
promised to “receive only such unto us as may be probably of one heart 
with us.”4  Through the exclusion of those who were “contrary minded,” 
Dedham’s villagers ensured a common ideological bond among its 
members.  During a dispute the covenant required villagers to turn towards 
their neighbors for a resolution.5  Villagers needed assurance that the 
neighbors shared a common mindset.  The social contract was not the only 
factor contributing to group cohesion.  The passage of the litmus test 
determining their moral fitness to join the community, the common 
experience of an Atlantic crossing, residence in an isolated town near 
wilderness, close proximity to Amerindians believed to be devil worshipers, 
and the shared experience of oppression in England collectively acted as a 
trial by fire in which the residents of Dedham drew their motivation and 
strength to remain in and at peace with the group. Dedham‘s first 
generation was devoted to their community and its utopian vision is evident 
in “the overwhelming majority of the settlers came to Dedham to stay. 
They neither ranged restlessly west nor sought wealth in the developing 
metropolis of Boston.”6 Willingness to stay in one area was not a passive 
acceptance of their lot, but a coherent and intensive attempt to create that 
“city upon a hill.” 
 The town of Dedham was settled in 1635.  In March of that year 
the General Court of the colony gave the assembly of townsmen in Dedham 
                                                            
3 Steven Sarson, British America, 1500-1800: Creating Colonies, Imagining an Empire (Great 
Britain: Hodder Arnold, 2005), 128. 
4 Ibid., 4. 
5 Lockridge, 6, 5, 4. 
6 Lockridge, 63. 
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and elsewhere authorization “to make bylaws not repugnant to the laws of 
the colony and to ‘choose their own particular officers.’”7  Though 
Lockridge states that it was “shortly” after this that Dedham elected a 
board of selectmen, this ignores four years of rule by the town meeting. 
Over those four years they had not been able to expediently use those 
meetings to resolve their problems.  It was not until May 1639 that the 
townsmen established the board of selectmen.  This is what they meant by 
the “long experience that the general meeting of so many men in one 
[assembly to consider] […] the common affairs thereof has wasted much 
time to no small damage.”8  The men of Dedham had not been passive in 
the administration of their local government, or the course by which they 
sought to achieve their utopian vision.  If they had been passive, then there 
would never have been the need for the selectmen.  Furthermore, the fact 
that the executive powers were not wholly surrendered to these selectmen 
and that the town meeting acted as an oversight is indicative that the 
townsmen had a stake in Dedham’s future and felt the need to ensure that 
their vision was fulfilled.  
 The selectmen were under the watchful eye of the populace.  As 
noted by Lockridge, many of the selectmen began their political careers in 
lower positions of government such as a fenceviewer or hogreeve.  Only 
after each had “submitted himself to the town’s watchful eye” could he have 
gained or lost the “necessary respect” to become a selectman.9  Once in this 
position, a selectman would find himself in day-to-day contact with his 
fellow citizens.  In these daily encounters he would have to assign guilt or 
innocence to a party, negotiate the location of public roads, or a whole 
assortment of other issues.  In fact, “It was a rare townsman who did not 
find himself either wanting or having to attend the selectmen at several of 
their meetings each year, and it was a rare selectman who did not find 
himself judging most [of] his fellow townsmen in the course of a year.”10  It 
is in these disputes, such as John Gay’s request for town land to build a 
barn or the punishment of men who took wood from public lands, that 
                                                            
7 Ibid.,38. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid.,46. 
10 Ibid.,40. 
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illustrate the political agency of the community through the actions of the 
selectmen.  The selectmen had to be fair in their response to these requests 
and illegal activities.  They could neither deny out of hand a request or 
overreact in cases in which punishment was necessary, and expect to 
maintain the peace.  The selectmen shared a common ideology and goal 
with the people they served and therefore sought to act fairly within the 
perceived parameters of that goal. If they did not, they were deemed 
unrepresentative of the communal ideology and removed from their 
position as the bureaucrats for the aggregate dictator that was the Dedham 
population. 
 It comes as no surprise that the wealthier members of this society 
dominated the position of selectmen.  While they may have been wise and 
judicious in their use of power, this can just as easily be attributed to the 
process described above as it can to Lockridge’s unspoken acceptance of the 
Great Person Theory.  The Great Person Theory is based on the belief that 
exceptional leaders possess extraordinary qualities and skills.11  Recall that 
the town was based on an exclusionary principle, only those who passed a 
rigorous personal examination were allowed to stay and there were many 
similar experiences which created a common mindset.  This is not to say 
that the inhabitants of the town were exactly alike and did not have 
differences of opinion, they all shared a common history and ideological 
background that informed the way they related to the community and 
treated their neighbors.  That the wealthy were in the position of leadership 
more often can more likely be ascribed to the Situational Approach to 
Leadership from Social Psychology.  This theory holds that external, 
situational factors can and do influence who will become the leader of a 
group.12  The townsmen did not simply elect the wealthy because of 
divinely ordained reasons—that they were blessed, therefore, possessed 
superior morals—nor does it mean that the voters necessarily “liked to elect 
the most substantial of the mature townsmen,”13 rather, because of their 
isolation, labor intensive occupation, and a whole host of other factors, the 
                                                            
11 Steven J. Breckler, James M. Olson, and Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Social Psychology Alive 
(USA: Thomson, 2006), 594, 597. 
12 Ibid., 597. 
13 Lockridge, 43. 
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wealthier members of the community were the logical choice for leadership.  
Their slightly higher appointment rate allowed the less wealthy to focus 
upon everyday tasks with some assurance their desires and views were 
being upheld consistently throughout the community. 
  Despite the power the selectmen held in Puritan society, they 
were still accountable to the town meeting.  Though the General Court of 
the colony regulated who could and could not vote, a clear majority of the 
male taxpayers in the town were eligible to vote in these meetings 
throughout this period.14  As Lockridge argues, these men were just as 
powerful as the selectmen and more influential in the sense that they also 
functioned as an oversight committee. Every so often the town “would 
reaffirm the broad mandate of power given to the board” of selectmen and 
through this reaffirmation “confirm the ultimate power of the meeting.”15  
They also had the power to vote a selectman, the whole board of selectmen, 
or the very position in and of itself out of political existence.  Outside of an 
incident in 1660 when the whole town voted to “withdraw the power of the 
selectmen,” Lockridge portrays this meeting as passive, content with 
leaving the running of the town to the selectmen.16  One possible 
explanation for this supposed passivity can be found in the day-to-day 
interactions in which deals between the town, represented through the 
selectmen, and individual residents resolved personal disputes amicably for 
the needs of the town and the individuals involved.  Personal quarrels, 
because of these interactions, were funneled away from the town meeting 
and did not become political disputes.  Another explanation for Lockridge’s 
conclusion can be found in a close perusal of his math in relation to the 
1666 tax list and the number of terms served by men of different rank.  
Assuming that wealthy selectmen could be considered “wealthy” during all 
their terms, for the 25 years between 1639 and 1666 the wealthy served a 
total of 14 years for an average of 3.5 terms for man. The middling and the 
poor served for a total of eleven years with an average of terms served for 
the middling sort around 5.8 terms.17  Of course, averages in government 
                                                            
14 Ibid., 47. 
15Ibid., 46. 
16Ibid., 48. 
17 These statistics are derived from information presented by Lockridge on pages 42-44. 
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representation are by no means definitive.  This pattern suggests a higher 
turnover rate than Lockridge asserts, with the board of selectmen being 
anchored by those few individuals who were steadfast and appealing to the 
community’s wants and desires.  If this would hold up to higher historical 
scrutiny, the town meeting would have to be reclassified as an active and 
vengeful polity asserting its vision of society.  
 
Dedham and other New England Towns in the Eighteenth-Century  
 By the last decades of the seventeenth-century, the utopian 
ambitions of New England towns were beginning to wear away.  Victims of 
population growth and its subsequent dispersal, the deaths of their 
founders, and the Great Awakening of the early half of the next century 
eroded the towns’ singular communal ambition and created factions vying 
for political power.  For Lockridge, these factions were the humble 
beginnings of “an active democratic behavior” where residents would come 
to “accept the vocal and sometimes violent conflicts that give rise to that 
kind of democracy.”18  Yet, as with the early exploration of Lockridge’s 
seventeenth-century Dedham, there is an alternative explanation for their 
behavior based on the central thesis posed earlier—Communal 
Authoritarianism.  Though the utopian ambition of this model imposed by 
their founders was lost, its political institutions of the town meeting and 
selectmen as well as the political relationship between the two survived 
well into the eighteenth-century.  Factions existed within Dedham and 
other towns such as Concord, but they were not operating under some 
before-its-time democratic impulse.  Rather, they were operating within the 
political framework and constraints of Communal Authoritarianism. 
 As they had during the seventeenth-century, eighteenth-century 
New England townsmen centered their social and political lives on their 
town.  Most, if not all, towns still politically communicated with the outside 
world solely through their delegate to the General Court.  This delegate 
was expected to follow his own discretion in representing a town’s interests 
unless instructed otherwise by the town meeting.19  With limited political 
                                                            
18 Lockridge, 138. 
19 Robert Gross, Minutemen and Their World (USA: Hill and Wang, 2001), 34. 
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contact the townsmen still held the ultimate power within their isolated 
community.  If they did not make people sign the covenant, they still 
actively “warned out” those who were undesirable.  Conversely, if a 
newcomer to town was deemed to be a hardworking, productive individual 
they would be allowed to stay, provided they could afford to setup shop or 
buy land.  In effect, while no longer necessarily tied to one another by 
affections of love in the sight of God or a common migration experience, 
many communities still exercised their right to exclusive residency.  This 
was important because, the town’s political power still lay with the 
enfranchised townsmen who either by their own rule or through their 
appointed bureaucrats—the selectmen—“claimed authority over anything 
that happened within […] [the town’s] borders” from moral 
transgressions of members of the town to the building of roads, levying of 
taxes, and religious and property disputes.20 
 With the growth in population, the resolutions to disputes that 
were acceptable to both the town and the individual that had characterized 
these communities in the seventeenth-century became nigh impossible in 
the eighteenth-century.  At their inception, towns such as Dedham, 
Andover, and Concord had formed a central village around the 
meetinghouse.  From this village, farmers would journey to work their 
fields that lay just beyond the limits of the village.  As the community 
granted subsequent land holdings to its men, the distance a farmer had to 
travel to his lands grew.  In the early days, problems such as these were 
esolved by land swaps negotiated between the town’s selectmen and the 
individual farmer.  As more and more land came to be distributed, 
landholding townsmen found themselves increasingly hemmed into the 
village and isolated from their landholdings.  Many of these men, or their 
sons who were coming of age and stood to inherit land from their fathers, 
took it upon themselves, for the sake of convenience, to leave the village 
and plant their roots closer to their landholdings.  As more and more men 
began to settle these regions, the seeds of discord were being sewn one 
settler at a time.21  
                                                            
20 Gross, 90, 10. 
 21 Lockridge, 94. 
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 Eventually, these seeds would sprout and blossom into highly 
divisive political issues.  As Robert Gross notes, “With town government 
affecting so much of daily life, no New England community could escape 
political conflict. A road urgently needed by a man at the outskirts was 
often a wasteful expense to an inhabitant near the center, while one 
churchgoer’s learned preacher was another’s prideful sinner on the way to 
hell.”  Problems such as these, and larger issues such as secession tied 
directly to them, were rampant throughout eighteenth-century New 
England towns.22  During the early period of these town’s existence, when 
the founders as well as their ideologies were still alive, most townsmen 
continued to live in or in close enough proximity to the village that 
everyone was likely to see the need for a road or to support a single 
preacher.  During the eighteenth-century in towns such as Dedham and 
Concord, the population of townsmen and thereby the controlling power 
remained concentrated in the original village. The townsmen were largely 
able to elect men with whom they had daily contact and shared their local 
concerns.  However, the numbers of those living in the periphery continued 
to grow.  These “outlivers” began to “wonder whether their interests were 
fully considered” when these selectmen met or when the town meeting 
gathered and repeatedly denied their petitions over a myriad of issues 
deemed by the village dwelling townsmen as against the interests of the 
town. 23 In Dedham and Concord, these residents of the periphery who were 
outnumbered and seemingly politically disfranchised and neglected sought 
to gain control of their political lives.  They did so by appropriating and 
abusing the political system under which their ideologically united 
ancestors had lived.    
 To demonstrate this trend , it is paramount to explore specific 
examples within New England society.  As early as 1704, signs of the larger 
conflict between the village and periphery were surfacing in Dedham.  After 
building a coalition of townsmen in the outlying areas and townsmen living 
in the village, and after three highly contentious votes over the month of 
March, the board of selectmen that had been dominated by men from the 
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village was replaced by a board in which men from the periphery dominated 
by a four to one margin.  These new selectmen from the periphery kept 
their political intentions quiet during the election.  Once they assumed their 
positions and they attempted to win political concessions for the outlying 
section of town they were soundly defeated by the townsmen on repeated 
occasions.  Some amount of political trickery must have occurred because 
why would a majority of townsmen vote in a slew of candidates over the 
objections of the incumbent board if they knew they were going to oppose 
their policies in the first place?  They must have been tricked.  Once they 
realized this deception the townsmen sprung into action and checked their 
selectmen’s power.  Over the next couple of years the peripheral influence 
“gradually lost control of the board of selectmen” and the village was once 
again in control. 24 
Twenty-three years later an alliance of men of the outlying areas 
around Dedham again sought to “control the mechanisms of town 
government and this time [meant] to force the town to grant independence 
to several of the outlying sections.”25  Men of the outlying areas had 
realized the basic weakness of the founders’ political system.  The position 
of selectmen had arisen in the early years of colonial settlement when it 
became clear that townsmen could not effectively administrate their own 
town or deal with day-to-day issues in an efficient manner. The selectmen 
were invested with the town meeting’s powers to resolve these disputes.  
The community at this time was a relatively small group of people where 
everyone was attending the same social functions and, likely, expressing the 
same general desires for the betterment of the town.  In this small 
community, the selectmen and their actions were on display for everyone to 
see and were responsible to the town meeting.  Only those townsmen that 
attended the town meeting could vote or exercise the townsmen’s oversight 
of the selectmen.  If the townsmen were the aggregate dictators and the 
selectmen their bureaucrats, the peripheral men realized that they could 
seize control of the town meeting by stuffing it with men sympathetic to 
their cause thereby forcing the town into acquiescing to their demands and 
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into electing a sympathetic board of selectmen.  In 1727, this tactic 
succeeded in winning a board of selectmen full of peripherally inclined men.  
With that accomplished these men then moved the meeting towards 
recognizing the petitions of independence for the outlying areas of town.  
Men from the village, realizing the tactic that had brought this about and 
appropriating it for their own means, exited the meeting and quickly 
rounded up “lazy yeomen” who had not attended the meeting “to restore 
their majority” and defeat the petitions. 26  Though the board of selectmen 
lay in league with the peripheral area, the awakened body of townsmen 
from the village successfully thwarted petitions for independence during 
subsequent meetings.  In March of 1728, when the election of selectmen 
was once again up for consideration by the townsmen, the faction in 
support of secession rushed through a resolution that “amounted to a 
declaration that, contrary to province law, a man with any taxable property 
at all could vote in the meeting.”27  Being that the men in the outlying areas 
were far less likely to meet the provincial requirements for the vote, this 
resolution was designed to enfranchise men from the peripheral regions and 
ensure the reelection of selectmen sympathetic to secession.  These men 
were duly elected, but the moderator, apparently sensing what had 
happened, “expressed his doubts or even tried to adjourn the meeting” and a 
confrontation ensued that resulted in a brawl.28  The next day the town 
meeting reassembled and finished electing selectmen sympathetic to 
secession, but defeated the resolutions that would have allowed secession to 
come to fruition.  In the next year, the town reestablished its control of the 
selectmen and the fractious debate seemed to be on a course of continual 
discord.29  The General Court, however, stepped in.  By 1748, after twenty 
plus years of continued political discord, the General Court did not 
recognize the independence of any outlying areas but instead created four 
precincts within the town of Dedham.  With the status of precinct, each 
area could elect and support its own minister.  In the end, the political 
discord within this community was apparently ended by the assignment of a 
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selectmen’s post to each of the precincts and special interest groups.  As 
Lockridge notes, “Neither side’s definition of community had won and 
neither would ever win.  The battle had ended in a cease-fire, an armistice, a 
truce.”30 
Particularly with the secession of outlying areas, such occurrences 
were not limited to Dedham.  Similar events with similar outcomes 
occurred throughout New England up to the American Revolution.  In the 
case of Concord, the debates revolved around religious strife caused by the 
reverberations of the Great Awakening, the building of roads, the 
positioning of the school house, and secession of outlying areas.  Here, as in 
Dedham, the delegation of “controversial issues to selectmen proved to be 
no solution to strife. Indeed, the policymaking failures of the town meeting 
simply intensified an ongoing struggle among sections to dominate the 
selectmen.”  And, like Dedham, “the outcome of annual elections turned 
principally on which quarter of town could jam more inhabitants into the 
town hall.”31  Both like and unlike Dedham, who eventually succumbed to 
political compromise imposed from the General Court, Concord townsmen 
cut the number of selectmen down to three—one for each faction of the 
debates.  The townsmen, however, continued to debate the issues in the 
town meeting.32  Though Lockridge’s account ends in the 1740s and never 
states whether townsmen still contested political power in the town 
meeting, it can be assumed that like the case of Concord, they still met and 
debated the issues of their day.   
In all of the cases discussed above, factions within the town sought 
to gain a political advantage by taking control of a political system that had 
been formed under the auspices of a unifying ideology in small communities 
with watchful neighbors. Communal Authoritarianism did not exist in the 
eighteenth-century. The communal ideology and ambition had gone.  
However, the political structure, born in the exigencies of the town’s 
infancy, where the townsmen invested their power into the selectmen but 
exercised political oversight of their actions persisted.  Understanding that 
the town meeting represented an empty political shell devoid of any 
                                                            
30 Ibid., 116. 
31 Gross, 16-17. 
32 Ibid. 
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unifying ideology outside of section, townsmen actively sought to use the 
meeting itself, where only votes counted, to gain the advantage for one side 
or the other.  To do so, factions within New England towns used the 
political existence of their ancestor’s model to impose their will upon 
everyone else by stuffing the town meeting with sympathetic townsmen.  It 
was a non-democratic, non-republican political maneuver made by factions 
that understood the political system under which they were operating.  
This resulted in a deadlocked political system that could not resolve itself.  
A majority of townsmen could deny the independence of a secessionist 
section while the selectmen could be of that secessionist mindset. This 
polarization is evidence of the continued political structures that had 
resided in these towns during the seventeenth-century in which townsmen 
did not defer to selectmen’s judgment lightly, but actively monitored their 
every move in day-to-day interactions and at the town meeting in a very 
small community.  What had changed in the eighteenth-century, however, 
was that there were geographically defined self interests that pulled the 
bonds of unity apart.  
 
Toward A New Narrative 
Communal Authoritarianism within early New England ultimately 
relied upon consent from the populace of any given town.  The communal 
spirit of early Dedham was held together by shared experiences and the 
belief and hope that it was possible to create a more perfect society based 
upon pure devotion to God and group piety.  Dedham was exclusive in that 
no one could become a member unless they passed a rigorous test of their 
character.  If they were deemed to be “one heart with us” they were 
admitted.  Through the selection process, the town created a group 
cohesive in their outlook on the proper role of society and individuals 
within that society in achieving their ultimate utopian community.  Though 
they attempted to administer their own affairs as a group, it became difficult 
because of unknown doctrinal arguments or personal property disputes.  In 
order to facilitate the implementation of their master plan for their town, 
they invested all the power of the general town meeting into a group of 
selectmen to administer day-to-day and very specific problems. The effect 
of this concentration of power was returned to the populace on a day-to-day 
basis.  The townsmen expressed whether they felt that these selectmen 
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ruled justly or unjustly, or in accordance with their general desire for a 
utopian community, at the next town meeting.  If their truly was an 
absence of political discord it does not necessarily mean that the townsmen 
were passive.  It could also mean that the selectmen were fulfilling their 
obligations to the community amicably.  After all, they were Puritans who 
lived in fear of a vengeful God.  When there was discord, and the selectmen 
removed, it can safely be assumed that the selectmen had not fulfilled their 
obligations or had exercised some perceived abuse of power.  Otherwise, 
year after year the townsmen reinvested their power into the seven 
selectmen to administer in day-to-day affairs. The townsmen’s needs and 
wants were regularly reconciled with the greater utopian vision of the 
community.  Thus, their needs and wants, such as land and the issue of the 
placement of public roads did not assume the size of a large, destructive 
political fight.  Through the years in which the founders lived, this model of 
Communal Authoritarianism worked like a well-oiled political and social 
machine, keeping the peace until the next generation rose to power.  
With changing attitudes towards religion, land pressures, and 
other socioeconomic pressures the utopian ambition was lost in the 
eighteenth-century.  What was not lost, however, was the political 
structure laid out by their forefathers.  As the expansion of the town 
roceeded, interests between geographically defined sections with disparate, 
antagonistic interests arose.  Each side, knowing the nature of the political 
structure bequeathed to them, sought to exploit it for their factional gain.  
Perceptive that only those who were in attendance at the town hall would 
be considered the electorate, the factions sought to pack the meetings with 
as many sympathetic townsmen as possible.  The result was political 
deadlock and far short of democracy.  
The date in which Communal Authoritarianism ceased to operate 
remains slightly ambiguous.  In towns like Concord, that largely 
maintained their political autonomy and integrity from outside influence, 
the taxation from Britain following the Seven Years War and, more 
importantly, the revocation of their right to assemble in town meetings 
without permission from British officials stirred them from their self-
contained political shell and hastened the creation of a polity that was 
increasingly aware that their livelihood, both politically and economically, 
was tied to the outside world.  During the economic crisis that accompanied 
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the War for Independence, they would become fully aware how much their 
livelihood depended upon the outside world.  With the British defeat, the 
political system in which Communal Authoritarianism had existed within 
was gone.  The townsmen, now largely aware and concerned with their 
new connections to the outside world, and with the knowledge from 
Communal Authoritarianism of just what mob rule by people with unlike 
interests could do to their lives, were among the first to step towards a 
modern form of democracy.  Thus, just as Communal Authoritarianism had 
been born in extreme political circumstances, it died in extreme political 
circumstances.  
Despite any reservations, the birth of a republic in the 1780s does 
not necessarily mean that all of the inhabitants of that new republic had 
been undergoing an evolution preparing them for this new political 
existence.  The people of New England towns, like most people, had clung 
to their past more readily than they had embraced an unknown future.  In 
the end, this interpretation is hampered by the fact that it has relied largely 
on Lockridge’s evidence.  Not only is it hampered by his evidence, but it is 
also hampered by the way in which Lockridge represents his evidence.  One 
can glean an alternative explanation from his work suggests that the 
experience of Dedham and other New England towns is not an open and 
shut case for “Conservative Corporate Voluntarism” or some before its time 
democratic impulse.  Instead, it is a topic that is in need for new 
investigations by a new generation of historians. 
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At the turn of the-eighteenth century, the English public was confronted 
with numerous and conflicting interpretations of Africans, slavery, and the 
slave trade.  On the one hand, there were texts that glorified the institution 
of slavery.  Gabriel de Brémond’s The Happy Slave, which was translated 
and published in London in 1686, tells of a Roman, Count Alexander, who 
is captured off the coast of Tunis by “barbarians,” but is soon enlightened to 
the positive aspects of slavery, such as, being “lodged in a handsome 
apartment, where the Baffa’s Chyrurgions searched his Wounds: And…he 
soon found himself better.”1  On the other hand, Bartolomé de las Casas’ 
Popery truly display'd in its bloody colours (written in 1552, but was still being 
published in London in 1689), displays slavery in the most negative light.  
De las Casas chastises the Spaniards’ “bloody slaughter and destruction of 
men,” condemning how they “violently forced away Women and Children 
to make them slaves, and ill-treated them, consuming and wasting their 
food.”2  Moreover, Thomas Southerne’s adaptation of Aphra Behn’s 
Oroonoko in 1699 displays slavery in a contradictory light.  Southerne 
condemns Oroonoko’s capture as a “tragedy,” but like Behn’s version, 
Oroonoko’s royalty complicates the matter, eventually causing the author 
to show sympathy for the enslaved African prince.  
After 1688, the public sphere expanded to enormous proportions 
and the English could read about the slave trade through the works of 
                                                            
1 Gabriel de Bremond, The Happy Slave: a Novel in Three Parts Compleat /Translated from the 
French by a Person of Quality (London: Gilbert Cownly, 1686), 9. 
2 Bartolome de las Casas, Popery truly display'd in its bloody colours, or, A faithful narrative of 
the horrid and unexampled massacres, butcheries, and all manner of cruelties, that hell and 
malice could invent, committed by the popish Spanish party on the inhabitants of West-India 
(London: R. Hewson, 1689), 5.  While the reproduction of Casas’ work mainly portrays English 
attitudes toward the Spanish, it represents one facet of the English Weltanschauung which 
abhorred slavery and the slave-Trade.   
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popular scholarship and Royal African Company publications.  The works 
of the Company contained surprisingly detailed accounts of the trade that 
focused on business, economics, and numbers.  And yet, the validity of the 
information attained by the leaders and stockholders of the Royal African 
Company, and the rest of England, proved questionable. This information 
often excluded Critical details about African society and the human aspect 
of the slave trade.  Popular writers and scholars, who created a speculative 
view of the slave trade, filled this void in the Company’s accounts of the 
slave trade.  Moreover, the sources available to the English failed to hold 
the standards of validity needed to build a complete understanding of race 
and slavery. Royal African Company (RAC) publications left out the human 
aspect while popular scholars and authors artificially created a human 
aspect.  This process would have disastrous effects for the collective 
English Weltanschauung (German word, literally translated as “world-
view”).  Similarly, the conflated the meanings of words like “slave” and 
“negro” in RAC correspondence and pamphlets created a society that would 
eventually treat all “negroes” as “slaves,” and help delay British abolition. 
 In order to determine the changes that the English Weltanschauung 
underwent during this period, this essay seeks to investigate the factors 
contributing to decisions made by the leaders and stockholders of the Royal 
African Company) and how these decisions may have shaped Englishmen’s 
conceptions of Africans and slaves.3  Three separate steps are required, 
namely, ascertaining who the leaders and stockholders of the RAC were 
and how they got their information, determining how information was 
conveyed to the wider society, both through the Company and through 
popular literature, and analyzing the use of the words “slave,” “negro,” and 
“native,” and the contexts in which they were used in correspondence and 
pamphlets.  English society at the turn of the eighteenth-century had not 
yet fully assumed that all Blacks were inherently slaves; it was well on its 
way. 
                                                            
3 Of the three essential avenues for exploring the English Slave Trade (official internal papers, 
documents of the Royal African Company, popular scholarship/literature, and pamphlets of the 
Royal African Company), I have access to the latter two.  Because internal documents of the 
Royal African Company do not deal directly with the transfer of information to the public, they 
are less important for this study.   
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 The need for discussing the English slave trade from such a 
vantage point emerges from the well-established, but still lacking, 
historiography of the slave trade.  Historians from Philip Curtin, K.G. 
Davies, Elizabeth Donnan, and Eric Williams to the more recent works of 
William A. Pettigrew, Susan Amussen, Kenneth Morgan, David Eltis and 
David Richardson have adequately mapped most areas of the trade.4  Each 
of these works touches on important aspects of the trans-Atlantic slave 
trade, but leaves some questions unanswered.  Pettigrew’s works focus on 
the political and legal aspects of the changes that occurred in 1688 as they 
relate to the slave trade, leaving questions about the social environment of 
England and the West Indies.  “The Costs of Coercion,”, brings economic 
factors into the discussion, but likewise leaves social effects of the slave 
trade unexamined.  Davies’ The Royal African Company, on the other hand, 
touches upon the issues of communication and efficiency within the 
Company, but creates effects on the greater society out of the discussion.  
Finally, Amussen makes powerful connections about the effects of the trade 
as they relate to the structure of work, gender, and law, but ignores a 
discussion of the larger society as a whole.  With this in mind, the current 
scholarship fails to make fundamental connections between the slave trade 
and its influence on the collective English Weltanschauung. 
 
The Organization of the Royal African Company 
 The RAC’s organization remained much like that of other joint-
stock companies of the eighteenth-century.  Its chief officers included a 
                                                            
4 William A. Pettigrew, “Free to Enslave: Politics and the Escalation of Britain’s Transatlantic 
Slave Trade, 1688-1714,” William and Mary Quarterly 64, no. 1 (January 2007): 3-38 and 
William A. Pettigrew “Parliament and the Escalation of the Slave Trade, 1690-1714,” 
Parliamentary History 26 (2007): 12-26; Ann M. Carlos and Jamie Brown Kruse, “The Decline 
of the Royal African Company: Fringe Firms and the Role of the Charter,” Economic History 
Review 49, no. 2 (May 1996): 291-313; Stephen D. Behrendt, David Eltis and David 
Richardson, “The Costs of Coercion: Agency in the Pre-Modern Atlantic World,” The 
Economic History Review 54, no.3 (August 2001): 454-476; K. G. Davies, The Royal African 
Company (New York: Atheneum, 1957); Kenneth Morgan, Slavery, Atlantic Trade, and the 
British Economy, 1660-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000); Susan Dwyer 
Amussen, Caribbean Exchanges: Slavery and the Transformation of English Society: 1640-
1700 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007). 
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Governor, Sub-Governor, Deputy Governor and twenty-four elected 
Assistants.  The charter required Assistants to hold at least ₤400 of stock.  
Moreover, they were elected by shareholders who received one vote for 
every ₤100 of stock.  The Assistants met twice a week to guide the day-to-
day business of the Company and twice a year—once to elect a Governor, 
Sub-Governor, and Deputy Governor and once to announce a statement of 
the Company’s stock.5  Assistants initially allowed served for only three 
consecutive years, but after 1691 this rule was dropped.  At the same time, 
the Company decided to raise the minimum stock holdings for Assistants 
from ₤400 to ₤1,000, with no more than ₤250 being previously-owned 
stock.  Sub and Deputy Governors were limited to one consecutive two-
year term; however, influential people often rotated between the positions 
of Assistant, Sub-Governor, and Deputy Governor, creating a stable group 
of decision-makers.6  Whereas the entire Court of Assistants met about 
once a week, the Company established a number of Sub-Committees to 
assist in the duties of running the Company.  Davies notes that Assistants 
served on one or more sub-committees.7  The Company pushed the entire 
burden of executive decision-making to the Assistants and their sub-
committees.8  What emerges from Davies’ description is an extremely large 
company ran by twenty-four of its most wealthy investors, who met 
multiple times a week, and were responsible for nearly every decision the 
Company made.  Because these twenty-four Assistants met so often, they 
were London-bound and found little time to travel to the places where the 
Company purchased slaves.  Assistants rarely acquired knowledge of the 
slave trade from firsthand experience.  
 In addition, those who ran the RAC had several common 
characteristics.  First, most of the influential members of the Company 
obtained multiple investment interests.  Most of the officials of the RAC 
established interests in the British East India Company.  For example, Sir 
John Banks, a wealthy merchant, financier, and director of the Royal 
                                                            
5 Davies, Royal African Company, 153-4. 
6 Ibid., 157.  In one instance, Sir Benjamin Bathurst was continuously elected from 1677-95 by 
being rotated between the three positions. He served thirteen times as an Assistant, twice as 
Deputy Governor, and four times as Sub-Governor.   
7 Ibid., 157-8. 
8 Ibid., 154, 159. 
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African Company, likewise served as a director of the East India Company 
and was involved with the Levant Company.9  Similarly, George Berkeley, 
an influential politician and founding member of the RAC, was a member of 
the East India Company in 1680 and a governor of the Levant Company in 
1681.10  Sir Josiah Child represented a “passive investor” whose central 
interest remained with the East India Company, despite being an early 
Assistant of the RAC.11  Jeffrey Jeffreys, Assistant of the RAC in the 1680s, 
participated in the tobacco trade, established business relations with the 
East India Company in the 1690s, and became a licensed Separate Trader, 
someone who traded separately from the Company, in the early 1700s.12  Sir 
John Moore participated in both the Royal African and East India 
Companies around the time of the revolution, being an Assistant for the 
former and the second largest shareholder in the latter.13  Sir Dudley North 
served as Assistant, Sub and Deputy Governor of the Royal African 
Company, Governor of the Russia Company, and involved in the Levant 
Company.14  In short, many of the Assistants of the RAC struggled with the 
demands of multiple different companies.   
 Similarly, those who ran the RAC tended to be wealthy individuals 
with deep-rooted political interests.  For example, D.W. Hayton’s The 
House of Commons, 1690-1715 lists twenty-five individuals who were both 
Members of Parliament and holders of significant offices within the RAC.  
Many of these, such as Sir Thomas Cooke, Sir Francis and Sir Samuel 
Dashwood, Nathaniel and Frederick Herne, John and Jeffrey Jeffreys, and 
Sir William Pritchard, also held significant interests in the East India 
                                                            
9 D.C. Coleman, “Banks, Sir John,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/38265?docPos=2. 
10 Andrew Warmington, “Berkeley, George,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/2209?docPos=2. 
11 Richard Grassby, “Child, Sir Josiah,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/5290. 
12 Jacob M. Price, “Jeffreys, Jeffrey,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/49858. 
13 Richard Grassby, “Moore, Sir John,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/19125?docPos=1. 
14 Ibid. 
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Company.15  Additionally, Davies notes that in the first two decades of its 
existence, the Company listed nearly fifteen peers or associates of the 
Company.16  Once again, many of the most influential members of the RAC 
displayed significant interests elsewhere.   
 Perhaps unsurprisingly, many of the most influential members of 
the Company were passive investors who had little real world experience in 
Africa, the West Indies, or anywhere else in the Atlantic world.  For 
example, Sir Dudley North, at the time of his investments with the Royal 
African Company, was a passive investor.17  Likewise, Sir Josiah Child, 
founding member and Assistant of the RAC, was a passive investor who 
believed that trade should be controlled from a central location, London.18  
Only a select few, such as Sir William Hedges, Charles Hayes, and Sir 
Dudley North had any significant experience away from England.  Sir 
William Hedges owned one of the first shares of the Company and was a 
multiple-term Assistant in the 1690s.  He was heavily interested in the East 
India Company and traveled to the Bay of Bengal, where he acquired 
knowledge about Islamic languages and customs.19  Sir Dudley North was 
sent abroad to Russia, Smyrna, Italy, and Constantinople, which certainly 
made him a more informed controller of his interests in the Russian and 
Levant Companies, but probably added little benefit for his interests in the 
Royal African Company.20  Charles Hayes, a widely known mathematician 
                                                            
15 David W. Hayton, The House of Commons, 1690-1715, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), 736; Jacob M. Price, “Jeffreys, Sir Jeffrey,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National 
Biography, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/49858,; and Gary S. DeKrey, “Pritchard, Sir 
William,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/22825. 
16 Davies, Royal African Company, 64-5; Other prominent men in English society, such as King 
James, Sir Edmund Andros, and Sir George Carteret had associations with the Company.  John 
Locke was also loosely associated with the Company.  It is also important to note that the Royal 
African Company was not entirely made up of politicians; in fact, the majority of the 
Company’s investors were businessmen, rather than members of Parliament. 
17 Richard Grassby, “North, Sir Dudley,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20297?docPos=1. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Gary S. DeKrey, “Hedges, Sir William,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/12860. 
20 Richard Grassby, “North, Sir Dudley,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/20297?docPos=1. 
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and geographer, traveled to Africa before his days as Sub and Deputy 
Governors of the Royal African Company.21  In short, it appears that some 
portion of the most influential members of the Company possessed little 
experience in the Atlantic world.22     
 
The Transfer of Information Concerning the Slave Trade 
With some of its major investors being passive, holding 
investments in multiple companies, and having political obligations, RAC 
investors relied heavily on outside forces to bring them information about 
what was happening in the Atlantic World.  With reliance this in mind, 
information was acquired through three avenues.  First, the members 
gained information through the frequent meetings of the Royal African 
Company.  While they took copious notes of these meetings, these 
documents represent the transfer of information within the Company and 
tell us little about the proliferation of information to the greater society.  
Next, Englishmen gained information through published works of the 
Company and through records of the Privy Council and House of 
Commons.  This avenue is, in some sense, more important because it 
remained accessible to the wider society; the pamphlet wars between the 
Company and the separate traders were directed towards wider groups of 
Englishmen as the ability for commoners to influence government 
expanded.  Finally, they received information from popular literature.  This 
avenue also  affected the rest of society.  
Popular literature and scholarship helped frame the most basic 
assumptions about slavery and the slave trade for all Englishmen.  Aphra 
Behn’s Oroonoko, published in 1688 lies at the heart of these assumptions.  
Behn noted the tale of the African prince who is forced from his homeland 
                                                            
21 R.E. Anderson, “Hayes, Charles,” in the Oxford Dictionary of National Biography, 
http://proxy.library.eiu.edu:2971/view/article/12755. 
22 I have access to records for approximately 40 individuals involved with the Company from 
1685-1710.  Given the fact that there are 24 Assistants and 3 elected governorships, and that 
most of the people that held these positions were rotated frequently in order to keep them 
involved in the company, I have access to somewhere around 5% of the total number of people 
involved with the company.  Given the frequency of characteristics in each of the stories I 
examined, I surmise that, as far as my data allows me to, the majority of influential people in the 
Company had little personal experience in the Atlantic World. 
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into slavery in Surinam, where he reunites with his love, Imoinda, and 
battles the assumptions of slavery, arguing that he cannot possibly be a 
slave because of his royalty.  The idea that Oroonoko, a slave, should be 
glorified rather than chastised, presents an interesting idea for this time.  
The author claims that, “The whole proportion and air of [Oroonoko’s] 
face was so noble…that, bating [except for] his colour, there cou’d be 
nothing in nature more beautiful.”23  Moreover, John Trefry, manager of 
Lord Willoughby’s estate, upon hearing Oroonoko claim to be, “above the 
rank of common slaves,” exclaims, “[Oroonoko] was yet something greater 
than he confess’d.”24  This idea—that there are distinctions between various 
types of slaves—is contrasted by the idea that Africans represnted an 
inferior race.  For example, the owner of the plantation holds Oroonoko as 
a slave, after which he is attacked by Whites.  Similarly, the leaders 
eventually decide to hang Oroonoko as a warning to the other slaves.  
Thomas Southerne’s adaptation of Oroonoko, which premiered in November, 
1695, projected the dual views of slavery.  Additionally, one of Southerne’s 
modifications involved Oroonoko’s suicide rather than enduring the 
struggle, indicating that he may have tried to represents Africans as 
cowards.   
 Oroonoko fits into the larger group of Atlantic Creoles, who were 
able to capitalize on their ability to speak African and European languages 
to, in some cases, gain small measures of freedom.  Atlantic Creoles were 
often African traders or their sons, who held high positions in African 
society.25  In 1767, European slave traders captured members of one ruling 
family in Old Calabar, which facilitated a seven year journey wrought with 
disappointment and disaster.  As a result, the two young African Creoles 
attempted to return home.  Cases like this were complemented by Africans 
being sent to England to receive an education and Atlantic Creoles securing 
freedom and property in America.  These situations, which occurred with 
                                                            
23 Aphra Behn, Oroonoko; or, The Royal Slave, in Catherine Gallagher, and Simon Stern, eds., 
Aphra Behn: Oroonoko; or, The Royal Slave (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2000), 44. 
24 Ibid., 67. 
25 Randy J Sparks, “Two Princes of Calabar: An Atlantic Odyssey from Slavery to Freedom,” 
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some frequency in the early days of the slave trade, became less common as 
time wore on.  By the 1730s and 1740s, Atlantic Creoles in America began 
to lose their socioeconomic standing at the hands of increasingly strict legal 
codes. 26  These codes, which shrank the ranks of the Atlantic Creole, 
reflected the English Weltanschauung, which increasingly focused on 
reducing the African to sub-human levels.   
 Compared to Oroonoko, Gabriel de Brémond’s The Happy Slave, 
translated from French in 1686, presents a decidedly more pleasant view of 
slavery.  The novel tells of a young Roman, Count Alexander, captured 
near Tunis.  While in captivity, Alexander realizes the lighter side of 
slavery.  In fact, the author declares that Alexander, “having happily fallen 
into the hands of so good and generous a patron, began to recover.”27  
Brémond’s work emphasizes the “benevolent master” concept, which may 
have impacted how Englishmen chose to see themselves in relation to 
African slaves.  The essence of Brémond’s stance on slavery is evident from 
the very beginning, when he exclaims, “Africk…where the people were no 
less cruel than the lions and tigers that fill the desarts of the countrey: But 
since the discovery of Love there, it hath appear’d, that as love grows in all 
Countreys, so barbary itself hath nothing of barbarous but the name.”28  In 
short, the translation and publication of Brémond presents Englishmen 
with an overwhelmingly positive view of slavery and the slave trade in 
which the slave trade appears as a civilizing process. 
 On the other hand, publication of the works of Bartholomew de las 
Casas at this time emphasized slavery as a barbarous institution.  De las 
Casas presents a systematic description of the various cruelties committed 
in the new world in Popery Truly Display’d in its Bloody Colours.  In this 
work, slaves and natives are shown as, “being oppressed by such evil 
usage,” and “afflicted with such great torments and violent 
entertainments”29 by their Spanish masters.  De las Casas argues that the 
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slave trade not only abuses the slaves, but Native Americans as well.  
Again, the publication of de las Casas’ work also reflects English 
competition with Spain; however, the anti-slavery message of Popery Truly 
Display’d in its Bloody Colours, distributed at a time when the English were 
so engulfed in their own slave trade, further illustrates the diversity 
regarding English attitudes toward the slave trade.  Moreover, when 
combined with Oroonoko and The Happy Slave, three distinctly separate 
views of the slave trade emerge in English popular literature. 
 Like popular literature, popular scholarship, most importantly the 
voluminous works of Nathaniel Crouch, help convey information about the 
slave trade to the English.  Crouch was a bookseller and writer who 
published a number of pocket-sized, informational books written under the 
pseudonym of Robert Burton (often abbreviated R.B.).  Between 1666 and 
1725, Crouch published some seventy-five books, which were written in 
simple English and sold for one shilling.  Although he published many 
novels that dealt with religion, he is best known for his historical works, 
which he himself wrote.  After his death in 1725, Crouch’s works continued 
to sell well for the remainder of the century.30  In English Acquisitions in 
Guinea and East-India, Crouch displays an overview of the customs, 
religions, wildlife, trade patterns, and marriages of the natives near each 
English fort or settlement in Africa.  Nowhere does Crouch explain how he 
received such information, and it is unlikely that he observed these things 
himself, especially considering the number and frequency of his 
publications.  In addition, Crouch conveys some degree of disdain for the 
natives, questioning the viability of their religion, calling them treacherous, 
and describing their feeding habits like those of swine.31  Crouch declares 
that the people of Guinea “are handsome and well proportioned, having 
nothing disagreeable in their Countenances, but the blackness of their 
Complexion.”32  In describing the natives around James Fort, Crouch claims 
that they “are Envious, curiously Neat, Thieves.”33  Unreliable information 
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conveyed in popular literature, such as Crouch’s works, shaped 
Englishmen’s conceptions of the slave trade. 
 Equally important were the pamphlets and publications of the 
RAC and the separate traders, which had considerable implications for the 
transfer of information on the slave trade and the shaping of slavery in the 
minds of many Englishmen.  During the pamphlet wars between free 
traders and monopolists in the 1690s, which continued in the public sphere 
until the 1720s, a number of publications attempted to convince 
Englishmen to support either side.  Reflections of the East India Company and 
the Royal African Company, authored by Roger Coke in 1696, chastises the 
Company for being a monopoly and yet allowing foreign protestants to 
trade within its limits.34  Similarly, Considerations Concerning the African 
Companies Petitions (1698) and Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of 
Commons by the Planters (1698) argue against the Company’s monopoly for 
imposing on Englishmen’s liberty and failing to provide enough slaves to 
the West Indian plantations.35  Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the 
Commons of England, written sometime in the 1690s, argued that Jamaica 
needed more “negroes” to work the plantations.36  In Considerations Relating 
to the African Bill (1698), separate traders argue that a continuation of the 
monopoly would further endanger relationships with Africans and other 
Europeans, which would be detrimental to the trade.37   
Like the separate traders, the Royal African Company chose 
pamphlets as the main medium of transferring information to the general 
public.  True Account of the Forts and Castles Belonging to the Royal African 
Company (1698) presents valuable information concerning the status of the 
Company’s installments in Africa.  The pamphlet provides the public with 
concrete numbers of men and guns, as well as comments on the state of 
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each of the Company’s forts.  This pamphlet concludes that the forts and 
castles were “sufficiently provided with small arms, powder, and other 
necessaries of war…built of Stone and Lime,” and that an adjoining factory 
was, “covered with lead, and in very good repair.” 38  Additionally, the 
pamphlet claims that the data was “taken from Sundry Persons,” which 
implies that the Company had multiple sources to acquire information.39  In 
short, this pamphlet shows that the English public was being given fairly 
detailed accounts of the slave trade. 
Further accounts of the forts, relationships with Africans, and the 
ability of the separate traders to supply slaves to West Indian plantations 
are found in Some Observations on Extracts Taken out of the Report from the 
Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations, authored by the Royal 
African Company in 1708.  This document contains information from the 
Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations and includes the number 
of slaves brought to the West Indies by the separate traders and a list of the 
RAC’s forts in Africa.  Additionally, the document argues that the forts and 
castles are the best foundation for continued friendship, justice, humanity, 
and honesty in English relationships with Africans.40   
Moreover, The case of the Royal African Company (1709) provides 
readers with a complete summary of the free trade debate as it applied to 
the RAC through 1709.  The Case provides details of the RAC’s trade with 
Africa, but leaves out human or social aspects.  For example, The Case 
describes the forts and settlements in Africa as a place to, “stipulate the 
price of the merchandize with the natives,” rather than hold prisoner 
hundreds of slaves until the next slave ship appeared.41  Furthermore, The 
Anatomy of the African Company’s Scheme for Carrying on that Trade in a Joint-
Stock Exclusive (1710) provides a balance of the Company’s books along 
with a claim that the benefits of the African trade are due solely to the 
efforts of the RAC, the overall goal being to get their subscribers to loan 
the Company ten percent of their payment.  Additionally, the Anatomy 
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provides the number of forts (“14”) and the amount of land they take up 
(“100 miles space on the Gold Coast”), but fails to describe any non-
business related aspect of the trade.42  In other words, the content of such 
pamphlets tended to focus on the business aspect, rather than the human, or 
emotional aspects of the slave trade. These gaps would be filled by popular 
literature and speculation. 
In addition to the publications of the separate traders and the 
Royal African Company, political writers such as Daniel Defoe and Charles 
Davenant frequently issued pamphlets articulating a particular stance on 
the slave trade.  In Reflections upon the Constitution and Management of the 
Trade to Africa (1709), Davenant sets forth the position of the RAC by 
examining memoirs, declarations, accounts, and other official papers.  Like 
most other pro-Royal African Company texts, Reflections claims that the 
Company was extremely successful before 1698 (before the separate traders 
were allowed to trade with the payment of a 10% duty).  Similarly, it uses 
numbers from the Navy Office of Barbados to disprove many of the separate 
traders’ claims.  Likewise, the article provides information about Africa and 
the Company’s holdings in Africa.43  Moreover, A Clear Demonstration, from 
Points of Fact, that the Recovery, Preservation and Improvement of Britain's 
Share of the Trade to Africa, is Wholly Owing to the Industry, Care and 
Application of the Royal African Company (1709), as the title might suggest, 
claims that the benefits of the slave trade are due to the efforts of the RAC 
and that a monopoly is better suited to fit the needs of England and its 
subjects than free trade.  Once again, Davenant uses RAC records to both 
prove his assumptions and discredit the separate traders.44  These works 
provide critical insight into the information that was conveyed between the 
RAC and ordinary Englishmen because they were designed solely for the 
purpose of galvanizing the support of the people in England.  They show 
that Englishmen had a wealth of detailed information about the business 
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aspect of the slave trade at their disposal, however, pamphlets often left out 
information about the social aspects of the slave trade.  
Information was transferred between the RAC and its smaller 
shareholders through a series of meetings that occurred in the first years of 
the new century.  Ultimately, these meetings were the result of the ever-
worsening fortunes of the Company at the hands of the separate traders.  
As the separate traders began to infringe upon the RAC’s market, especially 
after 1698, the Company found its finances increasingly in danger.  In order 
to keep afloat, the Company repeatedly asked its shareholders for loans in 
the first years of the new century.  In March 1701, the Company sent out a 
request of ₤4 per share from its shareholders.  Similarly, in 1702 the request 
increased to ₤6 per share, in 1704, ₤7 per share, and in 1706, another ₤4 per 
share.45  Similarly, in September, 1706, the Company sent out a public 
request for an increase in subscription.46  These public requests show that 
the Royal African Company’s smaller shareholders were frequently called 
upon by the RAC during the “pamphlet wars” with the separate traders.  
Additionally, they suggest that smaller shareholders were given frequent 
meetings where information concerning the Company was passed along.  
The information being passed along related solely to business and 
economics. 
 K.G. Davies’ Royal African Company provides a few hints about the 
Company’s official correspondence.  Sir Dalby Thomas, Agent-General of 
the RAC from 1703-1711 and Assistant for four years prior to that47, 
corresponded frequently with the RAC.  For example, Sir Thomas 
corresponded with the RAC concerning prices of gold, deaths, “coast 
charges,” relations with the French, Portuguese, and Dutch, and tax 
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systems with the natives.48  The RAC corresponded frequently with its 
other agents.  Like the correspondence with Sir Thomas, correspondence 
with other agents spanned any number of topics. Those topics included 
shipping, sloop trade, and, as most often was the case, the productivity of a 
particular area.49   
 From these observations, we can construct a number of assertions 
concerning the operation of the Royal African Company at the turn of the 
Eighteenth Century.  First, by wealthy, prominent investors who often held 
multiple business and political interests controlled the RAC.  There were 
minimum amounts of shares that a person needed to hold in order to be 
elected to an official position within the Company.50  Many of the investors 
were passive; they had not been actively involved in the trading of slaves, 
opting instead to remain in London.51  Moreover, the frequency of the 
Company’s meetings ensured that its leaders had little time to travel the 
world or become active in the trade.52  Observations on a Guinea Voyage, 
written nearly a century later by James Field Stanfield, asserts that a true 
understanding of the Slave Trade could not be achieved without a personal 
experience on a slave ship, thus inferring that many RAC decision-makers 
of had little understanding of the human aspect of the trade.53  
 Much of the information that was circulating within the Royal 
African Company and in the wider society left out a crucial humanitarian 
perspective that represented the foundation of future abolitionist writings.  
Popular literature and scholarship, in an attempt to fill the void left by 
pamphlets and official papers, often portrayed Blacks and the slave trade in 
less than accurate ways.  For example, The Happy Slave suggests that the 
slave trade could be a civilizing process aided by benevolent slave masters.  
Similarly, both Behn’s Oroonoko and Southerne’s adaptation question the 
sub-human nature of royal Africans, while at the same time reaffirm the 
                                                            
48 Davies, Royal African Company, 216, 226, 257, 259, 269, 274, 280. 
49 Ibid., 217, 219, 223, 227-8. 
50 Ibid., 153-4, 157. 
51 Ibid., 53. 
52 Ibid., 154, 157-9. 
53 James Field Stanfield, Observations on a Guinea Voyage, in a Series of Letters Addressed to 
the Rev. Thomas Clarkson (London: James Phillips, 1788), 30, in Marcus Rediker, The Slave 
Ship: A Human History (New York: Viking, 2007), 156. 
   43 
sub-human nature of non-royal blacks.  Moreover, writers of popular 
history, such as Nathaniel Crouch, surely did not possess an unbiased, 
objective and factual basis for their assertions.  Crouch, for example, 
published nearly seventy-five books in just over half a century, a fact that 
calls into question where he obtained information on such a short notice.  
Moreover, pamphlets that circulated at the turn of the century solely 
addressed the economic and business aspects of the slave trade, leaving out 
critical issues such as the living conditions on board slave ships, an issue 
that would make Thomas Clarkson famous in the last two decades of the 
eighteenth century. 
 
Implications for the Collective English Weltanschauung  
 With this in mind, the complex, yet haphazard, transfers of 
information concerning Africa, Africans, slaves and the slave trade during 
this time affected English society in a very profound way.  This change can 
be seen by a consideration of the various meanings of the three most 
common words used to describe Africans: “native,” “slave,” and “negro.”  
Two of the Oxford English Dictionary’s definitions of the word “negro,” 
states that “a person of black African origin or descent” and “a slave (or 
enfranchised slave) of black African origin or descent.”54  The use of the 
word “negro,” as either the former or latter meaning, provides a clue into 
the degree in which English society equated the words “negro” and “slave” 
during this period.  Moreover, the convergence of the two words shows one 
effect of the lack of cultural and societal information concerning the slave 
trade, despite the relatively detailed economic accounts of the trade. 
 In some cases, the English used the word “negro” to describe 
Africans before their enslavement in the West Indies, either in Africa or in 
the process of being sold into slavery (the middle passage).  In 
Considerations Concerning the African Companies Petitions (1698), the author 
claims that “no good negroes” reside in the most remote areas of Africa.55  
Similarly, Considerations Humbly Offered to the House of Commons by the 
Planters (1698) refers to a lack of “negroes” supplied to the West Indies.56  
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Reasons Humbly Offer'd to the Honourable the Commons of England (1690-
1699), too, claims that Jamaica needs more “negroes,” thus using the word 
to describe pre-West Indian Africans.  Finally, on December 26, 1695, the 
Calendar of State Papers notes that, “the factors of the Royal African 
Company picked out the best negroes.”57  In 1698, the Privy Council gave 
the RAC the authority to export beans as a means to feed “negroes” on 
board their ships.  In 1693, they requested that the Company send more 
“negroes” and goods in order to help furnish the West Indian plantations.58  
In each of these cases, the documents used the word “negro” to describe 
Africans in the process of being sold into slavery.   
On the other hand, the English sometimes referred to Blacks in 
Africa as “natives.”  Considerations Relating to the African Bill (1698) refers 
provides one such instance.   Similarly, in Some Observations on Extracts 
Taken out of the Report from the Lords Commissioners for Trade and Plantations 
(1708), the Royal African Company discusses friendly relationships with 
“natives” through permanent forts and settlements.59  One year later, the 
Company explained how separate traders gave the “natives” more leverage 
in their relationship with Europeans.60  In a letter to the Royal African 
Company from Captain Bernard Ladman in 1701, Ladman refers to “blacks 
being afraid to come aboard English ships,” that were docked off the coast 
of Africa.61  In this case, “blacks” instead of “negroes” was used to refer to 
Africans who the British traded with.  Interestingly, Ladman later refers to 
his coming away from the site with “24 Negroes,” thus referring to Blacks 
on board trans-Atlantic ships as “negroes.”  In each of these cases, the word 
“native” is used when referring to African trading partners of the English.  
In other words, the British still expressed some distinctions between 
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African trading partners, captured Africans, and slaves; however, they 
considered the majority of Africans “negroes,” rather than “natives.”   
 On the contrary, some writings blurred the line between “negroes” 
and “slaves,” in which case a document might use the word “slave” to 
describe an African in Africa or the word “negro” to describe a slave in the 
West Indies.  Some of these, however, provide a clear distinction between 
the words “negro” and “slave.”  On June 10, 1693, for example, the Calendar 
notes a slave uprising in the West Indies and refers to the aftermath in 
which soldiers, “fell upon all the negroes, free as well as slaves.”62  In this 
instance, although the author refers to slaves as “negroes,” he notes that the 
existence of a difference between free and enslaved Negroes.  Moreover, on 
September 14, 1693, a Committee discussed rewarding “freedmen and 
slaves who behave well against the enemy.”63  Once again, the document 
notes a clear difference between emancipated Negroes and enslaved 
Negroes.   
Moreover, using the word “negro” to mean the word “slave” 
represents one effect of the comparative lack of cultural and societal 
information about Africans.  The Calendar of State Papers notes one 
instance in which a ship, “shipped 700 slaves at Guinea,” and a 
disagreement between the Company’s agents and a planter over how much 
the planter owed the agent for “negroes.”64  In a letter from Sir Dalby 
Thomas to the Royal African Company in 1704, Thomas referred to 
purchasing of both “slaves” and “negroes.”65  A treaty between the Royal 
African and French Senegal Companies claims that both companies would 
assist each other, “against the Negros,” using the term in a very general 
manner.  Moreover, the “Project of the Assiento for Negroes Made between 
England and Spain, 1707” provides a great example of the development of 
the words by the end of the first decade of the eighteenth century.  To 
begin, the document is described as a “Contract for Blacks or Negroes,” 
thus leaving ambiguity in the meaning of both terms.  Next, it attaches the 
two words, declaring that it is an “Agreement to import Negro slaves,” 
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showing some convergence in the meanings of both words.66  A Report on 
the Trade to Africa in 1709 presents a similar pattern.  At one point, the 
document comments, “the Charges of their working Negroes, employed in 
carrying the Goods of the Company and other Matters relating to their 
Trade, and in looking after their Slaves.”67  In this example, the document 
used both “negro” and “slave” in the same sentence to mean the same thing.   
The Calendar of State Papers presents the words “negro” and 
“slave” as having similar meanings.  In the minutes for November 14, 1693, 
it refers to the “negro trade,” when referring to the slave trade.  Moreover, 
the same entry uses the word “slaves” when talking about blacks in the 
West Indies.  On November 9th, they once again referred to the trans-
Atlantic slave trade as the “negro trade.”  In all, the writings of the 
Calendar of State Papers, letters between factors and the Company, and 
pamphlets portray Africans as slaves, whether they use the word “negro” or 
“slave;” they represent a converging of the words “negro” and “slave” and 
are emblematic of a lack of cultural information concerning Africans. 
 
Conclusion 
 As we have seen, the convergence of the words “negro” and “slave” 
coupled with pamphlets and literary works which viewed the slave trade 
from an exclusively economic standpoint suggest that the English 
Weltanschauung underwent a significant change at the turn of the eighteenth 
century; however, any study concerning the British slave trade would be 
incomplete without a connection to British abolition.  Put another way, the 
developments occurring in the British Weltanschauung in the decades 
enveloping the year 1700—in which the concept of race was being solidified 
so that Africans were viewed primarily as slaves—may have clouded the 
vision of Englishmen, helping delay a widespread moral inquiry until the 
end of the eighteenth century.  
One way historians have explained this “delayed abolition” holds 
that the profits of the slave trade during previous years overshadowed the 
moral questions that surrounded it, an assertion that historian Eric 
                                                            
66 Ibid., 16-21. 
67 Ibid., 53. 
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Williams championed.68  In other words: willful ignorance.  While the 
correspondence concerning the slave trade available in Donnan’s Documents 
Illustrative of the History of the Slave Trade to America falls short of explicitly 
stating willful ignorance, such sentiments can be inferred from their 
writings.  In “The Slave Trade at Calabar, 1700-1705,” the author describes 
the “brutish creatures” that occupy the slave ships, as “cruel and bloody in 
their temper, always quarrelling, biting and fighting, and 
sometimes…murdering one another.”  Moreover, the author declares that 
slave captains “need pray for quick passage,” in order to avoid losing too 
many slaves, and thus, “turn’d to a very bad market.”69  In this case, the 
author hints that the health and well-being of slaves should be considered 
only in relation to the economic health and well-being of the captain and 
merchant.   Numerous petitions to the House of Commons cite professions 
in England, Gun-makers, Cutlers, Powder-makers, Dyers, Packers, Setters, 
Drawers, Shipwrights, and Sail-makers, just to name a few, whose 
livelihoods have been “supported by Sale of their Goods, usually exported 
by the Royal African Company.”70  In this case, Gun-makers, Cutlers, 
Powder-makers, etc. failed to question the morality of the slave trade 
because of its economic benefits.   
Philip Gould hints at another possible aspect of delayed abolition 
in Barbaric Traffic; the enlightenment. Those few criticisms of the slave 
trade that did exist in the early eighteenth century focused on the literal 
inconsistency of the trade with biblical law.  In the latter part of the 
century, this idea “gives away to the contemporary standards of enlightened 
civilization.”71 In other words, the ideas of an enlightened civilization 
implied just commerce, which was used instead of biblical law to combat the 
slave trade. 
When integrating the content revealed in this study, it becomes 
apparent that another explanation is possible.  In other words, the changes 
                                                            
68 Williams, Eric, Capitalism and Slavery, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
1994). 
69 Donnan, Documents Illustrative, 14-15. 
70 Ibid., 96-99.   
71 Philip Gould, Barbaric Traffic: Commerce and Antislavery in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic 
World (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 19.  Gould includes a further discussion of 
early inquiries into the slave trade during the period I focus on on pages 14-15. 
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occurring in the collective English Weltanschauung at the turn of the 
eighteenth-century clouded the English mindset, which may have delayed 
an inquiry into the slave trade.  As we have seen, many accounts of the 
slave trade tended to emphasize the economic aspect of the trade.  The 
origins of this can be found in RAC correspondence with Sir Dalby 
Thomas, which reveals discussions that focused almost entirely on 
international competition and prices of gold and slaves.72  Sir Thomas’ 
Weltanschauung, therefore, clearly viewed the slave trade through an 
economic lens.  Moreover, those who read pamphlets based on information 
conveyed by Sir Thomas and his counterparts would have experienced the 
slave trade through an economic lens.  To add, pamphlets reflected 
correspondence in that they began to confuse the meanings of the words 
“negro” and “slave.”  When this happened on a grand scale, as it did during 
the pamphlet wars of the 1690s-1720s, the collective English 
Weltanschauung underwent a critical change.  The end result was a 
generation of Englishmen who’s first experience with the slave trade was 
through a businessman’s rather than a humanitarian’s perspective; Africans 
were slaves first and humans second, rather than the reverse.  
Consequently, when the British slave trade expanded exponentially in the 
first decades of the eighteenth century, the English were well prepared to 
accept the institution, instead of question it.  That would be left for the 
women and men of a later generation.  
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The Vietnam War has certainly produced burgeoning scholars and 
literature.  In the decade or so after the Vietnam War ended, most scholars 
wrote critically of the United States’ intervention in Indochina.  Heated 
debates began to take place within books, article, and conferences.  Given 
the lavish attention, three scholarly views have arisen and become 
increasingly heated.  Orthodox scholars follow the traditional doctrine that 
America’s involvement in the war was unwinnable and unjust, while the 
revisionists believe that the war was a noble cause and Vietnam, below the 
17th parallel, was a viable and stable country, but policies and military 
tactics were improperly executed.  The heated debates have focused on two 
central issues—Ngo Dinh Diem and his reign over South Vietnam and poor 
leadership by American presidents and top officials.  Orthodox scholars 
argue that Diem as a corrupt tyrannical puppet, while revisionists believe 
Diem was an independent leader who knew what was necessary to allow his 
young country to survive.  According to the orthodox scholars, American 
presidents John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson and other 
top officials did their best to control the situation in Vietnam, though the 
war was doomed from the beginning.  Revisionists do not believe the war 
was lost on the battlefield but was lost due to poor decisions and lack of 
attention to the war.  Recently, another group of scholars have weighed in 
on this subject.  These scholars, post-revisionists, do not even admit 
defeat—arguing that the United States won the war by late 1970.  The goal 
of this paper is to give insight on orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist 
views.  
 
Ngo Dinh Diem 
In Philip Catton’s book, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s 
War in Vietnam, he does not attempt to whitewash any of Diem’s faults but 
does portray Diem as a modern nationalist, determined to follow his own 
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agenda.  Diem’s desire to build his own South Vietnamese state led to a 
coup, which the Kennedy administration supported.  Catton explains that in 
an attempt to find a reliable president in South Vietnam, the United States 
assumed the position of kingmaker.  Diem and his key advisers’ feared that 
the perception of their dependence on the United States tainted their 
credentials as nationalists, playing into the hands of the regime’s enemies.  
Catton points out that Diem feared the Americans nearly as much as they 
did the Communist insurgents.  Implementing his own vision of a sovereign 
national entity, Diem assembled the South Vietnamese peasantry for 
support while reducing the regime’s reliance on the United States.  Catton 
goes on to argue that the strategic hamlet program was intended not only 
to defeat the National Liberation Front (NLF) but also to further free the 
South Vietnamese from the overbearing American control.  In addition, 
Catton explains that Kennedy, Johnson, and top American officials did not 
fully understand Diem’s intentions or the social and cultural situations in 
South Vietnam.  Diem understood the necessity of American assistance, but 
he knew the intrusive American support would make him a puppet of 
Washington.  Catton finally suggests that the overthrow of Diem prompted 
the Americanization of the war in Vietnam.1       
Keith Taylor, a leading revisionist, sparked the reevaluation of the 
Vietnam War in an article entitled “How I began to Teach About the 
Vietnam War.”  Taylor aims to debunk three axioms regarding the war.  
The first is the idea that there was not a legitimate noncommunist 
government in Saigon.  The second misconception he addresses is the belief 
that the United States had no legitimate reason to be involved in Vietnam, 
while the third focuses on the assumption that the United States could not 
have won the war under any circumstance.  Taylor explains that Diem was 
actually a competent leader—not an American lackey.  Made into a 
scapegoat for American frustrations and misguided American advisors, 
Keith portrays Diem as understanding what was necessary for South 
Vietnam’s survival, but the U.S. sponsored assassination cut his leadership 
short.2   
                                                            
1 Philip Catton, Diem’s Final Failure: Prelude to America’s War in Vietnam (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2002). 
2 Keith Taylor, “How I Began to Teach about the Vietnam War,” Michigan Quarterly Review 
43 no.4 (2004): 637-647. 
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While Keith Taylor sparked the reevaluation of the Vietnam War, 
Mark Moyar continued to push this debate further.  Moyar’s book, Triumph 
Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965, explains how the United States’ 
government failed South Vietnam morally and politically by allowing 
Diem’s assassination.  His death put an end to his successful prosecution of 
the war against the Viet Cong, which obviated the controversial incursion 
of American troops from 1965 to 1973.  Generally, Moyar says, historians 
view Diem as an authoritarian Asian dictator who became an oppressor as 
he solidified his family’s stronghold over South Vietnam’s government, thus 
becoming a less effective leader.  Moyar, however, fiercely disagrees with 
these statements.  He acknowledges the authoritarian nature of Diem’s 
leadership, but argues for its necessity.  South Vietnam was fighting for 
survival and needed a dictator-like leader; Diem governed in an 
authoritarian manner because of the unsuitability of Western-style 
democracy for a country dominated by a totalitarian culture.  According to 
Moyar, in 1962 and 1963, the South Vietnamese army became increasingly 
skillful in intelligence gathering and in fighting under Diem’s leadership.  
Consequently, until he was assassinated in the November 1963 coup, Diem 
successfully prosecuted the war to the verge of victory over the Viet Cong.  
Moyar’s last chapter, “Betrayal: August 1963,” states that after the 
assassination, everything fell apart in Vietnam.  Diem’s death was a tragedy 
for South Vietnam as well as for American policy.3   
On the opposite side of the spectrum lies the orthodox scholar 
Robert Buzzanco and his article, “How I Learned to Quit Worrying and 
Love Vietnam and Iraq.”  Buzzanco argues that Diem engaged in an 
assortment of corrupt activities that included placing his family into high 
political positions, dealing in the black market, and firing roughly 6,000 
army officers and replacing them with more loyal but less qualified soldiers.  
He imprisoned over 40,000 political prisoners and executed more than 
12,000, and took control of 650,000 hectares of land, which denied peasants 
of their livelihoods.  Buzzanco also writes that if the South Vietnamese 
wanted Americans in their country, why were there several coups d’état to 
oust the Americans?  To counter this fabricated belief, Buzzanco suggests 
                                                            
3 Mark Moyar, Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954-1965 (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006). 
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that in fact, the South Vietnamese did not want American support, and that 
the United States’ sole motivation was imperialism.  In support of 
Buzzanco’s arguments is David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest.  
Halberstam and Buzzanco’s perceptions about Diem are closely related.  
Both historians believe the Diem regime lacked legitimacy and stunk of 
corruption.4   
Historian Edward Miller’s, War Stories: The Taylor-Buzzanco 
Debate and How We Think About the Vietnam War, is an article trying to 
separate historians Keith Taylor and Robert Buzzanco’s ideas about Diem’s 
legitimacy.  Miller disagrees with Buzzanco’s critical depiction of Diem as a 
spineless American puppet with no agenda other than appeasing American 
leaders.  According to Miller, Buzzanco believes that Diem was “hand-
picked” by American leaders in order to Americanize South Vietnam.  In 
addition, Miller argues that Diem actively pushed for a modernized nation 
in South Vietnam.  Diem’s determination to follow this vision made him 
much more autonomous than Buzzanco recognizes.  According to Miller, 
Buzzanco quotes Wesley Fishel, an American advisor to the South 
Vietnamese leader, saying that the government was “shaky as all hell.”5  
Buzzanco believes that Diem’s only agenda was to increase his family’s 
power, however, Miller contends that no credible evidence exists that 
implicates Diem as a “hand-picked” or excessively corrupt leader.6 
Miller moves on to explain that Diem showed his independence by 
redistributing land.  Diem, lacking interest in American land reform, 
pushed for his own ideas of land distribution.  Instead of America’s proposal 
of dispensing landlord’s property, Diem wanted to redistribute people by 
transporting thousands of peasants to Land Development Centers in lightly 
populated areas in South Vietnam.  Miller acknowledges and supports 
Philip Catton’s study of the Strategic Hamlet Program, Diem’s last 
                                                            
4 Robert Buzzanco, “How I Learned to Quit Worrying and Love Vietnam and Iraq.” 
Counterpunch, http://www.counterpunch.org/buzzanco04162005.html; and David Halberstam, 
The Best and the Brightest (London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1973).    
5 Ibid. 
6 Edward Miller, “War Stories: The Taylor-Buzzanco Debate and How We Think About the 
Vietnam War,” Journal of Vietnamese Studies 1, no. 1-2 (2006): 453-484. 
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modernization project.  Miller notes that Diem was trying to modernize 
South Vietnam and had no dependency upon the United States.7   
 While Miller tries to separate Taylor and Buzzanco, though siding 
with Taylor, Gabriel Kolko’s orthodox view portrays Diem as a corrupt and 
tyrannical leader.  Kolko explains that by the early 1960s the United States 
could not overlook the increasing threat that Diem’s blatant corruption and 
oppression posed.  Kolko writes that the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, 
addressed the dilemma the week after Kennedy took office, saying that the 
United States was “caught between pressing Diem to do things he did not 
wish to do and the need to convey to him American support.”8  By 1961 
Diem fully appreciated and relied on the Kennedy administration’s reliance 
on his regime.  Moreover, Diem ignored America’s modest proposals, Kolko 
says, “at best [only] agreeing to study them.”9   
 Well on his way toward self-destruction, Diem began arresting 
thousands of civilian non-NLF critics, political threats, and military 
officers—enemies that, according to Kolko, only existed in his head.  Diem’s 
oppression did not stop there.  On May 8, 1963, Diem ordered the killing of 
nine Buddhist protesters at an anti-Diem demonstration in Hue.  While the 
orthodox view of Kolko condemns Diem for his murder and oppression of 
Buddhists, Mark Moyar disagrees.  Moyar writes that reporters developed 
friendships with Buddhist leaders—Buddhists gave reporters tips, carried 
protest signs in English, and made the young men feel significant.  The 
correspondents, in return, favored stories about the Buddhist protesters. 
Moyar also contends that Diem gave Buddhists permission to carry out 
many activities that the French and Ho Chi Minh had prohibited, but 
animosity still loomed.  Moyar goes on to explain that the Vietnamese 
Communists had a history of posing as monks and infiltrating Buddhists 
organizations, since a Vietnamese man only had to shave his head and wear 
a monk’s robe to be considered a monk.  However, Kolko argues that only a 
few Communist documents have been captured revealing Communist 
participation in the Buddhist demonstrations.10                         
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Experience (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 115.     
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
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Controversy looming around Diem still remains.  Orthodox 
scholars adhere to the traditional views of Diem, while revisionists are 
trying to investigate and reevaluate Diem’s role during the Vietnam War.  
Both sides of this debate have credibility, however, the public and most 
historians would agree that the corrupt nature of Diem’s authoritarian 
regime only hindered America’s progress in Vietnam.  
 
Poor Leadership 
In the 1990s, historians began to reevaluate John F. Kennedy’s 
role in Vietnam, leading to their argument that the young president, had he 
not been assassinated, would not have escalated the conflict into a major 
war.  Kennedy supporters like Arthur Schlesinger, Howard Jones, Fred 
Logevall, David Kaiser, Lawrence Freedman, and others have also made 
this claim.  Furthermore, the 1991 Oliver Stone film, JFK, portrays 
Kennedy as a dove in regards to Vietnam, and alludes to the idea that 
Lyndon Johnson was responsible for the escalation of the conflict.  More 
recently, the revival of the war has gone further with Philip Catton, Keith 
Taylor, Mark Moyar, Ed Miller, and others claiming that America’s top 
officials, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, and the Joints Chiefs of Staff lost 
the war due to poor decisions, lack of attention, and separate agendas. 
 Buzzanco, agreeing with the revisionists, states, “I believe that 
Kennedy made bad decisions about Vietnam because he was not paying 
sufficient attention and Johnson did so because it was not his priority.”11  
Buzzanco explains that the sheer mass of documents, interviews, and oral 
histories pertaining to the war provide sufficient evidence that Kennedy and 
Johnson regarded the Vietnam War as a solemn and significant matter.  
However, Buzzanco also argues that the Kennedy and Johnson Libraries 
contain millions of pages of reports and analyses from an array of agencies, 
military branches, and diplomatic officials, all of which avidly demonstrate 
the dedication of both administrations to substantial levels of attention to 
the war.  In addition, Buzzanco questions Taylor’s notion of Johnson’s 
limited war, asking, “Should he have sent 500,000 men to Vietnam then?”  
He argues that the American public and congress would not have supported 
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such a sizeable commitment, while other orthodox scholars would agree 
that both Kennedy and Johnson were incorrect in their policy-making,12   
Harry Summers, a revisionist, published On Strategy: A Critical 
Analysis of the Vietnam War to defend and find a more plausible 
interpretation of the Vietnam War.  Summers contends with the notion that 
Vietnam was lost as a result of the poor training of American troops rather 
than strategy.  He supports his ideas by arguing that, at the time of the Tet 
Offensive, the Viet Cong possessed twenty-percent of their original power.  
He claims that the Tet Offensive and the 1972 invasion were both horrible 
failures for the North Vietnam forces.  Also, Summers argues that it was 
not until the United States pulled out of Vietnam in 1972 that North 
Vietnam succeeded in victory.  Bad tactical and logistical planning did not 
lead to the fall of South Vietnam, but rather the inadequate leadership of 
top American officials.  The United States had done everything it set out to 
do, according to Summers.  Providing supplies, munitions, and shelter for 
more than a million personnel several thousand miles from home, the 
United States’ military also fought and won almost every engagement with 
the enemy.  However, the United States’ presidents and top officials 
provided only a vague and generic expectation of victory.  Summers and 
other conservative historians, such as Lewis Sorley, Michael Lind, Edward 
Miller, Keith Taylor, and Mark Moyar, contend that the United States 
actually won the war militarily, but because of poor decisions and pathetic 
politicians, the war was lost.13  
 Revisionists believe that the Kennedy administration quickly 
began plunging deeper into the morass of the Vietnam War, while George 
C. Herring, an orthodox scholar, characterizes Kennedy as a cautious, 
hesitant, and improvisational leader.  Kennedy postponed a firm 
commitment for nearly a year, and he only acted because of the pressures of 
a collapsing Diem regime.  Wary of international and domestic 
consequences but unwilling to introduce a full-scale war, Kennedy chose a 
careful course, thus expanding the United States’ role in Vietnam.  
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13 Harry G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (California: Presidio 
Press, 1983). 
   56 
Kennedy’s unprepared and dangerous policies encouraged Diem to continue 
on his corruptive path.  The reluctant president rejected Walt Whitman 
Rostow’s proposal to put pressure on the Soviet Union to stop sending 
troops and supplies to North Vietnam, therefore entrapping the United 
States in a “long drawn out indecisive involvement.”14  Herring points out 
that Kennedy became frustrated with the unmanageability of the War and 
never devoted his full attention to Vietnam or the potential consequences of 
his actions.  The President and his advisors’ preoccupation with day-to-day 
events led to shortsightedness that encumbered the formulation of a long-
term solution in Vietnam.  Kennedy believed that the United States knew 
what was best for Vietnam, and this arrogant mentality pushed the United 
States farther into war.15  To reinforce Herring’s ideas, historians James S. 
Olson and Randy Robert provide further descriptions in Where the Domino 
Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-1995.  All three historians believe the 
Kennedy and Johnson administrations were ill-prepared, hesitant, and 
unable to comprehend the conflicts of the Vietnam War.  Consequently, 
Kennedy and Johnson were willing to use heavy firepower to overwhelm 
and insert American policies.16                    
 Herring explores President Lyndon Johnson’s deteriorating 
situation in South Vietnam, mimicking Larry Berman’s book, Lyndon 
Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam.  Between 1963 and 1965, 
Johnson transformed a limited war into an open-ended commitment within 
Vietnam, Herring explains.  Frightened that a large-scale involvement 
might endanger his chances for re-election, Johnson expanded American 
advisors and assistances until 1965 when it appeared that South Vietnam 
might collapse.  Over the next six months Johnson ordered a ground and 
air offensive against North Vietnam—pushing the United States into a 
major war in Indochina.  After America began attacking the North 
Vietnamese, Johnson publicly committed the United States to defending 
South Vietnam from the defiant North Vietnamese.  Moreover, operation 
Rolling Thunder, implemented by Johnson, grew from an infrequent effort 
                                                            
14George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975 (New 
York: McGraw-Hill, 1996), 101.     
15 Herring.   
16 James S. Olson and Randy Roberts, Where the Domino Fell: America and Vietnam, 1945-
1995 (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996).   
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into a determined program.  Herring explains that questions of Johnson’s 
comprehension of foreign policy circulated from the moment he took office.  
Consequently, Johnson regarded the Vietnam conflict as part of Kennedy’s 
program he was sworn to defend.17    
Agreeing with Herring’s view is Fredrik Logevall’s book, Choosing 
War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam.  
Logevall proves that Johnson had a variety of options that could slow or 
stop the escalation of the war, but the president and his advisers chose to 
increase the number of American troops in Vietnam, pushing America 
further into a war with appalling consequences.  In addition, Logevall 
argues that both Kennedy and Johnson had stepped away from 
opportunities for disengaging from the involvement in Vietnam for 
domestic and political reasons, for example the 1964 election.  Johnson’s 
actions after Kennedy’s assassination prove his desire to escalate the war 
secretly.  Meanwhile, world leaders dissociated themselves from American 
involvement, and privately counseled Johnson to “cut and run.”  Unwilling 
to admit defeat, Johnson lost numerous opportunities for détentes and 
improved relations with China and the Soviet Union.  Logevall also gives 
convincing evidence proving that individuals like Secretary of Defense 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, and General William 
Westmoreland haughtily chose to pursue a war that many around them 
inquired and discouraged.  Nevertheless, Johnson’s own agenda and the bad 
counsel of his military advisors followed a disastrous path of further 
escalation, condemning about 59,000 American soldiers to premature 
death.18 
 The policies of American presidents and top ranking officials 
sucked America into an unwinnable war, H.R. McMaster argues in his 
revisionist based book, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert 
McNamara, the Joints Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam.   
McMaster analyzes the decisions and viewpoints of the Johnson 
administration through 1966 by which time American troops were heavily 
engaged in Vietnam.  McMaster explains that Johnson and McNamara 
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excluded the Joint Chiefs of Staff from all major decisions on the war.  Both 
Johnson and McNamara believed that analysis and statistics could resolve 
any situation in Vietnam.  Unfortunately, the two men got approximately 
59,000 soldiers killed in a war they all knew proved unwinnable, according 
to McMaster.  Johnson and McNamara created a barrier which shielded 
them from professional counsel.  As political bullies and manipulators of 
intelligence, Johnson and McNamara were solely responsible for bad advice 
from their advisors.19    
Johnson was determined to commit to a limited war without the 
approval of Congress and hid the war’s escalation from the American 
people.  McMaster believes Johnson based all of his decisions on his 
domestic program—the Great Society.  He goes on to argue that in late 
January 1965, Johnson authorized American destroyers to patrol the Gulf 
of Tonkin, in hopes of provoking a North Vietnamese attack.  In February 
of that same year, Johnson introduced American ground troops into 
Vietnam, an irreversible commitment to the war.  McMaster made an 
alarming assertion explaining how the Joint Chiefs of Staff viewed the 
president’s policies as essentially flawed, but nevertheless acted to support 
and reinforce it—contributing to Johnson’s and General Westmoreland’s 
disastrous strategy of attrition in South Vietnam.20                           
 McMaster challenges McNamara’s critics saying that McNamara 
never had a good relationship with the Joint Chiefs of Staff because of their 
inability to respond fast enough, while their ignorant administration 
exacerbated the Johnson administration’s opinion of them.  According to 
McMaster, McNamara lost patience with the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
impassiveness.  The Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that McNamara's 
strategies would be inadequate to turn the tide against the North 
Vietnamese.  After Johnson’s approval of McNamara’s plan to escalated 
pressure on the North Vietnamese, the Joint Chiefs of Staff’s desire to 
further their own agendas hindered their cooperative ability to provide 
military advice.  By the summer of 1964, according to McMaster, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff had been reduced to serving “more as technicians for 
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planners in the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] than as strategic 
thinkers and advisers in their own right.”21  He concludes that the war in 
Vietnam was lost in Washington, D.C., long before Americans realized the 
country was at war and assumed the sole responsibility for the fighting in 
1965.  Logevall and McMaster’s beliefs mirror the evidence presented in 
other recent books such as Kaiser’s American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson, and 
the Origin of the Vietnam War. 22 
 Pressed by many advisors to pursue an aggressive course in 
Vietnam, the Kennedy administration followed suit.  Kasier, a recent 
revisionist, believes that Robert McNamara misled Kennedy as to the status 
of ongoing efforts.  As a result, Kennedy died believing the circumstances in 
Vietnam were much more manageable than what it really was. With 
Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the conflict began to move much more 
quickly toward a full blown war.  Johnson wanted to be a great domestic 
president, however, he was less experienced in foreign policy, thus pushing 
the United States further into a quagmire.  Unlike Logevall, Kaiser believes 
Kennedy’s confidence and skepticism led him to resist suggestions for 
major involvement.  According to Kasier, Kennedy was reluctant to commit 
American ground forces in Vietnam, while Johnson was determined to 
confront North Vietnam with ground forces and bombing campaigns.  
Johnson lacked Kennedy’s sophisticated foreign policy, Kaiser says, and did 
not understand or value the extraordinarily negative effects that war would 
have on “our” relationship with the rest of the world.   Kasier’s book is a 
worthy companion piece to David Halberstam’s book, The Best and the 
Brightest.  Halberstam argues that it was a number of specific individuals 
with their own private agendas and belief systems that led to the deepening 
investment in the Vietnam War.  Halberstam, like Kasier, notes that 
Kennedy purposefully denied repeated attempts by his senior advisors and 
the military to drastically widen actions in Vietnam.  According to Kaiser, 
while Kennedy did allow escalation by sending military advisors, he 
repeatedly and quite specifically denied, both verbally and by way of 
documented meetings with advisors, authorization to escalate by 
introducing direct combat involvement.  Still, this is not to suggest that 
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Kaiser either agrees with Halberstam’s thesis or to argue that he has 
nothing new or worthwhile to reveal—similarities do run through both 
books.  Kaiser argues that the Vietnam War was neither necessary nor 
winnable, but the greatest American policy failure in foreign relations.   
 In contrast to Kasier, Michael Lind’s revisionist book, The 
Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military 
Conflict, describes the United States’ involvement as a proper response to 
communist aggression and a need to assert America’s strength.  Lind also 
debunks the liberal mythology that the United States missed opportunities 
to befriend the North Vietnamese Communists.  He asserts that there was 
no opportunity for a Coalition Government in South Vietnam; and the 
South Vietnam’s government was at least as legitimate as the North’s and 
undoubtedly preferable.23 
 In accords with Kasier and Halberstam, Lawrence Freedman’s 
Kennedy’s War: Berlin, Cuba, Laos, and Vietnam and Howard Jones’s Death of a 
Generation: How the Assassinations of Diem and JFK Prolonged the Vietnam 
War argues that Kennedy would never have turned Vietnam into an 
American war, with a huge deployment of American forces, the way 
Lyndon Johnson did  in 1965.  Both Freedman and Jones argue that 
Kennedy did increase the number of advisers, who sometimes assisted the 
South Vietnamese in battle, but never favored deploying significant ground 
forces.  Also, Kennedy had a plan to eventually withdraw all American 
troops when the South Vietnamese army became more capable of 
controlling their government.24 
 Daniel Ellsberg covers much of the same material that appears in 
David Halberstam’s The Best and the Brightest, but, begins his examination 
of the war with President Johnson and Defense Secretary McNamara 
claiming unprovoked enemy aggression and threats to American interests 
instigated the war.  Within twenty hours of starting his new job at the 
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Pentagon, and referring to the Gulf of Tonkin incident, Ellsberg writes that 
he already knew that each one of the assurances given by the President and 
Defense Secretary was false.  Ellsberg explains that the intelligence did not 
fail in Vietnam since Presidents do get good advice from top officials, but 
that the position of the President combined with executive secrecy as an 
enabling condition permitted irrational and ineffective policies.  Even before 
the Gulf of Tonkin, the Johnson Administration was determined to start a 
war with North Vietnam, unbeknownst to the American people or 
Congress. With the full knowledge of the President and Secretary of 
Defense McNamara, massive covert operations were carried out.  Again, 
lies covered any of this up.  As a result, no one could be honest.  Johnson 
would never entertain any negative reports, nor would McNamara and the 
military.25  
 Moyar depicts Johnson as a figure trapped by circumstance, 
quoting Johnson as saying, “It’s like being in an airplane and I have to 
choose between crashing the plane or jumping out.  I do not have a 
parachute.”26  Moyar argues against the orthodox school’s view of 
American involvement in the war as “wrongheaded and unjust.”27  The 
main villains are former Vietnam War correspondents David Halberstam 
and anyone else who had anything negative to say about the South 
Vietnamese premier Ngo Dinh Diem and positive things to say about 
Vietnamese Communist leader Ho Chi Minh.  Moyar declares that after 
Diem’s assassination, Johnson had at his disposal numerous aggressive 
policy options that could have allowed South Vietnam to continue the war 
without a massive American troop involvement, but he ruled out these 
options because of faulty assumptions and inadequate intelligence.  
Therefore, Johnson had to fight a defensive war within South Vietnam’s 
borders in order to avoid the dreadful international consequences of 
abandoning the feeble country.  Johnson had always wanted to avoid 
American ground troop intervention, but most of his advisers doubted that 
ground force involvement would produce an easy victory, believing instead 
that it would result in a long and agonizing political struggle against an 
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enemy who might never give up.  Furthermore, in June 1965, Moyar states 
that Johnson and his military advisers concluded that only the use of 
American ground forces in major combat could stop the Communist 
conventional forces from finishing off the South Vietnamese Army and 
government.28  
 As Johnson contemplated whether to send American troops into 
battle, overwhelming evidence supported the conclusion that South 
Vietnam’s defeat would lead to either a Communist takeover or the 
switching of allegiance to China. Information that became available 
subsequently has reinforced this conclusion.  The Johnson administration 
could have negotiated an American withdrawal from Vietnam that would 
have preserved a non-Communist South Vietnam for years to come, but 
evidence from the Communist side reveals North Vietnam’s complete 
refusal to negotiate such an agreement.  While this may have failed, top 
American officials did miss some strategic opportunities of a different sort, 
opportunities that would have allowed them to fight from a much more 
favorable strategic position.  Following Diem’s ouster, the United States’ 
military leaders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff constantly supported an 
invasion of North Vietnam, however, Johnson and his civilian advisers 
rejected this advice.  Also, Moyar notes that Johnson’s failure to attack 
North Vietnam worked to the enemy’s advantage by assisting an enormous 
Chinese troop deployment into North Vietnam.29   
 Another missed opportunity was the destruction of the Ho Chi 
Minh Trail.  Johnson ignored many recommendations from the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff to put American ground forces into Laos in order to carry out the 
destruction of the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  The Viet Cong insurgency could not 
have brought the Saigon government close to collapse without the support 
of North Vietnamese men and equipment funneled into South Vietnam via 
the Ho Chi Minh Trail.  Orthodox historians, like Halberstam, have argued 
that an American ground troop presence in Laos would not have stopped 
most of the infiltration, but new evidence proves that the United States 
missed some important opportunities to sever the Ho Chi Minh Trail.30  
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Unlike all of the above authors, Lewis Sorley, a post-revisionist, 
does not even admit defeat.  In his book, A Better War: The Unexamined 
Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam, he argues that 
General Creighton W. Abrams had succeeded in effectively winning the 
war by 1971, however, this victory was giving away by Richard Nixon and 
Henry Kissinger at the bargaining table in Paris in 1972-1973.  Sorley 
claims that General C. Westmoreland focused on “search and destroy” 
missions that neglected the pacification program, but after General Abrams 
took over, it was “a better war.”  Also, Westmoreland failed to provide the 
effective training crucial to the South Vietnamese army’s ability to take the 
lead in the war effort.  The result was an escalation of the war with heavy 
casualties and a rising protest in the United States.31    
It is often said that time is the greatest healer of pain.  However, 
even today, the Vietnam War continues to be a difficult and sore subject.  
As stated earlier, orthodox, revisionist, and post-revisionist scholars offer 
three differing views regarding this challenging period of American history.  
The general public and orthodox scholars seem to dispute the revisionist 
and post-revisionist views, partly because they are less published and carry 
fewer supporters in the academic world.  However, the public and historians 
are still learning new information about the war with each passing day, and 
this new information will continue to give fresh insight and produce more 
revisionist and post-revisionist historians.  The contentious debate over the 
Vietnam War is far from over.  While the Vietnam War debate continues to 
loom around these three academic views, new attention has been brought to 
the Vietnamese side of the story.  Literature regarding the war has been 
dominated by American scholars searching through American produced 
documents.  As historian Huynh Kim Khanh argues, Vietnam is regarded as 
“a battlefield or a piece of real estate to be fought over” and its people “as 
passive bystanders in a historical process engineered elsewhere.”32  New 
declassified information will continue to raise questions among historians, 
which will push this debate far into the future.  
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When the Spanish first sailed to Latin America they found several large, 
well organized civilizations occupying the land.  In the late 1500s several 
Spanish accounts describe a game played by the native peoples of 
Mesoamerica.  Their interest in the game arose from a bouncing hard ball.  
Franciscan monk, Fray Toribio de Benavente, stated that “the balls of this 
land are very heavy, and the Indians run and jump so much that it is as if 
the balls have quicksilver within.”1  Pedro Martir de Angleria Spanish royal 
historian from 1520-1526, wrote that “I don’t understand how when the 
balls hit the ground they are sent into the air with such incredible bounce.”2   
  The Mesoamericans played the game on a ballcourt designed to 
correlate with their religious and astronomic beliefs.  Even the most 
insignificant items, such as the equipment worn by the players, had specific 
meaning.  These games were more than just a sport.  The ballgame could 
replace full-scale war, determining the winner of a conflict, based solely on 
the outcome of the game.  The games signified important forms of both 
entertainment and ritual, in which lives and honor were gambled along 
with money and material goods.  The losers of the game were expected to 
die with honor; and crying and begging for their lives was unthinkable.  
The idea of the losers’ honor, how they portrayed themselves as they died, 
remained of great import in the minds of the Mesoamerican people.  The 
ballgames incorporated religious beliefs about immortals, creation, and 
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various myths, to formulate the rules and traditions of the game.  These 
games proved an important part of Mesoamerican culture.3  
 
Types of Ballcourts 
Masonry courts were only built in the largest cities and the main 
trading centers. The upper class built ballcourts near ceremonial locations 
or markets.   Various types of courts were found in large and smaller cities 
throughout Mesoamerica.   Ballcourts were often “I” shaped, with two tall 
structures forming the top and bottom lines of a letter “I.”  However, there 
were simple linear courts, which did not have the “I” shaped structures.4  
 
The Ballgame 
Scoring depended on the game.  There were several rings which, 
like basketball, could give the team points when participants threw the ball 
through them.  In some places, corncobs were used to keep track of points; 
whoever had the most at the end won.5 However, if participants threw the 
ball through a ring mounted on the wall of the court, immediate victory 
would result.   
Both young and adult men played the game, and, on the ballcourt, 
class divisions disappeared.6  When on the field the men were equal.  The 
teams would consist of “teams of two, three, and occasionally as many as 
nine to eleven players.”7  Usually, they played in two teams of two.8  
Various rules governed the ways in which the players could touch the ball.  
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Players could use only the buttocks, hips and knees to hit the ball.  The 
restricted means of striking the ball lent the game the name hip ball. 
Many Mesoamerican myths talk about dividing the body into 
upper and lower parts.   The ball could only be hit where these two parts 
connected.  At this connection, players often wore a yoke, which separated 
these two parts, and was believed to put a player in and out of the 
Underworld at the same time.  The courts themselves were usually divided 
into two or four parts, representing the two or four divisions of the body, 
constellations, or the four parts of earth.  Furthermore, this separation was 
represented in the courts between the north nations, the sun, and the 
southern nations, the moon.   
One group of people went a step further and incorporated this 
division to the initiation of boys.  The Apinaye of South America held the 
games for boys undergoing their initiation into adulthood.9    
 
Equipment of Ancient Ballgames 
According to tradition, when the Hero Twins fought the gods, in 
the Underworld, they only used what items they had from the living world.  
Depending on the variation of each region’s myths, these items became the 
role for the equipment used in the Mesoamerican ballcourts.  The sort of 
clothing and equipment used, even the ball, varied by region.  Most of these 
items no longer exist and their exact use and significance is not clear.  Yet, 
there are some clues in the form of figurines, found in excavations, and 
depicted in written documents.  Some figurines have protective gear on, 
such as “a yoke at waist, a wrap on the left hand, and a pad on the left knee 
onto which they would fall when striking the ball.”10  In their original form, 
these pads were probably made of reed, wood, or cloth.11  Some types of 
pads may have been for certain ceremonies or as markers of victorious 
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ballplayers.  Although restricted to use their hands, they did have hand 
protectors.  It is not certain why they needed hand protectors, except to 
protect the bones in the hand.  Usually only three fingers would fit in the 
handle.  In addition, there are some headstones, which could have been 
awarded to the winning side.12   
 
Roles of the Ballgames in Mesoamerican life 
 The Mesoamerican ballgames were used for many purposes, from 
simple games in the dirt to complex ceremonial rituals in large cities.  
Evidence shows that there was a great amount of food involved in the 
games.  Moreover, archaeologists uncovered many utensils, such as empty 
plates and bowls, which probably contained food in them, now long since 
decomposed.  Scholars believed that Mesoamericans used food dedication 
rituals of the ballcourts.13  Numerous artifacts indicate that Mesoamericans 
also used ballcourts for sacrificial burials.  In the supernatural courts, items 
like precious jewels would take on symbolic meanings.  For example, a 
greenstone and a Spondylus shell could be the universe.  In the Tikal’s 
Triple ballcourt, there is evidence that “two females were placed within the 
benches of the two central structures in the seated positions, facing each 
other across the ballcourt alley.”14 Such sacrifices honored the dead, for it 
was believed that the life of the people killed gave life to the newly 
dedicated building, which in turn meant that it was also giving life to the 
whole community.   
 The ballgame created extensive connections for communication 
and trade.  Villages competed against each other, which involving men and 
women. These competitions were not just in the ballcourts.  There were 
contests of many kinds between the people within their village.  Feasting, 
dancing, singing, and mock warfare ensued:    
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When the two groups came together, they began to 
dance.  The dancing was continued for three hours.  The 
songs this first night gave their reasons for being joyful.  
The second night, the songs told of the valor and agility 
of their ball players.  The following day, the women 
occupied themselves in preparing a feast for the day of the 
contest.  If the challenging village won, the visitors were 
given a great feast, but, if it lost, the visitors were given 
nothing, the losers consoling themselves by eating the 
feast alone.15   
 
The games were a social event.  People mingled and enjoyed 
themselves, often casting bets in attempts to gain wealth.16  For most 
Mesoamericans, the games served as a form of entertainment.  For elites, 
the ballgames presented an opportunity to increase personal power and 
prestige, or to negotiate with other leaders.  Depending on the amount of 
wealth, and the rank of a particular person in society, elites might wager 
vast amounts of wealth.17  “Spectators wagered their finely woven mantles, 
with losers fleeing the courts leaving a trail of garments behind them.”18  
Ballcourts also served as a fertility ritual.  Because of such 
extensive feasting, historians believe these events were set around harvest 
time, when food supplies would have been most abundant.  With these 
harvest feasts, negotiations about village relationships could take place.  
Ballgames were a way for two rivaling villages to compete and 
fight without having to engage in traditional warfare.  The outcome on the 
field represented the outcome of the battle; some would lose wagers and 
honor, while the losing team would lose their lives. In addition, the 
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ballcourts were used as a “public reenactment of warfare.”19  In this case, 
prisoners from a defeated enemy were forced to play ballplayers from the 
city of the victors.  Thus, the ballgame signified ways to portray the victory 
of a battle.   
The ballgames were seen as a replication of the movements of the 
planet Venus, the moon, and the sun.  Ballcourts were pathways to the 
underworld.  One story, Popol Vuh, written by a Mayan noble in Central 
America, narrates the tale of two sets of twin brothers and underworld 
gods.  The brothers go to the underworld and the first set of them are killed 
and given to the gods, but the second set of brothers defeat the underworld 
gods several times.   The brothers travel to heaven and now represent the 
planet Venus and the Sun.20  Walter Krickeberg developed one idea 
centered on the story of Popol Vuh.  He states that the games represented “a 
symbolic reenactment of the struggle between day and night, between light 
and darkness.  It therefore symbolized the daily and seasonal journey of the 
sun and other celestial bodies, and their cyclical descent through the 
Underworld, and ascent into the sky.”21  
 
Origin of the Ballgames 
Each village contained its own legend about the foundation of the 
ballcourts; therefore, each ballcourt represented the village’s identity.  Two 
examples follow: 
   
After the Mexica had reached Coatepec and established 
their villages and the temple of their patron god, 
Huitzilopochtli, they were instructed by that god to build 
a ballcourt.  In these migration legends, the 
transformation of the wild, uninhabitable spaces into 
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controlled, social places was partly accomplished through 
the imposition on the landscape of public, ritual 
architecture.22  
  
Another legend stated the following:   
 
In another Central Mexican account, the native 
chronicler, Ixtlilxochitl, cited in Leyenaar, tells us that 
Topiltzin, the ruler of Tula, proposed to his three rivals 
that the four of them rule his realm together and 
presented them with a model of a ballcourt made of four 
kinds of precious stone.  In this case, the ballcourt 
symbolically represented Topiltzin’s domain and all of its 
wealth and resources.23  
 
Winners and Losers 
 While in society the players were separated by rank, blood, and 
class; in the ballcourts they were divided into winners and losers.  The 
winners would finish the day in victory, living on to play another game, 
while becoming champions for their village. The winners were also given 
the honor of being able to drink Chicha, a fermented drink typically made of 
maize.24  On the other hand, Mesoamericans often sacrificed the losers to 
their gods, generally by decapitating them.  In the Great Ballcourts of 
Chichen Itza, serpents or squashed plants depicted the neck of a person, 
once the decapitation finished.25   
 
 
Sacrifice and the “Rolling Heads” Myths 
                                                            
22 Fox, 485. 
23 Ibid., 485. 
24 Ibid., 493. 
25 Ibid., 493. 
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Researchers believe the rubber ball was created in the tropical 
lowlands, where rubber sources grew naturally and existed high supply.26  
In places where no rubber balls existed, documents show that human heads 
were used instead.  One Seneca myth describes this:   
 
A cannibal killed a woman and ate all but her head, 
breasts, and the boy twins she was pregnant with, which 
he placed in a hollow tree.  The boys survived on the milk 
in the breasts and were later discovered by their father, 
who made them ball clubs and a ball to play with.  The 
mother’s skull was still alive, and in fear of it the boys and 
their father fled.  The father, helped by his invisible 
brother, was chased by his wife’s flying skull until it was 
finally killed.  After the skull was dead, it was used as a 
ball in a game.27  
 
Sacrifice played an important role for the ballgames.  There are 
many accounts from art pieces, artifacts, and bones to confirm this practice.  
However, Mesoamericans used various means of execution, the primacy of 
decapitation in the act of ritual sacrifice remains uncertain..  In Popol Vuh, 
many references to decapitation exist, though not for sacrificial reasons.  
For example, one person did not die when losing his head and the other was 
already dead.28  The actual deaths were by other means.  One set of twins 
were killed before the ballgame, but the method was unknown.  In another 
story, from the same sacred source of the Mayas, another twin’s head was 
cut off, but his twin brother gave him a pumpkin as a replacement.  This 
second set of twins won the game, but allowed themselves to be put into a 
                                                            
26 Vernon Scarborough, Beverly Mitchum, Sorraya Carr, and David Freidel, “Two Late 
Preclassic Ballcourts at the Lowland Maya Center of Cerros, Northern Belize,” Journal of Field 
Archaeology 9 (Spring 1982):  21. 
27 Scarborough and Wilcox, 327-328. 
28  Ibid., 321-328. 
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stone oven and burned to death, by their enemies.  They were revived and 
killed again; this time with their limbs were scattered and their hearts and 
head removed.  Removing the heart represented the most important act of 
sacrifice in several Mesoamerican regions.  Many mythical stories 
portrayed the head living without the rest of the body.29  
 There is evidence to suggest that some nations used human heads 
instead of a rubber ball.  Many paintings and stories offer examples of heads 
used for balls and games in which the balls have faces.  Since the purpose of 
the game was to keep the ball moving, the bouncing behavior of rubber 
made it a perfect material for ball construction.  Several myths depict heads 
that could move on their own.  In this respect, decapitation would “bring 
about not a lifeless head, but a head that, once freed from the body, could 
jump, roll, and fly.”30  Thus the term, rolling heads, or rolling skulls, are found 
in many stories throughout the New World.  The Apinaye, in South 
America, only played ballgames for a boy’s initiation.  To coincide with the 
rolling heads legend, they used rubber balls based on a myth:  
 
A man who attacked people at night with his sharpened 
leg-bone was beaten to death by villagers, who cut off his 
head.  His head jumped away, and returned in the daytime 
to attack the people, but they tricked it into falling into a 
hole and covered it with dirt.  Later, youths going 
through their initiation came across the spot and noticed a 
rubber tree growing out of the head’s grave.  Using the 
sap from the tree they made the first rubber balls for the 
rubber-ball game.31   
 
                                                            
29 Ibid., 321-328. 
30 Scarborough and Wilcox, 326. 
31 Ibid., 328. 
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There are also stories where rubber balls represented the moon, 
constellations, or the Sun.  In addition, some believe that the loss of a game 
was a symbolic severing from society.  Therefore, decapitation and 
dismembering of body parts portrayed this disconnection.  Not only does 
the person lose life but also the connection to the body, which in turn 
represents the larger disjunction of culture, and a link to the constellations.  
These ideas can be used to describe aspects of the harvest and fertility.  
Both social interaction and agricultural fertility remained two of the central 
roles of the games.  The myths associated with decapitation and these two 
themes correlate together.32   
 
End of the Ballgames 
People played ballgames all over Mesoamerica.  Although each 
area had slight variations to the game, the overall definition of what a 
ballgame was and how it was to be played remained fairly similar.  
Ballgames had such an impact on the lives of the Mesoamerican world, and 
were so popular, that the gulf coast nations sent a tribute of 16,000 rubber 
balls a year to an inland king.33  The ballgames were tightly interwoven 
into the everyday life of society.  The ballgames incorporated the culture of 
Mesoamerican societies, which now aids archaeologists with learning about 
forms of Mesoamerican entertainment.  The ballgames displayed the power, 
prestige, honor, and beliefs of these people.  The games proved how 
complex these societies, later called savage and uncivilized by foreign 
invaders, really were at the height of their rule.  These games are no longer 
played.  Ultimately, the Mesoamerican civilization would fall to disease and 
Spanish conquerors.   
When the Spanish came, with their Christian beliefs, any practice 
that worshiped any creator but the Christian god was prohibited, which, of 
course, meant that the act of sacrifice was not tolerated.  The game which 
                                                            
32 Ibid., 325-330. 
33 Scarborough and Wilcox, 9. 
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had been played for 3,000 years ended not long after the Spanish 
invasions.34  By 1589, all the ballgames had ended, although a few 
Spaniards wrote accounts of a few games, and some artifacts have been 
preserved.  These are mere glimpses at the earliest form of organized sport 
in Mesoamerica.35 
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35 Ibid., 24. 
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The power struggle simmering between the Catholic Church and the 
Mexican national government erupted with Catholic bishops and priests 
suspending religious worship in protest of the anticlerical policies of the 
Calles administration on July 31, 1926.1  President Plutarco Elias Calles 
called for “submission to the law,” known as Calles Law, that implemented 
anticlerical conditions set forth in the Constitution of 1917.2  Laws that 
controlled property rights in Article 27 of the Constitution forbade Church 
ownership of property and limited foreign ownership.  All land served the 
public interest by the protection of communal rights of indigenous groups 
and redistribution of land under control of a strong national government.3  
Under Calles’ Law, the government nationalized all church buildings, 
outlawed religious houses, banned public religious functions, and required 
priests to register in order to avoid severe fines or imprisonment.4  
 Examination of the Cristero Rebellion as simply a conflict between 
church and state misses the many faces, or nuances, that surrounded the 
uprising.  In the work of historians from Jean Meyer, in the 1970s, to 
Ramon Jrade in the 1980s, and more recently the works of Jennie Purnell 
and Adrian Bantjes, reveals a multilayered portrait of the rebellion.  The 
secular nature and the anticlerical position of the Calles administration are 
clear.  What proves more complex, however, is how the conflict is defined.  
Was the rebellion a “holy war” with religious motivations?  Was the 
conflict based in an economic struggle between a variety of peasant groups 
                                                            
1 Matthew Butler, “The ‘Liberal’ Cristero: Ladislao Molina and the Cristero Rebellion in 
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Purnell, Popular Movements and State Formation in Revolutionary Mexico: The Agraristas and 
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Company, 2004), 272; Purnell, 76. 
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and the policies of a strong national government?  Was the rebellion the 
culmination of long-standing grievances between the Church and the state?  
Or, as Purnell suggests, was the rebellion the articulation of factional 
conflicts between various communities that included economic, political, 
regional, and community concerns?5   
 This paper examines the complexities of the Cristero Rebellion, 
exploring the motivations of the many factions that emerged on both sides 
of the conflict and the many faces of the participants.  The rebellion cannot 
be characterized as purely a battle between two dominating forces.  Like 
much of Mexican history, the story of the rebellion is one of continuing 
struggle for political, economic, and regional autonomy among a variety of 
groups.  Indeed, the portrait of the Cristero Rebellion has many facets, each 
with its own interests, ideologies, hopes, and dreams. 
 
The Face of the State 
 In 1925, Tobasco cacique Tomas Garrido Canabal criticized 
Catholic clerics and stated that “’the cassocked vultures have seized their 
prey, digging their talons into the heart of the Indian, who is less prepared 
than any other race to resist the seduction of the whole ritual farse.’”6  
President Plutarco Elias Calles, like Canabal, believed that the power of the 
Church obstructed modernization and that he must eliminate the power of 
the Church and its domination of the peasantry.7  Calles wanted absolute 
control and was suspicious of the politicization of the Church after the 
creation of a fairly successful Catholic Party in 1912.  Although the party 
had dissolved, Calles sought to rid Mexico of the potential for Church 
control.   
  The origins of the ideology of de-fanaticization were found in 
radical liberalism of the nineteenth-century scientific positivism, Marxism, 
and Protestantism.  Mexican revolutionaries understood the revolution as 
more than an economic struggle, but also one of spirituality.  They 
considered religion, like many of their Russian counterparts, a “drug” and 
the “Catholic ritual […] a seductive trick designed to exploit ignorant 
                                                            
5 Purnell, 3. 
6 Manifesto a los obreros organizados de la republica y al elemento revolucionario 
(Villehermosa, Tabasco, 1925), 9-10 in Adrian A. Bantjes, “Idolatry and Iconoclasm in 
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peasants ‘hallucinated by floats, adorned with clouds, little angels, chalices 
and all the artiface the clergy uses to cheat them out of their last penny.’”8 
They clerics accused of sustaining the “backwards” nature of rural 
peasantry and presenting an obstacle to the formation of a modern state. 
 However, the development of a secular state was not the only 
motivation for Calles’ actions toward the Church.  Following the February 
1926 proclamation of the “primate of Mexico” in which he “repeated a 1917 
declaration that the Church did not recognize the constitution,” Calles 
proceeded to fully implement all the provisions of the Constitution 
regarding the Church.9  He called for “submission to the law” that would be 
required anywhere and explained that this did not indicate the 
‘decatholicisation’ of Mexico.10  The Church antagonized Calles who 
already sought its end, or at least minimizing its strong presence in 
Mexico. 
 The State sought to end what they believed to be the hegemony of 
the Church over the Mexican people, in particular, indigenous and rural 
populations.  In order to modernize, the secular state must rid Mexico of 
fanaticism and mysticism that kept the people ‘backwards’ and without a 
national identity.   The Mexican government wanted absolute control over 
the social, cultural, economic, and political lives of the people, and the 
Church was considered a significant obstacle. 
 
The Face of the Church 
 The Catholic Church, although present in the daily life of many 
Mexicans and a fixture in many rural communities, was noticeably absent 
from the rebellion.  The majority of priests, according to Jean Meyer, were 
quite hostile to the cristeros.  Meyer found that in January 1927, out of 3,600 
priests, only five were participated in the rebellion.  One hundred priests 
were “actively hostile,” sixty-five were neutral but provided support to the 
cristeros, forty were “actively favorable,” and 3,600 priests left their 
parishes.11   The Vatican had forbade bishops and priests aiding the 
insurgents and demanded that they follow the law of the land.  Many feared 
persecution as priests had been attacked and murdered and so fled to the 
                                                            
8Guanajuato Veccinos Moroleon, to Sec. Gob., 31 December 1934, DGG 2.347, exp. 
2.347(8)15257, AGN in Bantjes, 96. 
9 Butler, Church, 521. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Meyer, 75. 
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cities or went into hiding in the hinterlands of Mexico under the protection 
of their parishes.12 
        Mexican clerics suspended of worship on 31 July, 1926, in order to 
encourage private worship.  This was “an attempt to put the sacraments 
and the clergy beyond the reach of civil law.”13  However, the “majority of 
clergy withdrew from rural areas and sought refuge in the big towns under 
the control of the Government.”14  Not only did the majority of priests 
withdraw from their parishes, they encouraged nonviolence, patience, and 
humility. According to Aurelio Acevedo, one of the cristero rebels, “the very 
Fathers forbade us to fight for Christ, for the religion our fathers taught us 
and then reaffirmed for us in baptism, confirmation and our first 
communion.”15  Many priests offered sermons opposing the cristeros, calling 
them ‘cattle-thieves’ and discouraging parishioners from participation in 
rebel activities.16 
        A few priests, such as Fr. Adolfo Arroyo, the vicar of Valparaiso, 
stayed with his parishioners and joined the rebellion in defense of the 
Church.  Fr. Arroyo criticized his fellow priests and wrote, “The 
overwhelming majority of the bishops and priests, displaying a criminal 
degree of conformism, wallowed in an accursed inertia, all expecting sheer 
miracle from Heaven to give liberty to the Church.”  They were content to 
give exhortations and say a few prayers.  The priests had recourse to 
theology and, without further consideration, announced the illicit nature of 
the violent struggle in defence of the Church.17  Msgr. Gonzalez y Valencia, 
Archbishop of Durango wrote in a pastoral letter on February 11, 1927, 
“We never provoked this armed movement. But now that this movements 
exists, and all peaceful means have been exhausted, to our Catholic sons 
who have risen in arms for the defence of their social and religious rights … 
we must say: be tranquil in your consciences and receive our blessing.”18 
                                                            
12 Ibid. 69. 
13 Butler, 531. 
14 Meyer, 70. 
15 Interview of Meyer with Aurelio Acevedo, in Meyer, Cristeros, 70. 
16 Ibid. 
17Archives of Aurelio Acevedo, notes on the religious persecution, armed defense, and 
agreements, by Fr. Adolfo Arroyo, MS of 8 pp., 24 January 1934, in Meyer, Cristeros, 69-70. 
18 “Outside the Flaminian Gate,” pastoral letter of Msgr. Gonzalez y Valencia, 11 February 
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 Because of Vatican-issued orders that bishops and priests abandon 
their parishes and spiritual duties, and submit to the mandates of the 
Constitution, priests rarely supported the rebellion.  Fear of persecution 
and death also created a barrier to clerical support, although many priests 
found ways to remain with their parishioners as spiritual leaders and 
conduct the sacraments covertly.  The face of the Church was not 
represented among the cristeros, only the presence of a few priests who felt 
they could not and would not abandon their charges.  If the rebellion was a 
conflict between the Church and the state, the Church was missing. 
 
The Faces of the Cristeros 
 In ideological, socioeconomic, and geographical terms, the cristeros 
were the most diverse of all the actors in the rebellion.  They were, in other 
words, not engaged in a large collective action, rather the cristeros 
represented numerous causes and concerns, not all of which were religious.  
Jennie Purnell writes that “communities did not rebel en masse during the 
cristiada unless revolutionary anticlericalism and agrarianism attacked local 
resources, values, and institutions that had been successfully defended until 
the revolution itself.”19  In fact, the peasants were deeply divided on the 
issue of rebellion and their opinions reflected their economic interests, the 
impact of agrarian reform on their villages and towns, and their feelings 
toward local authorities.  Although various communities and factions 
shared religious beliefs, there were differing political viewpoints.20  The 
rebellion acquired the name cristero because of the battle cry “¡Viva Cristo 
Rey!” and not necessarily because they shared a single view.21 
 Some cristeros engaged in rebellion for purely political and 
economic reasons.  Ladislao Molina, a large landowner in Michoacan, did 
not demonstrate any religious motivation, and was known to embrace 
liberal ideology first, and Catholicism second.22  According to Jose Perez, a 
delegate to the National League for the Defence of Religious Liberty 
(LNDLR), writing to his superiors, “he is not a cristero: whilst he is a 
Catholic, he is also a liberal, and does not fight for the same reasons as the 
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Catholics. He has his own point of view, but it is personal.”23 In the case of 
Molina, and most likely others like him, “Catholicism served as a dissident 
ideology for resisting state encroachments on his sphere of influence.”24 
 Some of the cristeros focused their revolutionary efforts on the local 
agraristas who benefited from Cardenas-era land reforms.25 Agrarian land 
reform created sporadic problems throughout Mexico as villages and towns 
lost territorial autonomy.  However, the problem for the cristeros did not 
necessarily revolve around the agraristas, it revolved around religion with 
political overtones.  Cristero Jose Gonzalez Romo wrote in a letter to 
agrarista Jesus Morfin, “Tell the agraristas that we are not fighting them 
because they are agraristas, but because they support the tyrant who is 
trying to wipe out the religion of our country and hand us over to the 
Protestant Gringos.”26  Government control over land distribution often 
meant foreign ownership and control, the previous statement suggests that 
some cristeros saw a connection between elimination of the Catholic Church, 
and the introduction of liberal, state-controlled, and foreign-based 
exploitation. 
 Despite the economic and political tones of the rebellion, defense of 
religion still motivated many of the cristeros.  Because of their commitment 
to Church restoration, they often defied the Church’s instruction to obey 
the laws and observe restraint and non-violence.  In a letter to the parish 
priest, the Quintanar Brigade wrote, “without their permission and without 
their orders we are throwing ourselves into this blessed struggle for our 
liberty, and without their permission and without their orders we will go on 
until we conquer or die.”27 Many cristeros “believed they were fighting a 
‘holy war’ against an anticlerical government frequently depicted as the 
Anti-Christ.”28 
 According to Javier Villa-Flores, during periods of “accelerated 
cultural, political, and economic change,” increased religious and spiritual 
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participation is common.29  He suggests that the cristeros, in response to 
crisis, mobilized around a religious belief that served as a source of 
motivation.30  Alliances and grassroots defense of the Church solidified in 
response to the rapid changes the government attempted to impose.31  In 
fact, cristeros were not only found in peasant communities and rural villages, 
but in urban areas as well, although their character and composition were 
significantly different. 
 In the cities, large urban networks formed. They engaged in 
clandestine operations collecting taxes for supplies, obtaining ammunition 
and food to sustain the rebels, and formed elaborate communication 
networks.  Workers and artisans, along with professionals filled the urban 
ranks of the cristeros.  Women played a critical role as cristeros. They carried 
messages, ammunition, obtained and delivered food, among many other 
duties, at great peril.32  What united the cristeros was their need to cope 
with and respond to government controls over every aspect of their lives. 
Government attacks against the Church mobilized the cristeros.  The 
Church, in many ways, was the symbol of autonomy, of cultural identity, an 
institution that sustained the people through decades of turmoil.   
 
Conclusion 
 The question remains, after this short discussion of the actors of 
the Cristero Rebellion, was this a conflict based on religion, or was it more 
a conflict between competing factions based on economic and political 
interests?  We have seen that the Church as an institution played a very 
minor role, if any role at all.  We have also seen that economics and local 
interests figured strongly in mobilizing the cristeros as in the ongoing 
conflict between the agraristas and the peasants.  Agrarian and land reform 
provided much of the fuel for the cristiada. 
        Religion served as a common denominator mobilizing the lower and 
middle class against the elite.  Devotion to the church bound diverse anti-
government sentiments, and the government’s action against the Church 
and religious freedom were springboards that propelled the cristiada. In the 
Cristero Rebellion a variety of concerns converged, and the Church served 
as a symbol and catalyst for anti-government expression.  The desire of the 
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government to inflict its control over Mexican life and create a new 
national identity based on secular terms intensified the commitment of 
many Catholics to practice their religion, with or without clerical guidance 
or support.  
 Religion ultimately served as the spark that set the wheels of 
rebellion in motion.  But religion was not the sole motivation for the 
rebellion.  In the end, it appears the Cristero Rebellion was not a conflict of 
the Church and the state, rather a power struggle between the autonomy of 
peasants, workers, and the middle class against the elites and the 
government. 
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…Had I discovered the Algerian nation, I would be a nationalist and 
would not blush as if I had committed a crime…However, I will not die 
for the Algerian nation, because it does not exist.1    
 Ferhat Abbas 
 
…Par delà la légende politique et les fictions juridiques de l’Algérie 
« terre de France en Afrique », notre pays est une colonie, dont 
l’originalité est d’être à la fois d’exploitation et de peuplement.2 
 Hocine Aït Ahmed 
 
…Si la peur donne des ailes et fait perdre tout jugement, elle fait dire 
aussi des bêtises. C’est ainsi que la période héroïque de 1936, au cours de 
laquelle la conscience nationale  a été éveillée par le venue de l’Étoile 
Nord-Africaine en Algérie, est qualifiée de période de lutte fratricide.3       
Declaration by followers of Messali Hadj, spring 1954  
                                                            
1 Ferhat Abbas, La Nuit Coloniale (Paris: René Julliard, 1962), 19.    
2 Hocine Aït Ahmed, Memoires d’un Combattant: L’Esprit d’independence, 1942-1952 (Paris: 
Sylvie Messinger, 1983), 55. Unless otherwise noted all translations are my own. (Beyond the 
political legend and legal fictions of Algeria ‘Land of France in Africa,’ our country is a colony, 
whose originality is of being both for exploitation and for [French] settlement.)    
3 Followers of Messali Hadj, “Le Point de Vue Messaliste: Le Congrès Nationale Algérien,” Le 
FLN Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962, Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier eds. (Librairie 
Arthème Fayard, 2004), 25. (If fear takes flight and makes one lose all judgment, it also makes 
one say stupid things. Thus, the heroic period of 1936, during which national conscience 
was awakened up by the arrival of North-African Star in Algeria, was described as a period of 
fratricide).  The North-African Star formed in 1926 under the auspices of Algerian workers in 
Paris. Messali Hadj became its president in 1927 and “superimposed” proletarian doctrine over 
the early religious and liberal nationalist movements.  This form of popular socialism became a 
staple component of Algerian politics in the FLN and after independence.   
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In 1954, Algerian leaders of the Front de Libération National (FLN) 
joyously declared independence from metropolitan France and aspired for a 
unified Algeria.  French colonialism, however, created deep divisions within 
the FLN.  These divisions were not formed spontaneously in 1954, but 
through a long process and relationship with metropolitan France.  
Algerian leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas, Hocine Aït Ahmed, Ben Bella, and 
Ahmed Messali Hadj, experienced French colonialism differently, and 
formulated their own visions of an independent Algeria.  Some, like Hocine 
Aït Ahmed, exposed French imperialism and conceptualized perceptions of 
the “other.”  For others, like Ferhat Abbas, altérité (otherness) remained a 
foreign concept and demanded French citizenship status.  Still, indigenous 
leaders came together and formed the FLN on November 1, 1954.  Political 
unity remained ambiguous and Algerian leaders adopted distinct language 
that worked for, but also against, independence.  Algerian political leaders 
were more fractured than united, partly as a result of the imperial legacy 
and partly due to an assimilation of ideas, permeated through the adoption 
of specific language that proved unable to solidify Algerian leadership.  
This paper seeks to tease out the various perspectives held by the FLN 
leaders, and in that way to present the viewpoints of the “other.”  
 
Colonial Context: French Imperial Legacies and Nationalist 
Formation 
French imperial authorities entered Algiers in 1830 and promised 
quiet occupation while respecting indigenous society, culture, and religion. 
Algerian had, then, two distinct ethnic groups: Berbers and Arabs.  Berbers, 
the country’s indigenous population, constituted roughly thirty percent of 
the population—Arabs seventy percent.4  After 1830, Algerians competed 
with a third group: pied noirs, or colons.5  A diverse group, the pied noirs 
settled Algeria under the encouragement of metropolitan French 
authorities.  The pied noirs were not, however, ethnically homogenous.  
Spanish, Italian, Maltese, and French constituted a large portion of those 
                                                            
4 Henry Jackson, The FLN in Algeria (London: Greenwood Press, 1977), 3-5.  
5 This literally translates “black feet” for French military boots.  Colons will also be used as an 
interchangeable term.  
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who emigrated and settled in Algeria.  The French imperial army famously 
coined the term méditerranéens-et-demi (half Mediterranean) to describe the 
pied noirs.6  In 1841, 37,374 pied noirs occupied Algeria.7  In only ten years, 
this number grew to nearly 131,000.8  Only one European in five 
constituted as ethnically “French” in 1917.9  Regardless, the French 
presence in Algeria supported these colonial ventures and reinforced pied 
noir supremacy over Algerian Arab and Berber populations.   Pied noir 
settlement coincided with French aspirations and new imperialist values 
even before the scramble for Africa.  Napoleonic war veteran Thomas-
Robert Bugeaud stated to the French National Assembly that ‘wherever 
there is fresh water and fertile land [in Algeria], there one must locate 
colons, without concerning oneself to whom these lands belong.’10 
Thus, France proclaimed Algeria an essential component of its 
empire.  While Bugeaud lamented Algeria’s strategic and practical value, 
French authorities immediately recognized Algeria’s value as something 
uniquely “French.”  In 1848, the French government officially 
departmentalized Algeria, giving it distinct “French” qualities.11  The 
French colonial press antagonized this uniqueness as well.  Jonathon 
Gosnell noted this influence: “the printed word indeed helped to redefine 
the meaning of the nation as one no longer restricted to one particular 
geographic body of group of people.”12  Colonial newspapers dominated 
Algeria from 1830 to 1965, and inundated “Frenchness” into Algeria.  More 
importantly, French rhetoric and action signified Algeria as an extension of 
France itself.  Imperial authorities divided the country into three 
départements, thus using distinct metropolitan terms to define Algeria.13  
French assimilationist policies fomented early Algerian nationalist 
                                                            
6 Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria, 1954-1962 (New York: The New York 
Review of Books, 1977), 51. 
7 Ibid., 30.  
8 Jackson, 5.  
9 Horne, 51.  
10 Ibid., 30.  
11 Jonathon K. Gosnell, The Politics of Frenchness in Colonial Algeria: 1930-1954 (Rochester, 
NY: University of Rochester Press, 2002), 73.   
12 Ibid., 76.  
13 Horne, 30.  
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movements, but these early nationalists sought integration rather than 
divorce.  From 1830 to the Great War, Algerian nationalism remained 
relatively quiet and undeveloped—partly the consequences of 
assimilationist policy.  This changed by the 1920s and 1930s.  In 1938, 
Rabah Zenati echoed Ferhat Abbas: “it is, in short, inadmissible that it [the 
Algerian administration] should pretend to continue treating today’s 
native, especially when he has been educated in the great French schools, 
like his grandfather of one hundred years ago.”14  Such sentiment reflected 
assimilationist legacies, which stemmed from metropolitan legislative 
measures during the late nineteenth century.  The French National 
Congress adopted these measures en masse:  
 
[France should] inspire French sentiments among the natives, to 
favor French colonization by all possible means, to assimilate the 
European foreigners […] [and adopt] a special naturalization 
compatible with the maintenance of their personal statues (under 
Moslem law) to those who fulfill certain conditions and offer 
certain guarantees […] to become entitled after a delay of ten 
years to occupy a place in the metropolitan chambers […] [and] 
sufficient financial resources should be created […] [and] 
accessible to the entire school-age population.15   
 
 As incipient nationalist forces digested these promises, important 
discourse resulted that developed, transformed, and permeated various 
nationalist conceptions of “Algeria.”  While other French colonies also 
experienced assimilation, Algeria represented something unique, at least for 
the metropolitans.  French metropolitan rhetoric exemplified these 
sentiments.  Early Algerian nationalist forces recognized this uniqueness; 
however, Algerian voices became increasingly emphatic after important 
international crises exploded during the early twentieth century.  
                                                            
14 Rabah Zenati, Le Problème Algérien vu par un Indigène (Paris: Comté de l’Afrique Française, 
1938), 31. Also quoted in A Savage War of Peace, 15.  
15 Robert O. Collins, ed. Historical Problems of Imperial Africa (Princeton: Markus Wiener 
Publishers, 2007), 150. 
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 With Franz Ferdinand’s assassination at the hands of proto-
nationalist Serbs, Europe spent the next four years destroying one another.  
In Algeria, French authorities drafted 173,000 indigènes into the 
metropolitan army, and they fought and died as temporary French 
citizens.16  In 1911, only one percent of the French immigrant population 
was Algerian.  By 1918, Algerian immigration numbers had risen twenty 
percent, only second behind Spanish immigrants which increased by thirty 
five percent.17  Others migrated and replaced metropolitan factory workers.  
Exposed to the propaganda of liberté, égalité, fraternité, Algerians emerged 
from war empowered, if only psychologically.  Attempts were made, 
however, to reform France’s imperial system.  In 1915, Prime Minister 
Georges Clemenceau and former Overseas Minister Georges Leygues 
introduced legislation that gave “Muslims […] a second electoral college 
and the right to elect half the members of the consultative assemblies.”18  
The bill finally passed in 1919.  Still, French colons retained majority power 
in the first electoral college, and through incessant opposition gained 
considerable concessions.  Consequently, nationalism strengthened within 
the French colon community.  In 1930, centenary celebrations blossomed 
throughout Algeria with grandiose and copious declarations: if Muslims 
knew then, in 1830, what they know now “they would have loaded their 
muskets with flowers.”19  The perfect storm brewed for those native 
Algerians seeking independence.  Future FLN leaders carried these burdens 
for the next thirty-five years.  Metropolitan politicians, unwilling to 
challenge pied-noir obstinacy and confidence, ultimately antagonized and 
nourished Algerian nationalism.   
 Nationalist movements erupted during the Interwar period.  
Various groups displayed deep divisions, however, in their respective 
visions for an independent Algeria.  Three distinct groups formed: Ben 
Badis’ religious movement, Messali Hadj’s proto-communist movement, 
                                                            
16 Horne, 36.  
17 Clifford Rosenberg, Policing Paris: The Origins of Modern Immigration Control Between the 
Wars (London: Cornell University Press, 2006), 115.  
18 Alf Andrew Heggoy, Insurgency and Counterinsurgency in Algeria (London: Indiana 
University Press, 1972), 7.  
19 Horne, 36.  
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and Ferhat Abbas’ liberal movement.20  Ben Badis, born in 1889, created the 
influential Association des Ulema in 1931.  While Badis himself never directly 
or personally influenced the FLN, largely because he died in 1940, the 
Ulema fomented and legitimized pan-Arabism in Algeria.21  This 
puritanical Islamic force declared ‘Islam is my religion, Arabic is my 
language, and Algeria is my country.’22  Many contemporary Algerian elites 
ignored Ben Badis’ message, secluding it from mainstream politics.  
Algerian pragmatists regarded Badis’ religious doctrine as counterintuitive 
to social and political change.     
 Messali Hadj created the radical nationalist movement, supported 
by the Étoile Nord Africaine—the first radical socialist organization in 
Algeria.  Born in 1898, Hadj migrated and worked in France after World 
War I.  He briefly studied political theory at the Sorbonne, and while there 
married a French communist.23  Messali had become Algeria’s first true 
revolutionary by 1933 and called for property redistribution from the pied 
noirs.  After failed reform under Leon Blum’s popular front government, the 
ENA disbanded; however, Messali regrouped and created the Parti 
Progressive Algérien (PPA), which then dissolved and became the Mouvement 
pour le Triomphe de Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD).24  Many early FLN 
leaders supported these organizations but often disputed the fine details.  
Messali’s appeal, however, remained ambiguous because he never embraced 
violence as an acceptable option.  Rather, Messali urged to achieve reform 
through strict legal frameworks, but he continued to emphasize popular 
socialism as the preferred alternative to both French imperial structures 
and the liberal nationalists’ call for further assimilation and integration.  In 
1947, Messali garnered little support within the MTLD convention on his 
proposed non-violent reform.25  Algerian liberals countered Messali with 
                                                            
20 Ibid.,, 38.  
21 William B. Quandt, Revolution and Political Leadership: Algeria: 1954-1968 (London: The 
M.I.T. Press, 1969), 36-37.  
22 Horne, 38.  
23 Jackson, 10.  
24 Horne, 38-40.  
25 Jackson, 17.  
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their pro-assimaltionist ideology, which ultimately reinforced French 
imperial policy. 
 The liberal nationalists’ undoubted leader, Ferhat Abbas, called for 
increased negotiation between Algerian and French leaders.  Abbas’ 
underlying belief, however, remained pro-assimilationist and aspired for 
provincial status in Algeria.  Educational experience provided Abbas with 
opportunities most Algerians never realized.  Abbas entered regional 
politics after becoming a pharmacist in the 1920s; moreover, he formed the 
Fédérations de Elus Musulmans d’Algérie (FEMA) in 1929—a group primarily 
comprised of Algerian intellectual elites.26  Throughout the 1930s and 
1940s, Abbas, along with R. Zenati, called for “the crystallization of an 
Algerian national “consciousness” through popular press outlets, like the 
newspaper Abbas edited: Egalité.27  Printed issues peaked from 1944-45, and 
produced 30,000 print copies per day.28   Zenati, too, published and edited 
La Voix Indigène from 1929 to 1942.  In its inaugural issue, Zentai declared 
‘L’Algérie doit devenir française.’29  In the September 12, 1929 issue, Zenati 
acknowledged that “nous avons le devoir de faire remarquer la contradiction d’un 
pareil système.”30  For Algeria to become France, Liberals believed 
assimilation policies such as education, language reform, and intermarriage, 
transformed Algerians into Frenchmen.  Such egalitarian promises 
remained political rhetoric for most of the Algerian population.  Critics, 
often future leaders of the FLN, chastised Abbas and Zenati for their refusal 
to acknowledge a preexisting Algerian identity.  While Zenati died before 
the FLN emerged, Abbas remained a prominent figure and voice for that 
movement, and legitimized the FLN during the late stages of the Algerian 
War when he joined the FLN in 1956.  Abbas reflected these volatile issues 
in 1962: “Ce sont malheurs de notre pays qui m’ont jeté dans l’arène politique. Si la 
France avait trouvé des solutions équitables aux problèmes qui se sont posés chez 
                                                            
26 Ibid., 10.  
27 Gosnell, 105-106.  
28 Ibid., 112.  
29 Ibid., 113. Translation is in Gosnell: “Algeria must become French.”  
30 “La Propriété Indigène,” La Voix Indigène September 12, 1929, page 1. Page one is 
reproduced in Gosnell, 111. (We have the duty to point out the contradiction of such a [French] 
system.)    
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nous, il est probable que je me serais contente de « cultiver mon jardin ».”31  
Liberals never realized their goals, primarily because French authorities 
never intended Algerians to assimilate into metropolitan society and 
culture—Algerians into Frenchmen represented a romantic ideal, but 
ultimately naïve and impractical.  
 We should not underestimate these variant and often divisive 
visions.  Nationalist movements remained inchoate.  Indeed, independence 
leaders never created monolithic nationalist movements.  Early leaders and 
their ideologies, however, remained paramount in the development of the 
FLN.  French imperial legacies, especially through Algeria’s unique status, 
created nationalist discourse, but more importantly transformed discourse 
that seemed to represent Algerian solidarity.  Algerians never escaped the 
perpetual altérité (otherness) that French imperial legacies ingrained into 
native society; and neither did the eventual FLN leaders who adopted the 
same divisive discourse that Baddis, Messali, and Abbas displayed twenty 
years earlier.  Exploring the complexities and dynamics of the emergent 
FLN will further emphasize these points.  By 1954, FLN leaders promoted 
so called “Algerian” and “Muslim” unity, but remained internally and 
politically fractured. 
  
Sétif and the FLN Perspectives 
 The Second World War further complicated Algeria’s eventual 
course to independence.  France’s humiliating defeat profoundly affected the 
Algerian psyche: were Algerians still “French” or did they owe their 
allegiance to Germany?  What about the national père de France, Marshal 
Pétain?  Indeed, Algeria remained officially pro-Vichy during most of the 
war.  Abbas seized this opportunity.  In 1943, Abbas declared, ‘the French 
colony only admits equality with Muslim Algeria on one level [being the] 
sacrifice on the battlefields’ in the famous “Manifesto of the Algerian 
                                                            
31 Abbas, 107. (The misfortunes of our country threw me in the political arena. If France had 
found equitable solutions to the problems that have arisen among us, it is probable that I would 
have been happy to ‘cultivate my garden.’) Abbas referenced Voltaire’s short story, Candide, as 
a philosophical analysis of his early ideas.  To cultivate one’s garden refers to the daily activities 
of life, which Abbas would have been willing to do if not for French imperialism.    
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People.”32  Abbas appeared to abandon the pro-assimilationist rhetoric; 
however, he still called for direct peaceful negotiation with metropolitan 
France.  At war’s end, Algerian nationalism escalated.  On May 8, 1945, 
demonstrations erupted in the town of Sétif. The day began to celebrate VE 
Day, but tensions had risen over the treatment of Algerian veterans and the 
imprisonment of Messali.  Algerian workers took to the streets with 
banners that stated ‘Vive Messali’ and ‘Long Live Free and Independent 
Algeria.’33  Algerians demanded social reform and the release of Messali, 
who spent numerous occasions in prison for his rancorous behavior.   
Although it is not clear who fired the first shot, the incident left thousands 
dead.34  No other event had such a profound impact on the development of 
the FLN.  French imperial authorities subsequently suppressed both Abbas 
and Messali—Abbas was forced into house arrest and Messali was exiled to 
the Congo.35  A small group of young Algerians, many who fought for 
France in World War II, emerged as the leaders of Algeria through the 
FLN.  Many of these leaders participated in the Sétif incident.  
 Nine principle Algerian nationalists, ranging from ages 27 to 42, 
founded the FLN in 1954: Ahmed Ben Bella, Ali Mahsas, Mostefa Ben 
Boulaid, Belkacem Krim, Omar Ouamrane, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, Mohamed 
Boudiaf, Mohamed Khider, and Hocine Aït Ahmed.  These members 
originated from socially diverse backgrounds.  Boulaid came from Aurés 
and was previously employed as a common miller.36  Hocine Aït Ahmed, 
born in 1926, grew up in a small Kabyle village with few opportunities, and 
where infant mortality rates remained high—Ait Ahmed attributed this to 
the French colonial system.37  None of the neuf historiques supported Abbas’ 
liberal ideology.  Rather, most gravitated towards Messali’s socialist 
leaning ideas.  Gilbert Meynier noted, however, that the eventual leaders of 
the FLN carried different concerns and visions for an independent Algeria, 
                                                            
32 Horne, 42.  
33 Ibid., 25, 41-43.  
34 French sources placed the number of dead Algerians at 1,300.  Algerian sources noted 45,000 
dead.  Moderate historians commonly place the number at 6,000.    
35 Horne, 73.  
36 Ibid., 77.  
37 Aït Ahmed, 9-10.  
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which countered Messali’s leftist leaning ideology: “Indépendantisme et 
aspiration de classe ne sont donc pas des vecteurs de sens oppose, mais des vecteurs 
de même sens. Si tout ‘nationalisme’ est ‘transclassisme,’ le ‘transclassisme’ ne doit 
rien a un common dénominateur social sur le long terme.”38  The FLN founders 
were not, as Meynier stated, unified in ideology for Algeria’s future, 
whether through Abbas’ liberalism or Messali’s socialism.  Moreover, the 
colonial system affected each in very personal ways, often impending on the 
family structure.  Thus, each carried his respective visions of revolutionary 
goals, that is, what should and could be achieved through Algerian 
independence.39   
 By the late 1940s, one figure emerged who influenced the FLN 
more than any other: Ahmed Ben Bella.  Bella’s immediate influence into 
what would become the FLN proved most important.  Born in 1918, Bella 
grew up in Marnia, a small town west of Oran.  His father worked in minor 
commercial ventures and sustained the family with a small farm.  Three of 
Bella’s brothers died early, one of whom died under the French flag during 
the Great War.  By 1940, Bella joined the French army and received the 
Croix de Guerre.  After Germany’s blitzkrieg and France’s subsequent 
surrender, Bella joined the French Moroccan resistance army.  At war’s 
end, Charles de Gaulle personally awarded Bella with the Médaille 
Militaire, unaware of the young Algerian’s future.  Dismayed over the Sétif 
massacre, Bella went underground within Messali’s MTLD movement in 
1947.  With Messali exiled, Bella broke from traditional MTLD doctrines 
and created the OS (Organisation Spéciale), which claimed to fight French 
colonialism ‘by all means,’ violent and non-violent alike.40  Messali’s MTLD 
continued to work within the system; however, Bella represented the first 
clear break from the old vanguard of Messali and Abbas. Armed 
confrontation became increasingly inevitable for Bella and his new 
followers.  Indeed, Aït Ahmed and Bella formed an important alliance in 
                                                            
38 Gilbert Meynier, Histoire Intérieure du FLN, 1954-1962 (Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard, 
2002), 136. (Independence and class aspiration are not therefore the vectors of opposite 
direction, but the vectors in the same direction. If all ‘nationalism’ is ‘transclassism,’ 
‘transclassism’ owes nothing to a common social denominator in the long term.)   
39 Ibid., 134-135.  
40 Horne, 74.  
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1949 and attacked a post office in Oran.  Consequently, French authorities 
issued outstanding warrants for both.  Aït Ahmed evaded capture, but 
French police apprehended Bella in 1950 and sentenced him to eight years 
imprisonment.  Bella escaped from prison, along with fellow FLN founder 
Ali Mahsas, in 1952.  The period from 1950 to 1954 remained largely 
chaotic, and the principle nationalist groups (UDMA and MTLD) 
splintered further into separate spheres.  A core group of nationalists broke 
from the radical side of Messali’s MTLD and called themselves 
“centralists.”  The most important point with this remained with Bella’s call 
for a third party.  By early 1954, Bella, Mahsas, Didouche and Boudiaf 
secretly collaborated in Paris and outlined the FLN’s initial formation.  
This third party unequivocally advocated overt violent action against 
metropolitan colonial authorities.41  
 
1954: The FLN United?                      
 Detailed information about the inner circles of the FLN remains 
problematic at best.  Ben Bella and Aït Ahmed wrote extensively after 
Algeria gained independence in 1962; however, both attained principle 
positions of power (or opposition power) with the newly formed Algerian 
government.  Several other founders were either assassinated or exiled; 
therefore, our understanding of events must be seen in this context.  Official 
FLN documents must be examined with caution, as these documents 
emphasized solidarity through FLN propaganda.42  Despite Frantz Fanon’s 
arguments, FLN leaders remained, as they had before and after 
independence, deeply divided over political, social, and cultural issues.  
Frantz Fanon argued in Wretched of the Earth that leaders unite through 
“the practice of violence [which] binds them together as a whole, since each 
individual forms a violent link in the great chain.”43  Fanon was heavily 
invested in the FLN cause, primarily as a member himself.  Terrorism 
certainly played an important role, as it often does.  This paper attempts, 
                                                            
41 Ibid., 74-77, and Besma Lahouri, “Ahmed Ben Bella (1916-),” L’Express, December 18, 
2003, 1.  
42 See Mohamed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962, 
“Information et propagande du FLN/ALN,” 110-136. 
43 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), 73.  
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however, to distinguish these perspectives, and echoes William Qaundt’s 
analysis that “contrary to Fanon’s prophecy […] it is simply untrue that 
the Algerian revolution produced unity within the political elite.”44  Indeed, 
we must deconstruct both early Algerian reactions and official FLN 
documentation in order to fully tease out and distinguish divergent FLN 
perspectives.  In many ways, altérité (otherness) remained an important, 
perhaps ingrained, concept within the FLN hierarchy.  This was not only 
directed at metropolitan France, but became an important distinction from 
an internal point of view.  
 On November 1, 1954 (All Saints Day), the leaders of the FLN 
officially proclaimed their sovereignty as a political and military 
independence movement with the following objectives: 
  
Our movement of regeneration presents itself under the label of: 
Front de Liberation  Nationale, thus freeing itself from any possible 
compromise, and offering to all Algerian  patriots of every social position 
and of all parties…the possibility of joining in the  national struggle. 
 Goal: National independence through: 
 1. restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and 
social, within the  framework of the principles of Islam; 
 2. preservation of all fundamental freedoms, without distinction of 
race or religion. 
 INTERNAL OBJECTIVES 
 1. political house-cleaning through the destruction of the last 
vestiges of corruption and  reformism, the causes of our present 
decadence…. 
 EXTERNAL OBJECTIVES 
 1. internationalism of the Algerian problem; 
 2. pursuit of North African unity in its national Arabo-Islamic 
context 
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3. assertion, through the United Nations Charter, of our active 
sympathy towards all    nations that may support our liberating 
cause.45     
  
 The “political house-cleaning” served formal acknowledgment of 
divided leaders within both the FLN and other nationalist groups.  It also 
offered a warning to those individuals or groups not aligned with the FLN.  
Only months earlier, the Messalists issued their own proclamation to the 
National Algerian Congress, which echoed 1930s North African Star 
ideology that “est qualifiée de période de lutte fratricide.”46  Not all 
nationalist members agreed with the FLN agenda, thus creating their own 
internal fratricide.  Still, fratricide became an available and conceptualized 
term which carried both pragmatic and psychological meaning into the 
formation and fate of the FLN.  This concept may be compared, in 
theoretical framework, to a Norbert Elias idea that “seek[s] the conditions 
for transformation in psychic economy in changes in ways to exert power 
and exist in society.”47  Goals of the FLN appear to have retained much of 
this thinking.     
FLN leaders portrayed these goals as the only true, legitimate 
cause—success depended primarily through violent military actions.  For 
example, early FLN propaganda utilized excessive military idioms.  Leaflets 
issued in November 1955, titled La Bataille de Djorf vue par Le Patriote, 
galvanized the FLN’s intrepidity: “Nous chargeons avec cœur, le choc est 
irrésistible.”48  Further leaflets, issued in 1955 or 1956 throughout the Oran 
region, portrayed notions of FLN unity through military rhetoric: “Le 
moment de l’action nous attend maintenant et nous ne pouvons obtenir des 
résultats [a travers] […] les méthodes, les objectifs, l’emploi du temps et 
                                                            
45 Horne, 95.  
46 Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962 (Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 25. (…is described as the period of fratricide.)  
47 Roger Chartier, On the Edge of the Cliff: History, Language, and Practices (London: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 108.  
48 Mohammed Harbi and Gilbert Meynier, Le FLN: Documents et Histoire, 1954-1962 (Paris: 
Librairie Arthème Fayard, 2004), 110. (We charge with heart, the shock is irresistible.) 
   96 
faisant preuve d’esprit de sacrifice, de courage et de foi.”49  However, the 
FLN remained at the outset, fragmented both strategically and logistically.  
Propaganda illustrated clear common objectives, motives, and ideology.  It 
serves important evidence that shows perceived, whether subconsciously or 
deliberately, notions of unanimity with monolithic features, like war or 
religion.  On the contrary, it may prove more accurate to propose that FLN 
leaders knowingly manipulated these ideas in order to form a broad 
movement.   
The FLN struggled to appeal to Algeria’s diverse populations.  
The popular French news press, L’Express, echoed this statement in a 1954 
article that discussed how French, Arab, Jewish, Mozabite (Berber), Italian, 
and Spanish groups lived together, since colonial conception, with much 
suspicion.50  Diverse ethnic groups interfered with the FLN’s “solidarity” 
rhetoric.  Algerian populations became increasingly fragmented and 
separated.  Popular support waned in the beginning, only slowly gaining 
wider revolutionary participation by war’s end.  Indeed, Algeria’s majority 
illiterate population could not process the information, which came from 
Cairo radio broadcasts and pamphlets similar to the noted examplesbroad 
enthusiasm over FLN actions initially resulted in the Aurès region.  Why, 
then, did Algerians slowly but surely gravitate towards FLN ideas?  Alf 
Andrew Heggoy proposed evidence to answer such a question.  Rather than 
the FLN’s attempts to foster widespread violent nationalism, Heggoy 
argues that native Algerians participated for numerous reasons, but 
particularly through French rifle restrictions.  This “legal” restriction 
embodied the larger colonial system of inequality.  French colonialism 
assaulted pre-established Berber traditions that included the rifle.  Heggoy 
noted that “Kabyles gladly tell a folk story which illustrates […] a […] 
man, according to this homily, owns a wife, a dog, and a gun. He can 
dispense with the wife and, if need be, do without the dog. But to have no 
gun is to have no honor.”51  Others, when asked why they joined the FLN, 
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51 Heggoy, 131.  
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provided no answer.52  This suggests individuals joined for reasons other 
than stated in official FLN propaganda.   An often-overlooked explanation 
was simply the idea of group conformity, influenced on Algerians through 
word of mouth.  Psychological sociality, that is the nature and tendency to 
mobilize along socially similar grounds, may have been more important 
than the FLN.  Colonialism, in its much broader understanding, adversely 
affected native culture and society.  Both Heggoy and Pierre Bourdieu 
noted the importance of the Algerian family structure where “the misery 
and insecurity have been made even worse by the distress resulting from 
the loss of the group ties on which the individual’s psychological and social 
stability was based in the old communities. One can imagine how precarious 
family unity must be in such a context.”53  Is it a coincidence that the term 
“fratricide” is found in much of the FLN documents and personal writings 
of the various national leaders?  This term implies a complete breakdown of 
family solidarity within the colonial structure.  It seems, rather than a 
unified FLN message, Algerians participated, if at all, in the independence 
movement for personal reasons.  The grandiose principles of FLN 
propaganda recruited some individuals; however, this evidence suggests 
Algerians never thought of themselves within those terms.  The FLN 
leaders, too, brought these different life stories and experiences into the 
party.  Those leaders attempted to create and legitimize its fledgling 
position in 1954, despite their competing visions for an independent 
Algeria.  Deconstructing this evidence has shown that FLN leaders and 
many Algerians were not united in 1954—just as they had not been in 1930 
or 1962.   
 
Conclusion 
 The Algerian War increasingly demonstrated intense violence 
between both parties.  For the FLN, internal division plagued its overall 
efforts.  By 1955, the FLN core in Aurès deposed its military general, 
Bachir Chihani, and executed him.  Moreover, Ben Bella remained in self-
imposed exile in Cairo in attempts to form broad international coalitions.  
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In 1956, the FLN leadership in Algeria issued an “ultimatum” to Bella: “If 
you cannot do anything for us outside, come back and die with us.”54  
Indeed, Bella found little logistical support for the Algerian cause outside of 
the country.  Internal quarrels increasingly divided FLN leadership.  
Things became so desperate for the FLN that they welcomed Abbas into 
the party by spring of 1955.  Abbas continued his moderate positions—
exemplified by his numerous international trips to France and the United 
Nations assembly.  His clarion call for equitable solutions ultimately fell on 
deaf ears.55 
The war continued with numerous cases of overt terrorism, by 
both sides, and widespread torture.  The Battle of Algiers ensued in 1956, 
leaving thousands dead and countless more homeless.  By 1962, the war 
ended with Charles de Gaulle’s concession and decision to “grant” Algeria’s 
independence.  Indeed, the war’s conclusion ultimately rested with his 
decision, influenced, nonetheless, by the growing metropolitan dissent.  In 
Algeria, the FLN emerged victorious and transformed itself from a 
revolutionary movement into a legitimate, albeit unitary, political party.56 
 Evidence of FLN divisions quickly formed once again in Ben 
Bella’s new authoritarian government.  From 1962 to 1965, Bella utilized 
the army to remove and oppose the other existing founders of the FLN—
Aït Ahmed, Khider, and Boumedienne among others.  Bella’s excessive 
authoritarianism could not sustain itself, and he was removed in a relatively 
non-violent coup in 1965.  Houari Boumedienne claimed the presidency and 
remained in office until his death in 1978.57  Ironically, Abbas, Aït Ahmed, 
and Bella all fled to France and Switzerland in exile.  Abbas retired to a 
Paris suburb until his death in 1985.58  Aït Ahmed and Bella remain active 
voices in Algerian politics.  Thus, Algeria’s immediate post-war history 
exemplified the same divisions that plagued nationalist leadership in the 
1920s to 1940s and in 1954.  The imperial legacy created altérité (otherness) 
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in which FLN leaders never fully detached themselves, clearly evident in 
the post-war struggle for stability. 
 Independence movements, especially in the colonial world, often 
portray unanimity.  This paper has shown, however, the Algerian 
perspective proved much more dynamic and convoluted.  We often 
understand the colonial system in these terms.  The Algerian story is one of 
deep-rooted conflict, created and nourished by the French imperial system.  
The process proved gradual, but ultimately chaotic and violent.  Liberal and 
moderate leadership simply could not sustain its call for assimilation.  
Indeed, not just French authorities invested these ideas into Algeria, but a 
core group of individuals—initially led by Zenati and Abbas—accepted the 
assimilation doctrine, including the idea of fratricide.  French leadership 
never intended, however, for Algeria to assimilate French culture and 
society.  It served, rather, an important convenience to apply such rhetoric 
and facilitate an efficient colonial system.  French imperialism applied the 
concept of altérité in order to instill pragmatic and psychological inferiority.  
This came through the adoption of specific French linguistic ideas that 
FLN leaders carried and employed during the independence movement.  
The unintended consequences worked two fold.  First, Algerian nationalism 
strengthened. Secondly, Algerian nationalist leaders never agreed on a 
monolithic path for Algeria.  The evidence presented highlights the intense 
internal conflict between the original FLN founders; however, these 
disputes devolved from decades of linguistic assimilation that worked in 
contradiction.  While Algeria achieved its independence, it carried the 
imperial burden beyond 1954 and arguably to the present.  Algerian 
fraternity proved too weak to sustain the imperial weight; instead, it 
fractured and divided them.  The symbolic power of November 1, 1954 will 
always represent a better, independent Algerian future.  Beneath it all, 
however, FLN leaders engaged in a storm of ideas, and remained politically 
fractured and incapable of shedding one hundred twenty-four years of 
French imperial domination. 
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When Kim Dae-jung completed his term as the Republic of Korea’a 
President, the government constructed a presidential library in his honor.  
The library was built at Yonsei University, a private college with a history 
leading back to the dawn of western-styled education within Korea.  
Interestingly, Kim Dae-jung never studied at Yonsei.  So why build the 
library at this private, well renowned university?  Perhaps because they 
represented “firsts” for their nation: Kim Dae-jung as the nation’s first 
Roman Catholic President and Yonsei University as the first hospital to 
provide Western medical education in Korea.  By the end of the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries, many Western missionaries founded schools 
in Korea to spread Christianity.  These schools and hospitals provided new, 
modern access to education for the people of Korea.  Christian missionaries 
played a significant role in developing Korea’s education system and 
medical infrastructure from 1882 to1910. Without the works of these 
individuals, a “modern” educational system would not have evolved on the 
peninsula until the occupation of Korea by Japan in 1910.  
Before examining the work of Christian missionaries and their 
efforts to establish schools and hospitals on the Korean peninsula, we must 
explore the context in which Christianity arrived and became available to 
the Korean people.  Takemichi Hara notes that one of the first significant 
ways that Western influence reached Korea was through the annual 
tributary missions to China by emissaries of the Korean Kingdom during 
the eighteenth-century.1  Even though the emissaries were theoretically 
forbidden to enter Peking, little stopped them from intruding into the city 
to search for entertainment, shopping, or conversation.  Korean emissaries 
regularly visited the Nan-t’ang, or South Church, where resident Jesuit 
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priests of the Manchu court provided the visiting Koreans with scientific 
works or Christian writings translated into Chinese.2 When these writings 
returned to Korea they found a receptive audience in the Sirhak3 crowd, 
leading to academic interest and conversion among many of the intellectual 
elite.  This new religion was so attractive to Korean emissaries that the first 
recorded baptism occurred at Peking in 1784.4  
Individuals who returned from Peking and converts among the 
Sirhak movement continued to spread Christianity in Korea without any 
official missionaries until 1794, when Chou Wen-mo became the first 
Catholic Priest in Korea.  When Chou Wen-mo, a young Chinese man 
entered the country he found at least four thousand converts.5  Wen-mo 
became the first Catholic priest in Korea. So pervasive was this new 
teaching, that it attracted followers from the late King Chŏngjo’s political 
faction.  In 1801, Queen Reagent issued the Shinyu proclamation, 
authorizing a large scale persecution of Christianity as an “evil teaching” in 
Confucian tradition.  Despite this government sponsored persecution of 
Christianity, its religious base continued to grow.  These trends continued 
to influence the peninsula as the isolationist policies of Korea began to 
crumble when Korea opened to Western powers by signing the United 
States–Korea treaty.  Christian persecution calmed in 1886 after Korea 
signed a treaty with France containing a remarkably vague clause that 
allowed missionaries to spread Christianity in Korea.  The ending of official 
persecution of Christians allowed for the entrance of many Protestant 
missionaries into Korea who not only spread the word of God, but also 
created schools and hospitals.  
The brief observance of Christianity’s history in Korea is 
important for two reasons.  First, it exemplifies how the religion arrived on 
the peninsula as a byproduct of the tributary missions between Korea and 
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China.  It spread among the academic population, partially through the 
Sirhak movement, before being persecuted by royal mandate in 1801 by the 
Shinyu proclamation.  Second, the end of official persecution in 1882 opened 
the door for the missionaries to come to Korea, bringing their Western 
knowledge that changed the face of Korean education and medicine forever.  
These two reasons prove critical to understand and contextualize the 
history of Christian missionaries in Korea.  
 With the treaty signed in1882, the United States began their 
missionary work in Korea by building hospitals and schools.  Although a 
pre-established form or practice of individual education existed within 
Korea, especially through male dominated Confucian traditions, it remained 
inaccessible to many individuals.  Missionaries brought accessibility to 
Korean education by creating an educational system for everyone at every 
level.  Prior to the establishment of missionary schools, Korean education 
centered upon private primary and secondary education.  State controlled 
public schooling focused on college education.  Sungho Lee summarizes 
these ideas: 
 
The state run institutions were mostly those of higher 
learning, which opened their doors only to the selected 
youths of the privileged upper class. The primary purpose 
of higher learning was to acquaint the students with 
Confucian philosophy and ethics through a course of 
study composed of Chinese classics, which were thought 
to be a guide for the bureaucracy. […] the private 
institutions of education were for primary and middle 
levels of education. The formal general education for 
people was generally a private matter, while higher 
education for the ruling class was a public one.6 
 
 In Korea, before the introduction of missionary schools, schooling 
for all levels of education did not exist, either private or public.  
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Complicating this problem, the state provided the only one form of higher 
education.  American missionaries created a system of public and higher 
education outside of the Korean government’s public style.  They founded 
schools with the intention of upgrading them to junior colleges and to 
“extend every effort to eventually create Western four-year colleges.7 
 In less than two years after the signing of the first United States-
Korea treaty, countless missionaries had arrived on Korea’s shores.  Among 
them, Dr. Horace G. Underwood, published the first Korean-English and 
English-Korean dictionaries.  The Reverend Underwood would later create 
the Chosǒn Christian College in 1915.  In addition to schools, many 
missionaries came to Korea to establish hospitals that not only provided 
Western medicine, but taught willing students different forms of medicine.  
Dr. Horace Allen and Dr. O.R. Avison opened the first hospital to provide 
and teach Western medicine in Seoul in 1885.  This hospital, 
Gwanghyewon, was the forerunner to Yonsei University.  With the 
assistance of Ohio industrialist L.H. Severance, the college eventually 
opened a medical school: the Union Medical College and Hospital and the 
School of Nursing.  This, too, eventually consolidated into Yonsei 
University. 8  Such a prestigious university has roots in the missionary 
schools of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.  Missionary 
schools revolutionized the quality of Korean education and medicine.  
 Missionaries founded schools and institutions founded with two 
primary differences from the Korean private and public schools systems. 
These schools taught Korean Hangul and provided an educational system 
for women.  Sungho Lee reveals the greatest strength of these mission 
schools: 
 
[T]he Western missionaries introduced Western higher 
learning in the Korean language, “Hangul.” They did 
away with Chinese classics. They were first class Korean 
speakers and scholars in Korean studies. They wrote the 
history of Korea and studied Korea’s traditional religions.9 
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Rather than teach Confucian traditions by using Chinese Confucian texts, 
the missionaries broke these constraints upon higher learning in Korea by 
using Hangul, making them pioneers of education within Korea.  The idea 
that Koreans could receive a higher education in their own language 
without the use of Confucian texts was new.  Its popularity trickled 
downward into the primary and middle levels of education provided by the 
missionaries.  By establishing this new education in Korean, and not in 
Chinese, the doors of opportunity were opened to all Koreans who wanted 
to pursue an education. 
 The attention devoted to women made mission schools 
indispensable to the Korean educational system. Traditionally, the 
education system in Korea was exclusive to men, and those women of the 
upper yangban class who did receive some education did so in the onmun 
vernacular script.10  This practice would change soon after 1882 when Mrs. 
Mary F. Scranton arrived in Korea.  She began  a women’s school, Ewha 
Haktang, in 1886 with just one student.  She created the school with the full 
blessing of Queen Min11, a renowned and infamous monarch with a very 
anti-Western background.  Ewha Kaktang struggled at first.  Initially, the 
people of Korea believed that the missionaries intended to abduct their 
daughters for service as slaves in foreign countries.  Ewha Haktang, 
however, began accepting orphaned girls from backgrounds of extreme 
poverty some of whom, when given a chance, excelled.12  Ewha Haktang 
developed quickly and Sungho Lee notes that it was a “pioneer” of progress: 
 
[T]he girls of Ewha Haktang in 1898 asked that the 
teaching of Chinese characters be included in the 
curriculum. This was a reflection of the new spirit that 
education for girls should not in any way be inferior to 
that of boys’, knowledge of Chinese characters and 
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classics being the traditional hallmark of a good education 
given only to boys.13 
 
Ewha Haktang would continue to pioneer in the area of women’s education 
when it offered its first college courses in three departments—literature, 
music, and home economics—in 1910 for fifteen female students.  The 
pioneering work of schools like Ewha Haktang brought greater educational 
equality and inspired generations of women, regardless of economic 
background to pursue an education. 
 In addition to creating an educational structure for higher 
education for both genders, missionaries also worked to develop a medical 
infrastructure.  Missionaries founded numerous hospitals and schools for 
nursing. Another hospital of note was the East Gate Women’s Hospital 
founded in Seoul by Dr. Mary Cutler in 1886.  In 1905, Dr. Cutler and 
Margaret J. Edmunds, a nursing graduate of University Hospital in Ann 
Arbor, Michigan, began the first training school for nurses.  Frances Lee 
Whang, former director of the Severance Hospital School, notes in an 
article from The American Journal of Nursing that: 
 
The School admitted only Christian applicants, on their 
parents’ written consent, and their pastors’ or teacher’ 
recommendation… the school provided books, shoes, 
uniforms, citizen’s clothes, bedding, food, room, light, fuel, 
summer vacations and at graduation a handsome diploma 
and gold school pin.14 
 
Korean female nurses often came from poor backgrounds, much like the 
girls of Ewha Haktang, and relied heavily upon the scholarship and charity 
of the nursing school.  The missionaries that came after the signing of the 
first United States-Korea treaty strengthened the educational background 
of these girls and, by extension, the nursing infrastructure of Korea.  These 
missionaries were the first group to establish a complete curriculum for 
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Korea, from kindergarten to college, which brought a modern approach to 
education by including the study of science and medicine.15  Establishing 
schools, of all levels, and hospitals became the focus of many missionaries in 
Korea.16  
 By 1910, when the Japanese annexed Korea as a colony, 
Missionaries operated about one-third of all schools.17  The large 
proportion of mission schools in Korea shows the demand for, and quality 
of, the education that these schools provided. The establishment of nursing 
schools, hospitals, and expansion of medical instruction by missionaries 
vastly strengthened the medical infrastructure of the country.  
By establishing these schools and hospitals, the missionaries set a 
precedent for future generations of Koreans that can be seen in the 
educational attainment of Christians in Korea today.  In the article 
“Characteristics of Religious Life in South Korea: a Sociological Survey,” a 
Gallup Korea survey revealed that about one-fourth of Korean Protestants 
and one-fourth of Korean Catholics surveyed had university degrees, 
compared to only seven percent of the Buddhists surveyed.  Thirty percent 
of Korean Buddhists had only an elementary education or less, compared to 
the three and eleven percent of Catholics and Protestants who had the same 
educational achievement.18 This shows the impact that these missionaries 
had on their converts; they took the need for an education which they found 
in Korea, created a modern system of education, and established an 
educational system that served generations of Koreans, even during the 
Japanese occupation.19  Lillie Ora Lathrop, in a letter to the editor of The 
American Journal of Nursing, provides a candid assessment of the situation 
and desire for education in Korea in 1922.  While discussing the celebration 
of Korean Thanksgiving, the anniversary of Christianity’s arrival in Korea, 
she talks about women attending night school in order to learn to write and 
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read so that they may educate their children “who all, now, seem to want an 
education.”20 These missionaries had changed Korean society by combining 
their evangelism with a desire to provide and create a passion for education 
and training.  When the Japanese closed these missionary schools, claiming 
they wished to purge Western influence from their new colony, they did 
not expect an outcry over the loss of educational opportunities provided by 
the missionaries. Christian missionaries provided the means, education, and 
training, to be successful in post 1882 Korea, and many Koreans embraced 
these opportunities regardless of the political climate. 
The relationship between Christian missionaries and the dynamic 
changes that occurred in Korea during the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth-century, affected the policies of Meiji Japan in Korea. The 
influence of Christianity continued to affect the peninsula during the 
twentieth-century, even after World War II, as one-fourth of Koreans 
today identify themselves as Christian.  During the decades prior to the 
occupation of Korea by Japan in 1910, Christianity and the mission work of 
missionaries played a significant role in developing the Republic of Korea’s 
education system and medical infrastructure.  The history of Christianity in 
Korea highlights how early converts and missionaries were the victims of 
persecution until the first United States-Korea treaty in 1882 and the 
Korea-France treaty in 1886. In the late nineteenth-century missionaries 
founded multiple institutions to provide a beneficial education system to 
Korea through the establishment of a curriculum that spanned from 
kindergarten to college.  This curriculum employed Hangul as the language 
of instruction and provided an expansion of educational opportunities for 
women, and established nursing and medical schools to provide Western 
medical instruction and training to Koreans. One-third of the formal 
schools within Korea adopted this educational system which illustrates the 
impact of religion on educational attainment in Korea today.  After the 
missionary schools closed in 1911, Koreans voiced their need for this 
education which was not fulfilled until the reopening of Korea in 1925.  
Connecting the efforts of missionaries with Korea’s future leaders reveals 
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the true impact of the mission work of Christian missionaries in Korea.  
Without their work creating a complete educational system, schools, and 
hospitals, the face of Korea today might look very different.
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They saw that now they lacked their full strength and great name, no one 
took notice of them or spoke to them.  When they saw this, they lay down on the side 
of the hill at Tara, put their lips to the earth, and died.1 
  
In the spring of 1866, less than a year after the end of the American Civil 
War, veteran combatants from both sides of that conflict invaded the 
British North American territory of Canada.  These soldiers staged a two-
pronged attack: one from Buffalo, New York, and the other from St. Albans, 
Vermont.  They planed to use a vanquished Canada as a bargaining tool to 
coerce the British Empire into releasing its grip on Ireland, creating a 
sovereign Irish Republic.2  The invasion failed, however. 
 These soldiers were members of an Irish-American nationalist 
organization known as the Fenian Brotherhood, a society dedicated to the 
establishment of an independent Irish state through the violent removal of 
British influence.  Fenian Brotherhood adopted their name from the Fianna, 
an ancient band of Celtic warriors led by the mythological folk hero Fiona 
Mac Cumhaill, who earned fame throughout Gaelic culture as the defender 
of Ireland.  The exiled Irish nationalist, John O’ Mahoney founded The 
Fenian Brotherhood in New York City in 1858.  Fellow expatriate James 
Stephens led The Irish counterpart, the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood.3 
 From a geopolitical standpoint their failure is not surprising.  St. 
George’s Channel separates the southeastern edge of Ireland from England 
by less than one hundred miles.  The proximity of the islands, however, 
along with the intense disparities between their martial capacities, is only 
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part of the equation.  Another crucial component relates to the problem of 
Irish identity itself, not only as to how the British viewed the Irish, but how 
the Irish viewed themselves.  The British considered the Irish as the “other” 
despite their shared histories.  The British portrayed the Irish as hovelling, 
Catholic barbarians ill-suited for self-rule.  While the British saw themselves 
as “British,” the Irish defined themselves in ambiguous terms; no all-
encompassing “Irish” identity existed.   
The Fenians failed, in part, because they struggled against near 
insurmountable odds.  However, the Fenians also failed, as did many Irish 
nationalists before and after them, due to a lack of a coherent strategy.  
They failed due to infighting and bickering and ill-defined objectives.  The 
Irish nationalists failed because they saw themselves as the other, much like 
the British.  
   English antagonism towards Ireland has long historical roots.  In 
the 1530's, Protestant rulers, beginning with King Henry VIII, attempted 
to subjugate the Catholic population.  William of Orange’s victory at the 
Battle of the Boyne in 1688 solidified Protestant English control of Ireland.  
By this time, most of the Catholic ruling families were either dead or living 
in exile on the Continent.4  Thus began a period known as the Protestant 
Ascendency, when colonists, reinforced by the might of the English 
government, imposed a crippling system of social, political and economic 
controls against the Catholic majority.  The English confiscated most of the 
land and reallocated it to approximately ten-thousand Protestant families, 
reducing the vast majority of the Catholic population to the level of peasant 
laborers.5  The English established Penal Codes, which prohibited Catholics 
from buying or inheriting land, in the late 1600s.6  Driven by the need to 
raise livestock or cash crops, Catholics with larger farms exploited those of 
lesser means.  While the English treated Catholic tenant farmers poorly, 
these farmers treated their Irish agricultural laborers in an even worse 
fashion.7  Catholics could not participate in the English controlled 
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parliament in Dublin.8  However, from this very Parliament the seeds of 
Irish nationalism began to take root as the increasingly revolutionary-
minded eighteenth-century drew to a close.   
  With British soldiers busy in the American colonies, Irish 
Protestants decided to form themselves into companies of armed volunteers 
in an effort to defend the island from the potential of opportunistic 
Continental exploitation.  Two parliamentary leaders, Henry Flood and 
Henry Grattan, opted to use the offensive capabilities of this body, which 
numbered forty-thousand by 1780, to insist on economic and political 
reforms, particularly legislative independence from England.  Grattan 
succeeded in this venture in 1782, when the English government granted 
the Dublin body partial parliamentary autonomy.  However, even in 
“Grattan’s Parliament,” British government patronage controlled nearly 
two-thirds of the elected members.9   
 Within this relatively relaxed political environment, the Society of 
United Irishmen formed, first in Belfast, then in Dublin, in 1791.  The 
Society, led by Protestant lawyer Theobald Wolfe Tone, sought to end 
British rule.  The success of revolutionary efforts in France increased both 
the boldness of the Society and the attention of their opponents, and in 
1794 the organization was declared illegal and driven underground.   As a 
result, the United Irishmen reorganized themselves into a secret, oath-
bound society whose goal was to create a nationwide, military network in 
preparation for an insurrection that now seemed inevitable.10  
 The rebellion that began on May 26, 1798 in Wexford, failed to 
meet its objective.11  Unlike the Young Ireland insurrection of 1848, 
however, or any of the Fenian exercises in the 1860's, this uprising, led by 
Catholic priests and acted out by thousands of pike-wielding peasants, was 
particularly brutal and relatively long.12  An estimated 30,000 people were 
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killed before the six-week ordeal was finally snuffed out on June 21.13  The 
rebellion failed for a number of logistical reasons: poor organization on the 
part of the rebels, vastly superior strength on the part of the government, 
and inadequate aid on the part of the French.  Ideological differences 
between the combatants themselves also contributed to thefailure of the 
insurrection.  Whereas Protestant aristocrats revolted against British 
political control, Catholic peasants fought and died in an attempt to 
alleviate social grievances.14  Rather than uniting Irish patriots in a 
common cause, the Wexford uprising antagonized tensions between these 
factions.  Even more damning, it also led to increased British control of 
Ireland through the Act of Union in 1801.     
 William Pitt, the Prime Minister, believed that the Act of Union 
would allow Westminster to govern the island more efficiently and also 
alleviate at least some Catholic animosity toward the Protestant Parliament 
in Dublin.  Pitt succeeded in his efforts, but not without considerable effort 
and loss of political capital on both islands.  Many Britons, for example, saw 
Ireland as a useless liability, whereas Irish Parliamentarians were 
concerned by what they saw as the waning of their political clout.  The 
Union and the violence that preceded it soon found a place within the 
ideological framework of later nationalists, men who saw the destruction of 
the Act as their paramount objective, and the use of violence as a 
historically justifiable means to an end.15  
 For the half a century 1798 uprising, there would be no more large 
scale violence against the British, due, in part, to the efforts of Daniel 
O’Connell.  O’Connell, a Catholic born in Count Kerry in 1775, dedicated 
himself to the cause of Catholic emancipation.  Both a staunch royalist and 
social conservative, O’Connell had no interest in the revolutionary theatrics 
of the United Irishmen, instead advocating peaceful coexistence within the 
larger British Empire.  He created the Catholic Association in 1823, 
arguing that his countrymen could be loyal subjects even to a Protestant 
king if they were given representation in Parliament.16   
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 In 1828, O’Connell brazenly stood for election to Parliament 
against a government candidate.  As a Catholic, he was barred from civil 
service and thus the results would only be relevant if he lost. But O’Connell 
won the election.  Fearing increased animosity from angry Catholic 
peasants, however, Parliament relented and passed the Catholic 
Emancipation Act in 1829, which allowed Catholics to enter Parliament and 
hold high civil and military office.  Flush with victory, O’Connell formed a 
second organization, the Society for the Repeal of the Union, in 1830, again 
arguing that such legislation would strengthen Irish loyalty to the British 
crown.  Unsuccessful in this venture, he nonetheless continued his efforts 
and finally, after ten years, founded the Loyal National Repeal Association.  
This organization was strengthened in 1842 by the addition of a new group 
of allies who called themselves the Young Irelanders.17   
  Led by Thomas Davis, a Protestant barrister from Cork, the 
Young Irelanders were middle class intellectuals who sought a pluralist, 
non-sectarian movement to remove British influence in Ireland.18  The 
Young Irelanders were also cultural and religious purists. They supported a 
revival of the Gaelic language and believed in a devote adherence to strict 
moral standards.19  O’Connell, in contrast, carried his Catholicism loosely, 
had little interest in the promotion of the Gaelic language, and frowned 
upon the revolutionary zeal which he considered to be plaguing the rest of 
Europe.20  Thus, while their ultimate goals and tactics were never entirely 
synchronized, these forces nonetheless saw themselves on the same side in a 
larger struggle against a common opponent.  These ideological differences 
may have been overlooked had O’Connell’s political authority not been 
seriously compromised by events which occurred in October of 1843. 
 O’Connell had scheduled a “monster meeting” near Dublin.  These 
immensely popular, open-air gatherings gave O’Connell the chance to use 
his impressive speaking abilities to invigorate massive crowds of already 
dissatisfied Irish.  Despite his alleged loyalty to the throne, the government 
became less enthusiastic about such gatherings as they grew in popularity 
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and eventually decided to ban them altogether.  Reluctant to risk violence, 
O’Connell cancelled the meeting, a decision Young Ireland leaders saw as a 
weakness. Eventually O’Connell began to move toward more conventional 
parliamentary tactics in his efforts, even going so far as to forge an alliance 
with the Whig party that came to power in June of 1846.21   
 Such tactics did not sit well with the increasingly impatient Young 
Ireland leadership, who saw a permanent fracture between Irish and British 
society as the only way to achieve their goals.  As they declared in The 
Nation, the Young Ireland journal, “To make our people politically free but 
bond slaves to some debasing social system like that which crowds the 
mines and factories of England with squalid victims, we would not strike a 
blow.”22   
 The inevitable break with the O’Connellites came in 1846 when 
the Repeal Association officially condemned violence as a political tool.  
While no such violence was being planned, the Young Irelanders withdrew 
from the organization.  They shared the view with most romantic 
nationalists that the forceful removal of a corrupt government was a 
justifiable course of action.23   
 In early 1847, Young Ireland leader Smith O’Brien formed the 
Irish Confederation, which sought the immediate restoration of Irish 
government.  O’Connell’s death that same year accelerated the development 
of this more radical ideology amongst nationalists.  Another such radical, 
John Mitchell, left the Irish Confederation in February of 1848 to focus on 
The United Irishman, a newspaper devoted to revolutionary rhetoric.24  The 
relatively bloodless removal of the French monarchy that same month 
convinced many Irish nationalists that such success could be duplicated on 
their island.25   
 On March 2, British authorities arrested Mitchell, O’Brien and 
others on charges of sedition, and two months later declared their 
organization illegal.  This declaration led to the Ballingarry insurrection, 
where Young Irelanders attempted to initiate a revolution by leading a 
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handful of starving Munster peasants into armed conflict with British 
government officials.26  The so-called rebellion ended in diaster, and on 
October 9, 1848, O’Brien was sentenced to the standard rebel fate.  
However, before he was decapitated and his limbs given the standard 
British tour, O’Brien, a romantic to the end, declared, “Having failed, I 
know my life is forfeited […] for Ireland I shall carefully surrender life 
itself.”27   
 
Thus, it was not lack of enthusiasm that kept Irish nationalists 
from success.  Perhaps Thomas N. Brown offers the most 
thorough analysis of the Ballingarry fiasco: 
These events pointed to the difficulties nationalists faced in trying 
to overthrow so resolute and confident a people as the British with 
so divided a people as the Irish.  The richest and most powerful 
Irish—the Anglo-Irish—were committed to the British 
connection.  The middle classes were too few in number and too 
unsure of themselves to go it alone.  Peasant support was 
imperative […] but hard to command […] peasant and 
nationalist conceived of Ireland in different ways.  The Young 
Irelander wanted the peasant to act in the name of an abstraction 
called the Irish nation, but his loyalties inhered in more concrete 
relationships—those of the family, the parish, the village and 
Whiteboy society.  The peasant followed leaders, not principles 
[…] and looked to the priest or the landlord or both for 
leadership.28 
 
 The British, of course, disagreed with each other over multiple 
issues and they represented, at the time, one of the most socially stratified 
nations on Earth.  However, like a moody family capable of pasting on a 
smiling face while dining in public, Great Britain in the nineteenth-century 
confronted the outside world behind a unified front.  No such uniformity 
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existed in Ireland between the Catholic peasant and the middle-class 
Protestant. 
 Though the failures of 1848 did spell the end of Young Ireland as a 
political force, blood was not spilt entirely in vain.  Veterans of the uprising 
moved further underground for the time being and began to plot their 
revenge.29  In time the uprising, despite its lack of success, assumed an 
almost mythic significance as a bridge gapping the history of revolutionary 
nationalism, from those involved in the 1798 insurrection to the movement 
that came next. 
 Before discussing the Fenian movement in depth, one must 
examine the way in which intense Irish migration to North American, 
along with the horrific suffering that exacerbated such an exodus, affected 
these Irish-American nationalists.  Descendants of Protestant colonists 
owned almost all the farmland in Ireland.  These landowners rented out 
their plots to Irish Catholics of middling means, who in turn sublet smaller 
plots to poorer and poorer farmers.   By 1841, a population of eight-million 
Irish were plugged into a social pyramid that consisted of an often 
absentee-landlord at the top, tenant farmers that rented out smaller parcels 
to cottiers in the middle, who in turn offered work to landless agricultural 
laborers, peasants who barely grew enough food to survive.30   
 Almost half the population of Ireland depended on the potato for 
existence.  Nutritious and simple to grow, the success of the crop in most 
years allowed for rapid population growth amongst those most dependent.  
When the crop failed or succumbed to blight, the results were cruel.  
Though there were actually a number of potato famines throughout the 
nineteenth-century, between 1845 and 1848 the disease became especially 
virulent. The death rates became so terrible that mass burials became 
commonplace.  Due to the Act of Union, the famine was, legally, just as 
much a British problem as an Irish one.  Such legislative technicalities were 
not born out in practice.  While the government provided some aid relief, 
help was laughable at best; the British government eventual apologized for 
its neglect of the dire situation.31 
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 The famine exacerbated migration and increased Anglophobia 
among the Irish.  Like pouring a can of petrol on an already angry flame, 
British reaction to the famine provided more than enough evidence for 
many nationalists that the Act of Union was insincere and that British 
influence on the Island had to be ended.  Many Irishmen and even some 
members of Parliament saw in British famine policies as more than mere 
neglect.32  Those Irish who did migrate to North America carried with 
them a considerable amount of anti-English sentiment. 
 The Irish, of course, has been immigrating to the United States 
well before the 1840s.  As a democracy, the United States was an obvious 
choice for political refugees from both the 1798 uprising and the 
insurrection of 1848.  By 1860, these refuges and their descendants, coupled 
with famine survivors, numbered more than 1.6 million, with the 
overwhelming majority of them arriving between 1847 and 1854, the 
height of the famine-induced misery.33   
 However, these large numbers do not indicate American 
hospitality.  Though many politicians welcomed the Irish for their votes 
and capitalists welcomed them for their labor, many Americans were 
unimpressed by the arrival of people they deemed “unruly.”  Harsh 
treatment from families who had been living in the country for over one 
generation only strengthened Irish-American nationalism.  Like all 
immigrants, loneliness played a key role in the Irish-American experience, 
and this loneliness led to the establishment of Irish-American social clubs 
and fraternities.34  Outside of Ireland, a common “Irish” identity was 
beginning to strengthen. 
 The leaders of both the American and Irish branches  of the Fenian 
movement were Young Ireland exiles.  John O’Mahony journeyed to the 
United States after the uprising in1848 while Stephens escaped to mainland 
Europe only to return to Ireland in 1856.  Correspondence between the 
Fenians in the U.S. and the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in Ireland, 
indicate that, while the actual rebellion would take place in Ireland, support 
for the venture, both financial and military, would come from the United 
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States.  Stephens met with O’Mahony during a tour of America, and, before 
he returned to Ireland in January. he delegated his old ally as “supreme 
organizer and Director of the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood in 
America.”  American Fenianism began in New York, but O’Mahony was 
charged with the laborious project of extending the movement throughout 
the United States.35 
 “It is but natural that our progress should be slow at first,” 
O’Mahony wrote in April of 1859, “particularly as our finances do not yet 
warrant us in sending round agents to the different centres of the Irish-
American population…We must calculate upon a certain amount of 
opposition from some of the priests...Those who denounce us go beyond 
their duty as clergymen.”36   
 The controversy between the Fenians as a secret, oath-bound 
society and the Catholic Church had followed the nationalists to America, 
much to the chagrin of the Brotherhood.37  No insurrection could succeed 
without vast numbers, and, since the church was closely linked to the lives 
of most Irish-Americans, these numbers would be difficult to accumulate.   
Many rebels in Ireland wanted to strike immediately, and it was 
not long before similar impatience spread to the United States.  As a result, 
O’Mahony traveled to Dublin in 1860 to examine how the funds he had 
sent across the Atlantic were being spent.  The two leaders sat down and 
discussed specifics: The revolution needed at least 5000 disciplined men,, 
complete with competent officers leading them, and the Brotherhood must 
acquire at least 50,000 rifles and muskets.  However, considerably more 
guns than this would soon be in the hands of even more Irish-Americans 
fighting in the Civil War, a dilemma that struck both men as a disaster.38 
 Ironically, in the long run, the American Civil War did more to 
help the Fenian cause than hinder it.  Despite the lament of the Boston Pilot 
on May 4, 1861, “The first enemies the 69th will encounter will, in all 
probability, be Irishmen...what a spectacle this is.  There they 
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stand...thousands of miles from the land which it would be their common 
pride to defend,” Fenian membership expanded during the Civil War.39  
And, despite nativist concerns to the contrary, Irish-Americans joined the 
ranks in droves.  The impetus was booth financial, many enlistees were 
offered bounties of 600 dollars or more, and ideological, particularly after 
Great Britain lent support to the Confederacy.  Army recruits focused on 
this British involvement, arguing that the military training soldiers would 
receive would prove invaluable in the “coming struggle” for Irish freedom.  
Estimates indicate that anywhere from 150,000 to 200,000 Irish-Americans 
served in the Union armies alone.40   
 In the mean time, however, Fenian leadership believed that 
something was needed to keep the Brotherhood on the minds of Irish-
Americans who might otherwise be tempted to focus on more obvious 
concerns.  Another veteran of 1848, Terrence McManus, played his role in 
the patriotic drama by dying in San Francisco at the beginning of 1861.  
McManus’s funeral procession, from California to Chicago to New York 
and finally to Dublin, became a mass Fenian demonstration.  How cruel a 
fate, the nationalists decried, that such a man should die so far from his 
ancestral home.  On September 18, the well-traveled remains of Terrence 
McManus were placed onto the steamship “Glasgow” and set off to Ireland.  
Fate smiled again on the nationalist cause when Archbishop Colton refused 
to offer mass for the rebel.  Now the Irish Revolutionary Brotherhood was 
more than just another secret society; they were patriots whom the Church 
persecuted by the Church in their valiant fight to free Ireland.41  Stephens 
could not have designed a better recruitment tool. 
O’Mahony took advantage of the increased Anglophobia in the 
United States to continue his recruitment efforts.  Under normal 
circumstances Washington would not have tolerated such behavior, 
particularly during wartime.  However, with the British building 
Confederate warship, Washington not only allowed but encouraged Fenian 
activity.  Members of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Potomac and the 
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Tennessee were allowed to travel to Chicago in 1863 for the very first 
Fenian convention.   
The movement started to take on a more “American” tone.  
Delegates drafted a constitution that created an Irish government in exile.42  
Some believed that O’Mahony’s power was still too centralized, however, 
and he himself was too hesitant to act, thus another convention was held in 
Philadelphia two years later.  At the 1865 convention, the office of the Head 
Centre was abolished and replaced by an elected President answerable to a 
General Congress.  O’Mahony left the Philadelphia convention with much 
of his autocratic influence gone, and two months later the Senate deposed 
him as President, insisting he step aside.  He refused.43 
 “Cut and hack the rotten branches around you.”  Stephens wrote to 
him, infuriated by the Americanization of the cause.  Once again the burden 
of factionalism crept into the movement.  Invoking the Chicago 
constitution, O’Mahony commanded one wing of the movement while the 
Senate led the other, which was now more popular with Irish-Americans 
because its form of government was more American in nature.44 
 The Civil War ended in April of 1865, and thousands of Irish-
American soldiers who had fought and survived the violence focusrd their 
energies on a common enemy.  Enthusiasm was high, as many Fenians, 
soldiers and leaders, assumed that once the war ended, the United States 
would naturally take Great Britain to task for its belligerent support of the 
now vanquished Confederacy.45  However, this would not be the case.  The 
Fenians had mistaken the prevailing anti-English mood of the last half-
decade as pro-Irish sentiment, while most Americans, were not too 
impressed with either group.  While Americans focused their animosity 
toward the English government and not necessarily its citizens, the exact 
opposite was true for the Irish.46  Thus, the best the Fenians could hope for 
on the part of the U.S. government was to let them exist unhindered, and, 
because the Irish-American population represented such a powerful voting 
block, Fenian activity was allowed to flourish. 
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 At this point in time, the Catholic church could no longer justify 
its animosity toward the Brotherhood due to its status as a “secret-society,” 
as very little about the nationalist movement was secret.  A New York 
Times article from September 15 of 1865 explained, “...it will be seen the 
British government are becoming so alarmed at the progress of Fenianism 
in Ireland that they have determined to increase the military force stationed 
in that portion of the United Kingdom.”47  The January 12, 1866 edition of 
the Chicago Tribune reported that the Fenian congress “has elected a 
Central Council to take the place of the Senate...at the Senate headquarters, 
President Roberts has sent instructions to the Brotherhood to purchase 
arms for their members.  The arms which the circle are to procure are 
Springfield muskets […] It is reported that preparations are being made 
for the purchase of large quantities of war material at seventy-five percent 
less than the usual cost.”48   
 It is difficult now to imagine the boldness with which the Fenians 
then acted.  Here was an Irish-American government acting within the U.S. 
government, openly making military preparations against a sovereign 
world power. We can only conclude that the attack on Canada, though 
certainly a bold course of action, was not as quixotic a plot as one might 
assume.  Many influential Americans considered the annexation of Canada 
as a reasonable compensation for British behavior during the course of the 
last half-decade. William R. Roberts, a wealthy American merchant and 
leader in the Fenian movement, believed that an invasion of Canada might 
instigate actual war between the United States and Great Britain, thus 
paving the way for Irish independence.49   
 Evidence indicates that senior members of the American 
government knew about the Fenian plot, and that a Fenian “diplomat” 
broached the subject with both President Johnson and Secretary of State 
Seward themselves and was told that while the U.S. government could not 
officially condone such behavior, it would “acknowledge accomplished facts” 
as it pertained to the potential success of such a venture.50  
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 As mentioned, however, the Fenian invasion of Canada failed, and 
U.S. troops did, in fact, arrest the combatants once Canadian troops had 
driven them back.51 The quick defeathad as much to do with the earnestness 
with which the British and Canadian governments took Fenian activity in 
the days leading up to the attack as it did with the audacity of the initial 
plot.  The British had heard rumors of an invasion as early as 1864, and had 
deployed additional troops along the Canadian border.52  Here is an excerpt 
from a New York Times article from March 10, 1866, mere days before the 
invasion, “The government buildings and all the banks in Ottawa have been 
placed under military guard at night.  There has been a most enthusiastic 
response throughout Canada to the call for volunteers, and ten thousand 
men are already marching toward the frontier.”53  A month before, another 
article from another American newspaper commented on the approaching 
invasion.  It merits inclusion here at length due to its discussion of Fenian 
infighting: 
 
In the Fenian addresses recently delivered, both by the O’Mahony 
and Roberts leaders, it appears that the true reason of the division 
between the Roberts and O’Mahony factions is that the former 
proposes to invade Canada and the latter would make the 
campaign direct against Ireland...General Sweeny, President 
Roberts, and the Senate, confess that they have arrived at the 
conclusion that the original plan of freeing Ireland by raising the 
standard of revolt in that country would be insane.  Probably the 
O’Mahony faction perceive[s] that the plan of invading Canada is 
still more insane.  In Ireland the invading force might possibly be 
joined by a considerable portion of the people.  In Canada it would 
be met by a resistance as united as it would encounter on the coast 
of Cornwall or Wales.  The invaders would probably by disposed 
of as summarily as were the Filibusters under Lopez in Cuba.  The 
project of conquering Canada with 16,000 men as a base of 
operations from which to attack Ireland, is worthy of that rich 
Irish imagination from which it emanates.  Meanwhile, it seems 
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very clear that such projects are a palpable violation of our 
neutrality laws.54   
 
A final raid on Canada was attempted in 1870, but by this time the 
political winds had shifted.  The incoming President Grant informed his 
cabinet that he would no longer offer the Fenians the privilege of the 
“organization of a government within the U.S.”  The Fenian Senate was 
now reluctant to commit the Brotherhood to battle, fearing the erosion of 
their political clout.  As Brown writes:  “Irish-American nationalism was 
directed chiefly toward American, not Irish, ends.  A free Ireland would 
reflect glory on the Fenians, but of more immediate and practical value was 
use of the Brotherhood as an American pressure group.”  Wealthier 
American-Irish became even more opposed to the violence because it kept 
the Irish viewed as “a distinct nationality in the midst of the American 
population.”55 
 The Irish transformed into the “other” for many Irish-Americans 
who were becoming more and more determined to create a new life for 
themselves in the United States.  that Irish immigrants or their children did 
not forgot about the homeland, as donations towards the burgeoning Home 
Rule movement and other nationalist groups continued throughout the rest 
of the century and up until 1916.56    However, the battle to purge British 
influence from Irish soil would be fought on Irish soil, by Irishmen.  The 
zenith of Fenianism was over. 
 As Irish nationalism twisted its way toward the violence of 1916, 
the Fenians played the part of martyred patriot-ghosts in much the same 
way as did Wolfe Tone and Smith O’Brien and other dead nationalists from 
1798, 1848, 1867, and beyond.  The Home Rule Party in Ireland, though it 
lacked the martial vigor of earlier nationalists, still looked to these figures 
as inspiration for their cause. 
 In the end, it was not the Home Rule Party who brought Great 
Britain to the bargaining table after years of violence and agitation.  It was 
Sinn Fein, who, after winning nearly every election in 1918 in Ireland’s 
Catholic constituencies, refused to take their seats in a British Parliament.  
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Uninterested in co-existing within a large British empire, Sinn Fein, like 
the Fenians and Young Irelanders before them, insisted on total Irish 
independence.  
In December of 1921, after two years of guerilla warfare against 
Great Britain, a half-century after the Fenian revolts, seventy-three years 
since the debacle at Ballingarry, and a hundred twenty-three years 
following the violence at Wexford, such independence was won.  The 
fighting was not entirely over, however, because the Irish still were not 
certain as to what, exactly, such a Republic was to look like, or where, 
precisely, its borders were to fall.  Sinn Fein translates into “Ourselves 
alone.”  By 1921, Great Britain was finally ready to leave the “other” alone, 
and thus, the Irish “other” became the Irish Free State.   
One should not conclude that the primary reason it took Irish 
nationalists so long to secure their independence was their inability to get 
along with each other.  The British were numerically superior, possessed 
technological superiority, and used both advantages to create one of 
history’s most successful war machines.  One might just as easily analyze 
the reasons Great Britain relented to the nationalists so soon.  However, 
factionalism did take its toll on Irish nationalist goals.  Be it the religious 
animosity between Catholic and Protestant, the class struggle between 
landlord and peasant, the ideological differences between political parties, 
or merely the universal disagreements among personalities, for years the 
nationalists suffered for these divisions.  Taking into account the modern 
day borders of the island and its violent 20th century history, it is 
reasonable to conclude that Ireland still suffers from this factionalism; that 
even today the specter of “the other” exists, always too close for comfort.  
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Divided into four parts, Our Lincoln: New Perspectives on Lincoln and His 
World offers new insights into Abraham Lincoln’s life.  Divided between 
Lincoln as President, as the Great Emancipator, as Family Man, and in 
Memory, these essays span from revisionist efforts to wholly new 
contributions to the historiography of Lincoln and the world in which he 
lived. Contributors include such household names as James McPherson and 
Eric Foner as well as names recognizable to specialists of the Civil War Era 
such as David Blight, Mark Neely Jr., Lincoln specialist Harold Holzer, and 
up and comer Manisha Sinha.  Acting in his role as editor, Foner excels 
illustrating coherent themes that run through the volume while allowing 
each essay to stand on their own.    
The first two sections of this compilation, “The President” and 
“Great Emancipator,” contained some of the most interesting, illuminating, 
and convincing articles. Leading off part one is James M. McPherson’s “A. 
Lincoln, Commander in Chief.”  Using an interdisciplinary approach of 
studying politics, strategy, and tactics to explore wartime Presidential 
leadership, McPherson seeks to fill the gap left by Lincoln’s biographers—
Lincoln’s relationship with his armies. McPherson argues that Lincoln 
“took a more active, hands-on part in shaping military strategy than 
presidents have done in most other wars.”1  Through his well known 
correspondence pushing McClellan to take the initiative in spring 1862 to 
other lesser known examples of Lincolns prodding his generals, McPherson 
portrays Lincoln as actively espousing his own strategic outlook. The 
hesitancy of his generals troubled Lincoln, especially the commanders of 
the Army of the Potomac, until he finally found his kindred spirit in U.S. 
Grant in 1864.  Anyone who may have heard McPherson speak over the 
past year will recognize this article and recall specific passages if not entire 
pages from his speaking engagements.  If one were to buy this solely for 
McPherson’s article they would be better advised to purchase his recently 
released book length exposition on this topic: Tried by War: Abraham 
Lincoln as Commander in Chief.  
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Anyone interested in Lincoln and his questionable actions in 
relation to the Constitution during the war would benefit from Mark Neely 
Jr.’s article.  Neely argues that while it is widely known that Lincoln was 
attempting to expand his Presidential powers through the suspension of the 
writ of habeas corpus, what has remained unacknowledged is that Supreme 
Court Justice Taney’s Ex parte Merryman decision was also an 
unconstitutional position aimed at increasing the Supreme Court’s power.  
In his zeal Taney had not formulated his argument completely.  His 
“overeager acceptance of the jurisdictional gift of Section 14 of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789” points to the “aggressive nature” of Taney’s rulings and the 
willful expansion of his powers to protect Southern rights that began to 
turn reckless in his Dred Scott decision. 2  Sean Wilentz’s article portrays 
Lincoln as a Whig that “had always been more egalitarian than that of 
other Whigs” and had some Jacksonian tendencies.  While an otherwise 
well argued article, Wilentz does not seem to take into account that 
Lincoln, as a western Whig, may have differed from eastern compatriots 
solely due to regional interests. 
 Part Two begins with an James Oakes’ “Natural Rights, 
Citizenship Rights, States’ Rights, and Black Rights: Another Look at 
Lincoln and Race.”  Historians have long struggled with the issue of 
Lincoln’s racial views. As Oakes points out “The evidence for Lincoln’s 
views on the equality of blacks and whites is hopelessly contradictory.  
String together one set of quotations, and Lincoln comes off as a dyed-in-
the-wool white supremacist.  Compile a different body of evidence, and 
Lincoln reads like the purest of racial egalitarians.”3 Oakes divides Lincoln’s 
views into three levels: constitutional natural rights, privileges and 
immunities of citizenship, and race relations at the local level.  Only this 
third division pertained to matters such as voting, jury duty, and marriage 
that, according to Oakes, Lincoln made “every concession” to “racial 
prejudice”.4  Conversely, according to Oakes, Lincoln consistently upheld 
the natural rights and privileges and immunities of citizenship guaranteed 
to all citizens in the Constitution.  
 In “Lincoln and Colonization,” Foner points out that most 
historians believe Lincoln adhered to Colonization of freed blacks for 
reasons of political pragmatism.  According to this view, he did not want to 
alienate the less radical antislavery members of the Republican Party’s 
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antislavery coalition.  He, therefore, held up the promise of exporting the 
“problem” of freedmen outside of the boundaries of the United States as a 
way to keep potential detractors within his ranks.  For Foner, Lincoln was 
a true believer in colonization.  He demonstrates that the Preliminary 
Emancipation Proclamation contained references to colonization and that 
Lincoln’s embrace of colonization did not reconcile him to opponents of 
emancipation during the elections of 1862.5  Even on New Year’s Eve 1862, 
the day before Emancipation Proclamation was to go into effect, Lincoln 
signed a contract with Bernard Kock to help settle freed blacks on Cow 
Island in the Caribbean and, even though he never spoke publicly of 
colonization after January 1 of 1863, Lincoln continued to look into 
schemes of colonization.  For Foner, Lincoln’s “long embrace of 
colonization suggests that recent historians may have been too quick to 
claim him as a supremely clever politician who secretly but steadfastly 
pursued the goal embodied in the Emancipation Proclamation or as a model 
of political pragmatism in contrast with the fanatical abolitionists. For what 
idea was more utopian and impractical than this fantastic scheme?” 6  As 
Foner argues that, if Lincoln truly was a political pragmatist, he seriously 
misjudged the Border States’ embrace of emancipation, the willingness of 
blacks to leave the country of their birth, and the “intractability of northern 
racism as an obstacle to ending slavery.” 7  
 Foner’s provocative and convincing essay is followed by Manisha 
Sinha’s equally provocative but less convincing “Allies for Emancipation?: 
Lincoln and Black Abolitionists.” Like many historians, Sinha upholds the 
view that Lincoln’s time in the Oval Office changed his perception of his 
role and the conflict’s role in American history.  Moving from a war of 
reunification to a war of emancipation, Lincoln came to see the conflict as 
part of a millennialist divine plan for the nation and the ending of slavery.  
Yet, from this basis she overstates the influence that black abolitionists, 
including Douglass, had upon the president.  It is likely that black 
intellectual leaders of the abolitionist movement influenced Lincoln, but her 
argument does not show a causal link between their influence and Lincoln’s 
views.  In fact, if one was to accept the view of James Oakes’s essay, 
Douglass and other black abolitionists were preaching to the choir.  Her 
essay, like her book The Counterrevolution of Slavery: Politics and Ideology in 
Antebellum South Carolina, seems to garner its main force from the 
restatement of her thesis throughout the work. That, however, does not 
make it convincing.  
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 Part Three of the compilation investigates Lincoln “The Man.”  
This section begins with Andrew Delbanco’s exploration of what meanings 
may have been lost and wrongly attached to Lincoln’s words over past 140 
years.  It is an intriguing read for anyone concerned with the meaning of 
Lincoln’s words in Lincoln’s world. For this reader, most impressive within 
this section is Richard Carwardine’s “Lincoln’s Religion” which traces 
Lincoln’s religious beliefs from his days as an “‘infidel’ politician of the 
1830s” to an evangelical Protestant during his stint in the White House in 
which he looked for signs from God.8  In his early political days in Illinois, 
Lincoln was well aware that religion played a significant role in people’s 
lives as well as their political motivations—different sects usually voted 
certain ways.  Though Lincoln was an inconsistent attendee at Church, he 
garnered a reputation as an ethically earnest person that followed him from 
his early days and into the White House.  Over the next four years, Lincoln 
would transform from that infidel of the 1830s into an intensely religious 
man and, finally, following his assassination, a Christian martyr.  
 Closing out Part III is Catherine Clinton’s “Abraham Lincoln: The 
Family That Made Him, the Family He Made.”  As Clinton establishes that 
we still know very little about his family and those who shaped him, 
especially his mother.  Her intervention, however, has very little to do with 
exploring and speculation on these unknowns.  Instead, she offers the use of 
current scholarship on family honor in southern households to explore 
Lincoln’s “complex personal character.”9  Her exploration holds promise, 
but relies heavily on theories of cause and effect especially in regards to 
Lincoln’s relationship with his mother and his treatment of women 
throughout his life.10  
 The book closes with an article in the vein of recent scholarship 
exploring the memory of the war and its appropriation. David Blight’s “The 
Theft of Lincoln in Scholarship, Politics, and Public Memory” should serve 
as the beginnings of new facets directed towards understanding the 
memory of the war and its leaders in modern society.  For Blight the 
Lincoln myth is just as tenacious as that of the Lost Cause, but maybe a bit 
more malleable. As he points out, the Republican National Committee 
recently has been reminding the electorate that it “is” the “Party of 
Lincoln.” Such claims, Blight points, misrepresent Lincoln’s character and 
the Republican Party’s beliefs of the time period that serve to create a 
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direct, albeit fictitious, tie with the Republican Party of today.11  Other 
examples abound, Blight’s work is an important reminder that it was not 
just the losers of the Civil War that created myths.     
 The strength of this compilation is its holistic approach towards 
Lincoln.  While there are no direct disagreements between scholars within 
the volume, one can draw distinctions between the different approaches, 
interpretations, and uses of sources in the volume.  Despite some 
shortcomings, this volume is a worthy edition to any Civil War scholar’s 
library and has the potential to reopen some old and create some new 
debates.  
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Bayard Rustin’s long and tumultuous life was shrouded in successes and 
setbacks.  John D’Emilio’s book, Lost Prophet: The Life and Times of Bayard 
Rustin, explores these two issues.  D’Emilio explains how leading activists 
such as Martin Luther King and Malcolm X overshadowed Rustin, making 
him a lost prophet.  Rustin’s successes seemed small, but the combination of 
his remarkable gifts and talents, along with the brave supporters of 
America’s radical movements, enabled him to leave his mark on the 
American pacifist tradition, campaigns for economic justice and 
international peace, and the Civil Rights Movement.  However, Rustin’s 
homosexuality and paradoxical silence on the Vietnam War tarnished his 
career.   
 Rustin’s successes stemmed from his early childhood as a Quaker 
with a mother who instilled peace and equality in the community.  When 
Rustin became an active member of the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) 
and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), he quickly became renowned 
as a remarkable orator.  Dave McReynolds, a UCLA student, attended one 
of Rustin’s lectures in the late 1940s and said, “You would see people with 
tears coming out of their eyes.  He could respond to a group or get in touch 
with them because he was a likeable creative person.”1  His ability to 
influence and accumulate admirers was inspiring.  Nevertheless, Rustin’s 
ideas, modeled after those of Gandhi, and his superb speaking skills 
followed him to prison from 1944 to 1946.  However, unwilling to fight, 
Rustin and many other nonviolent activists refused to serve their country 
in World War II.  Those who declined the draft were sentenced to prison.  
While Rustin’s imprisonment initially seemed to have been a setback, it 
proved to be a stepping stone to his success.  His pacifist ideas helped push 
for desegregation in Lewisburg Federal Penitentiary.  Rustin acquired a 
number of followers within Lewisburg, and some of these supporters would 
provide assistance for future protests.  During these two years, correctional 
officers kept an attentive eye on Rustin.  He began to lead strikes where 
black inmates refused to leave their cells for work assignment, recreation, 
and meals.  Most of Rustin’s protests within the jail received recognition 
from people within and outside the walls of the penitentiary.           
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 Several years before the Montgomery Bus Boycott and a few years 
after Rustin’s release from prison, he and George Houser devised a plan to 
abolish the racial segregation on the public transit system.  The Journey of 
Reconciliation, Rustin and Houser called it, included an array of groups like 
CORE, FOR, NAACP, WRL, and veteran COs.  After twelve arrests, due 
to the Journey of Reconciliation, thousands of black and white Southerners 
engaged in discussion about the Jim Crow laws.  Rustin and Houser’s 
attempt to bring desegregation to the public sphere worked.  The Baltimore 
Afro-American newspaper reported, their movement “knocked several props 
from beneath the already tottering Jim Crow structure.”2  Also, the Journey 
of Reconciliation achieved a high profile in black press, seeping the model of 
nonviolent action further into the consciousness of African Americans.   
 However, seventy-five years of setbacks seemed to outweigh 
Rustin’s successes.  During a time in American history when segregation 
and inequality towards blacks was prevalent, Rustin also endured criticisms 
for being a homosexual.  D’Emilio explains that Rustin’s first problem with 
his sexuality was in Lewisburg Penitentiary.  One officer observed Rustin 
with another inmate, saying, “sitting with different other inmates, his arms 
around them, rubbing their legs and other parts of their bodies, while 
rubbing his cheek against theirs.”3  Another officer observed Rustin 
“walking around the yard with his arms around several different inmates, in 
a very loving and personal manner.”4  On August 18, 1945 two inmates 
described to Captain Huntington an incident in which Rustin was caught 
performing oral sex on another inmate behind a curtain on the stage of the 
prison auditorium.  Rustin’s denial and eventual confession of the ordeal 
created conflict within his prison movements.  The once admired pacifist 
was now shrouded in suspicion and disgust.  After learning about Rustin’s 
betrayal, Abraham Muste, leader of the FOR, sent him a harsh letter, 
saying, “You have been guilty of gross misconduct, specially reprehensible 
in a person making claims to leadership.”5  After his release in June 1946, 
Rustin found himself in trouble again because of his sexuality.  Davis Platt, 
his lover for several years, kicked Rustin out of the house because of his 
sexual escapades became unbearable.  A few years later, in January of 1953, 
after a lecture at the American Association of University Women at the 
Pasadena Athletic Club, police caught Rustin performing oral sex on two 
young men in a parked car.  Yet again, Rustin was imprisoned and his 
creditability was severely damaged.  Near the end of Rustin’s life he “lost” 
his voice precisely when the most potent anti-war movement in modem 
American history crested.   Rustin’s conspicuous record as a pacifist puzzled 
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activists since he did not play a major role in the Vietnam-era antiwar 
movement.   
 At the outset of his book, D’Emilio stresses that Rustin’s ideas and 
movements were relative obscure in the popular memory of the Civil Rights 
Movement.  Yet, Rustin paved the way for the Civil Rights Movement in 
the 1960s.  His pacifist ideas may have been radical to the public eye, but 
the combination of Rustin’s remarkable gifts and talents crept into future 
civil rights activists.  Rustin left a profound mark on the Civil Rights 
Movement with his lectures, penitentiary movements, bus boycotts, and 
assistance in the development of Martin Luther King’s movement.  
E’Dmilio agrees, noting that “Rustin was as responsible as anyone else for 
the insinuation of nonviolence into the very heart of what became the most 
powerful social movement in twentieth-century America.”6  Rustin’s career 
of pacifism and conservatism helped define the Civil Rights Movement.    
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Historians incorporate interdisciplinary approaches to history with various 
degrees of intensity and effectiveness.  Is the historical discipline a social 
science or is it confined solely within the humanities?  Historians find 
numerous answers to this question.  Perhaps hesitant to admit, historians 
rely on interdisciplinary approaches regardless of their methodological 
biases.  Sandra Ott’s War, Judgment, and Memory in the Basque Borderlands 
offers another work to bring together various approaches into what can be 
defined as broad historical research in a specific regional locale.  Ott’s book 
is a regional study that effectively integrates larger national trends.  While 
combining heavy doses of anthropology, social history, and cultural history, 
Ott examines a minute Basque community nestled in Southern France 
within the Western Pyrenees: Xiberoa (Soule in French).7  Ott argues that 
Xiberoans carried defined terms of social and cultural legitimacy through 
judicial and behavioral judgments in wartime experiences, including 
occupation and resistance among others.  Ott defines these social and 
cultural dynamics as a moral community: “distinctions between insiders and 
outsiders defined the boundaries of the moral community in spatial and 
linguistic terms, in social and symbolic acts, in customary law, in trans-
Pyrenean treaties, and in popular culture. Membership in a moral 
community entailed a shared habitus, compliance with certain moral codes 
and behavioral norms, and validation by public opinion.”8  Thus, Ott 
employs these techniques within Xiberoan experiences during wartime 
(both World Wars) and how these experiences shaped their identity in the 
years after, including memory. 
 Divided into thirteen chapters, Ott produces a solid organizational 
structure to the book.  Chapters one and two trace relational developments 
Xiberoa’s diverse social makeup.  Xiberoa’s inhabitants shared “long-
standing traditions of trans-Pyrenean migration, immigration, and human 
displacement […] although Xiberoa was relatively isolated geographically, 
even its most secluded inhabitants had contacts with the world around 
them.”9  Moreover, it is here that Ott establishes the moral community, 
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formulated, in part, from anthropological structures developed by Pierre 
Bourdieu.  Despite the traditions of contact between diverse social groups, 
Ott argues that Xiberoans formulated their communities around “house” 
inhabitants and strangers, or simply those who emigrated from abroad.10  , 
Ott shows that Xiberoans carried a strong regional identity into the Great 
War, the Second World War, and beyond.   
 Ott supports these conclusions about local identity within the 
context of war.  Echoing much of Eugen Weber’s ground-breaking work 
Peasants Into Frenchmen, Ott explores Xiberoan obstinacy, reluctance, and 
difficulty in defining themselves as “Frenchmen” during the Great War.11 
Wartime desertion or conscription evasion proved a common feature within 
Xiberoan communities.  For those who did serve on the Western front, 
language difficulty proved an immense problem for Xiberoans.  French 
military leaders used this to their advantage by promoting regional identity 
within the military.  For example, military leaders created competitions 
between Bretons and Xiberoans—either group would attempt to prove 
their physical superiority on the battlefield.12  During the Interwar period, 
class conflict over returned veterans, commune workers, and factory 
owners dominated Xiberoan communities.  Ott shows that Xiberoan 
communities proved dynamic and abrasive, which resulted, at least in part, 
by the combination of regional and newly conceived notions of national 
identity.  
 The central chapters emphasize Xiberoan’s experience under 
Vichy rule and German occupation.  Xiberoan authorities, coupled with 
public sentiment, generally supported Pétain’s Vichy in the early stages of 
the Second World War.  However, Ott shows that Xiberoans became 
discontent with the status quo.  Although many Xiberoans displayed 
conservative tendencies, Ott argues that Xiberoans displayed sentiments 
more closely aligned with xenophobic tendencies, although Ott never 
employs the term.  Perhaps a more appropriate observation shows that 
Ott’s analysis relies heavily on ideology.  Xiberoan communities, from the 
outset of Spanish Civil War refugees, were characterized as largely hostile 
towards communist affiliates.  Authorities in Béarn, the province bordering 
Xiberoa to the east, constructed the important Gurs concentration camp in 
the late 1930s, which held nearly nineteen-thousand prisoners at its height 
including communists and Jews.  Anti-Semitism, however, proved a 
relatively quiet issue, at least presented by Ott.  Again, ideology takes 
precedence in this analysis.13  Important for Ott is the way the moral 
community challenged Xiberoan communities through complaisance, 
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resistance, and denunciation, especially the latter two.  The moral 
community, through human communication, rumor, and imagination, 
proved highly malleable in these situations.   
 Ott finishes the book with an exploration of divided memories.  
Commemoration, through ritual and communication, played an important 
role in understanding the Xiberoan experience.  Such issues surfaced as late 
as 2004 with the sixtieth anniversary of Xiberoan resistance.  As Ott shows, 
such commemorations proved highly contentious for current inhabitants 
and remaining survivors.  Family members and supporters of distinct 
resistance groups—Secret Army, CFP, FTP, International Brigade, and 
Guérilleros—all vied for adequate representation in public 
commemorations.14  Moreover, each group, or rather its representatives, 
asserted their long-established traditions and values within the structure of 
the moral community.  Divisions within the moral community remained 
well intact into the twenty-first century. 
 Ott concludes that Xiberoa’s moral community remained divided 
through its experiences before, during, and after wartime.  Even though 
resistance groups coalesced during German occupation, Xiberoans were 
torn over how each represented themselves and conducted their resistance.  
In other words, conceptions of the moral community were never fully 
integrated and unified.15  Ott’s analysis proves intriguing and important for 
our understanding of regional and national identity.  Ott suggest that 
regional identities operate over national identity, at least in this case.  
Divisions apparent before the world wars remained within Xiberoa’s moral 
community.  Expanding from past works, like Weber’s Peasants and 
Gildea’s Marianne in Chains, Ott expands our understanding of 
regional/national dynamics and argues that these go well beyond the 
nineteenth and twentieth-centuries.  Ott integrates archival research, 
memoirs, and a strong emphasis on local enthographic fieldwork into a 
well-balanced and nuanced study.  At times, Ott fails to adequately address 
how these sources mesh and support one another.  Oral testimony in 2004 
can be quite contentious for events that originate at the turn of the 
nineteenth-century.  It is difficult to see how one can make such 
connections without an adequate explanation which is lacking in this study.  
Critics of anthropological studies may latch on to this fact.  Regardless, Ott 
should be commended for making broader connections between the past 
and present and between the region and nation.  Expanding our 
understanding of such social and cultural complexities proves an asset for 
historians attempting to bridge memory with the past.                  
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In her preface, Kathryn Bard states the impetus for writing this book was 
that there was “no one text that covered everything … in a comprehensive 
survey.”1  Attempting to incorporate everything she ever “wanted to know 
about ancient Egypt” when first beginning her study, Bard’s first three 
chapters include the background necessary to understand the survey of 
Egyptian archaeology and history.2  These initial chapters focus on the 
ecology, geography, and natural resources available in Egypt.  The 
following seven chapters offer a detailed analysis of Egyptian archaeology 
on a chronological foundation beginning with the Paleolithic, around 
500,000 years ago, and extending through the Greco-Roman Period.  
While textbooks on Egyptian history discuss the archaeology to 
supplement the history, Bard explicates the history based in, and extracted 
from, the archaeology of Egypt, not the other way around. Throughout the 
book, Bard narrates a thoroughly detailed and thoughtful history of Egypt.  
Bard devotes the final chapter to a summary of the current applications and 
potential implications of ancient Egyptian archaeology.  In keeping with 
her stated goal of writing a textbook designed for classroom, Bard includes 
a set of chapter summaries and review questions in the back.  Finally, Bard 
provides a glossary of terms as well as an extensive “suggested readings” 
list. 
  Bard discusses Egyptian history from an archaeological point of 
view, and utilizes an assortment of tools to aid the reader.  She presents the 
panorama of Egyptian historical periods, which are derived from cultural 
and political considerations based on the important remains dating from 
that period.  In the section on the pyramid of King Khufu at Giza, Bard 
provides a detailed map of the Giza Pyramid Complex.3  The map includes 
the three largest pyramids built by Khufu, Khafre and Menkaure, and the 
excavated subsidiary buildings such as mortuary temples, workers’ quarters 
and the boat pits.  Bard gives illuminating descriptions of the buildings and 
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artifacts.   She goes into ever-increasing detail on the excavations at Giza 
and finally explores the statues discovered at the various parts of the site.4   
 One of the most impressive works of art in the ancient world 
originates from the Giza Pyramid Complex. The life-size statue of King 
Menkaura and his wife Khamerernebty II is shown in Plate 6.5.  Bard notes 
that the statue bears traces of the original paint, so what we see today is a 
dull reflection of the original. Bard notes that fifteen statuettes of the king 
existed at various stages of completion. Indeed, the pyramid itself was not 
completed.  This king was the last to build at Giza and his pyramid is tiny 
compared to his father’s and grandfather’s.5  She further comments that the 
incomplete pyramid, royal statuettes, and the relatively small size of 
Menkaura’s pyramid point to possible economic difficulties, changes in the 
religious practices of the time, or space on the Giza plateau.  While 
discussions of the current debates in Egyptian archaeology are outside the 
primary purpose of her book, Bard believes the value of including such 
material, if only in passing.  This analysis of the implications for Egyptian 
cultural, social and political history is founded on the examination of the 
excavated objects.  The archaeological discoveries spotlight the content of 
the book.   
 To the student of ancient Egypt, justification for its study seems 
superfluous. Nonetheless, in chapter eleven Bard spends some time and 
effort illustrating the applications of Egyptology to other questions and 
problems which lie outside the scope of ancient Egyptian studies.  For 
example, ancient Egypt provides both material remains and textual 
evidence for the “earliest large territorial state” which “unlike most early 
states…was a stable one, in existence for over 800 years, from Dynasty 0 to 
the end of the Old Kingdom.”6  One such link is the study of the unification 
of Egypt which illuminates the study of primary state formation. 
 Another example of the applications of archaeology is that it yields 
information on environmental problems pertinent to the present day.  Bard 
notes that over its long history, Egypt became increasingly arid.  The way 
the Egyptian government and people reacted to, or failed to react to, these 
environmental changes remains of great interest to modern researchers. 
 Comparing this textbook to others in the field would be useful.  
However, as John Baines states on the back cover, no other scholarly 
introduction to Egyptian archaeology exits that was also intended for 
classroom use.  One might compare Bard’s text with Nicholas Grimal’s A 
History of Ancient Egypt, which presents Egyptian history as a coherent 
narrative but does not generally link the history with archaeology in such a 
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direct way.7  While Bard’s text emphasizes the archaeology, she makes a 
clear connection with the history. Bard has filled the need for a single text 
integrating Egyptian archaeology and history into a pedagogically useful 
textbook while maintaining a scholarly approach to the subject matter. 
 Bard’s discussion of the influence of Ancient Egypt on modern day 
fiction and cinema represents a potential point of contestation regarding the 
relevance of present-day pop-culture and archaeology. Her rationale was 
that Egyptian archaeology and archaeologists exert an important influence 
on society as a whole today.  It has the beneficial effect of encouraging the 
general public’s interest in ancient Egypt.  Movies such as The Mummy 
series, though obviously intended to entertain and not inform, opened the 
door to more accurate portrayals of Ancient Egyptian society. Indeed, a 
Hollywood rendition of Cleopatra stirred the first interest in Egyptian 
history and archaeology in the author of this review. 
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